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ABSTRACT 
“OBSCENE FANTASIES”: ELFRIEDE JELINEK’S GENERIC PERVERSIONS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2009 
 
BRENDA L. BETHMAN, B.A., DICKINSON COLLEGE 
 
M.A., TEMPLE UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Sara Lennox 
 
This dissertation examines Elfriede Jelinek’s investigation of Austria’s and 
Western Europe’s “obscene fantasies” through her “perversion” of generic forms 
in three of her best-known texts (Die Liebhaberinnen, Lust, and Die Klavierspielerin). 
It also investigates how these texts, at first glance less overtly political than 
Jelinek’s later work, can be seen as laying the groundwork for her later, more 
political, analysis of Austrian fascism and racism. The dissertation is composed 
of three chapters; each investigates a central psychoanalytic concept (alienation, 
jouissance, perversion and sublimation) and reads a Jelinek text in relation to the 
genre that it is perverting, exposing the “obscene fantasies” that lie at its heart. 
Chapter One examines how Jelinek depicts alienation (in the Marxist, 
socialist feminist, and Lacanian senses) in her 1975 novel Die Liebhaberinnen, and 
explores how Jelinek’s depiction of alienation functions to make Die 
 viii 
 
Liebhaberinnen an anti-romance. Chapter Two addresses whether Jelinek’s novel 
Lust (1989) is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. I investigate the complex 
relationship between aesthetics and pornography, arguing that many other 
Jelinek scholars collapse the distinction between mass-cultural forms of 
pornography and the high-cultural pornography of Bataille and Sade, and thus 
fail to understand how her text is simultaneously pornographic and anti-
pornographic. Chapter Three focuses on Jelinek’s novel Die Klavierspielerin (1983), 
examining the development of its protagonist as a (perverse) sexual subject, and 
her ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual position and how Jelinek’s text 
perverts the genre of the Künstlerroman. It also discusses Erika’s training as a 
pianist as a possible causal factor of her perversions and lack of sexual identity, 
concluding that her inability to sublimate demonstrates the similarities (and 
differences) between the artist and the pervert, illustrating how Jelinek’s novel 
deviates from the traditional Künstlerroman. 
The dissertation argues that the disruption of genres is one of Jelinek’s 
most significant literary contributions, her works functioning to create a 
“negative aesthetics” as opposed to a positive reworking of generic forms. 
Jelinek rejects an identificatory mode of writing and refuses to create “positive” 
subjects, preferring instead to produce art that is a “critique of praxis as the rule 
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of brutal self-preservation at the heart of the status quo” (Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory, 12). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Der Fall Fritzl 
In April 2008, world news was dominated by headlines concerning the 
Fritzl Case. It emerged that Josef Fritzl of Amstetten in the Austrian province of 
Lower Austria had been holding his daughter captive in their basement for 24 
years (beginning in 1984) and had fathered seven children with her (for more 
details on the Fritzl case, see Jüttner). In the wake of the scandal, speculation also 
centered around Fritzl’s wife, whose claim of having known nothing many 
related to the Austrians’ collective failure to “know nothing” about what the 
Nazis were doing in the 1930s and 1940s. As Austrian novelist Josef Haslinger 
pointed out to The Australian: “There is this pretty, shiny surface that Austrians 
like to show, but it hides a monstrosity . . . On the surface we have moral 
standards and enlightened policies, but in the background we have this perverse 
world that nobody wants to talk about” (Campbell). 
It is precisely this “perverse world,” or what Slavoj Žižek identifies as 
Austria’s “obscene fantasies,” that the work of Elfriede Jelinek investigates. As 
Žižek puts it: 
For decades, Jelinek was uncompromisingly describing the 
violence of men against women in all its modalities, including 
women’s own libidinal complicity in their victimization. 
Without mercy, she was bringing to light obscene fantasies 
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that underlie the Middle European respectability, fantasies 
which crawled into public space in the Fritzl affair which 
effectively has the unreality of a ‘bad’ fairy tale (Žižek; see 
also Robertson, for a discussion of the ways in which “Fritzl 
existed in literature before he existed in life”). 
 
In this dissertation, I examine Jelinek’s investigation of Austria’s and Western 
Europe’s “obscene fantasies” through her “perversion” of generic forms. In this 
introduction, I will first give a brief overview of Jelinek’s biography and the 
reception of her work in order to place my work in context. 
Elfriede Jelinek: A Brief Introduction 
Elfriede Jelinek was born on October 20, 1946 in Mürzzuschlag, Styria in 
Austria. Her father was a working-class Czechoslovakian Jewish socialist and her 
mother was a bourgeois Austrian Catholic. Jelinek grew up mostly in Vienna, 
where she attended kindergarten, grade school, and high school. While at high 
school, she also studied organ, piano and flute at the Vienna Conservatory, and 
in 1971 she completed examinations as an organist at the Conservatory. After 
high school she studied dramatics and art history at the University of Vienna, but 
she gave up her studies after six terms. Since 1966 Jelinek has lived and worked 
as a freelance author in Vienna, Munich and Paris, marrying Gottfried 
Hüngsberg in 1974. Until 1991 Jelinek was a member of the Communist Party 
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(for further biographical information on Jelinek, see: Fiddler, Rewriting, 1-8 & 10-
11). 
As an author Jelinek is not only productive, but also versatile. Her 
writings encompass almost all literary genres. She has written poetry, novels, 
radio plays, dramas, essays, television and film scripts, and also a libretto, Robert, 
der Teufel (Robert the Devil). She has also translated novels by Thomas Pynchon 
and dramas by George Feydeau and Eugène Labiche. She is the recipient of 
many prizes, including the 2004 Nobel Prize for Literature, which was awarded 
in recognition of her “musical flow of voices and counter-voices in novels and 
plays that, with extraordinary linguistic zeal, reveal the absurdity of society’s 
clichés and their subjugating power” (“Nobel Prize”). 
Jelinek’s Reception: Jelinek as a “Political” Writer 
Jelinek is often read as a “political” writer thanks to her self-proclaimed 
Marxism and feminism. At the same time, however, others view her as a 
“postmodern” author, thus leading Allyson Fiddler to pose in her 1994 essay, 
“There Goes That Word Again, or Elfriede Jelinek and Postmodernism,” what 
she considered to be “something of a ‘Gretchenfrage’ of our time, namely, where 
does Elfriede Jelinek stand on the question of postmodernism, or rather . . . what 
position, if any, do her texts occupy within the postmodern debate on literature? 
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Can Jelinek’s writing be called postmodernist?” (“There Goes. . .” 129). Part of 
my intention in this dissertation is to expand this discussion beyond the either/or 
dichotomy that categorizes much of the discussion regarding Jelinek’s politics. 
A survey of the critical literature leaves no doubt that many scholars view 
Jelinek as either a Marxist or socialist feminist. 1 Fiddler, for example, describes 
Jelinek as a “Marxist-feminist” (Rewriting, 12), and in the article cited above, 
answers her “Gretchenfrage” in the negative, maintaining instead that Jelinek is 
located “firmly within the older, Modernist tradition,”2
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will use the terms “Marxist feminism” and 
“socialist feminism” interchangeably, for as Rosemarie Tong points out, it is difficult to 
distinguish between Marxist and socialist feminism. Tong goes on to state that she has come to 
view the differences between them as “more a matter of emphasis than of substance” (94). For 
example, Marxist feminists often “identify classism rather than sexism as the ultimate cause of 
women’s oppression,” while socialist feminists “insist the fundamental cause of women’s 
oppression is neither ‘classism’ nor ‘sexism’ but an intricate interplay between capitalism and 
patriarchy” (Tong, 94). Both Marxist and socialist feminists, however, share the conviction that 
“women’s oppression is not the result of individuals’ intentional actions but is the product of the 
political, social, and economic structures within which individuals live” (Tong, 94). 
 due to her “adherence to 
certain ‘metanarratives’—such as Marxism and feminism” (“There Goes. . .” 144). 
2 For a definition of an “older, Modernist tradition,” see Callari and Ruccio, who explain: 
“As a modernist discourse, classical Marxism was characterized by two mutually supporting 
forces: the protocols of scientism and a nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century notion of 
progress . . . Marxism tended to deny the ‘constitutive’ (as opposed to a ‘supportive’) role it 
played in the shaping of history and to believe that it was merely ‘revealing’ a predetermined 
historical trajectory. Its belief in notions of progress . . . certified the inevitability of social change, 
and this, in turn, supported the notion that the laws of history could be discovered scientifically” 
(11). As I shall make clear in this dissertation, Jelinek’s texts cannot be exclusively located within 
a classical, Modernist tradition of Marxism, as her work clearly posits neither the “inevitability of 
social change” nor a “belief in notions of progress.” 
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In the same collection in which Fiddler’s essay appeared, Linda DeMeritt also 
argues for a view of Jelinek as a Marxist feminist, citing Jelinek as an example of 
a writer whose “main theme is the submission of everyone, regardless of sex, to 
the accumulation of capital and their resultant alienation,” (115) and who 
“effectively advances both the marxist and feminist battle” (125). Other examples 
of scholars who position Jelinek within a Marxist/socialist feminist framework 
are: Rudolf Burger (21), Jacqueline Vansant (5), Dagmar Lorenz (111), and 
Marlies Janz, who uses the term materialist, rather than Marxist or socialist, 
feminist, but who nonetheless believes that Jelinek’s materialist feminist 
orientation has been falsely assessed in Jelinek criticism (vii).3
                                                 
3 In Janz’s view, the reason for the lack of convincing interpretations of Jelinek’s work lies 
“nicht nur in der Schwierigkeit des Werks, sondern auch in der anhaltenden Verkennung Jelineks 
als politischer Autorin. So wird wohl ihr Feminismus als auch ihre Situierung im Kontext von 
Poststrukturalismus und Postmoderne zumeist falsch eingeschätzt, weil ihre marxistischen 
Orientierungen ausgeblendet werden. Diesen aber ist Jelinek bei allen scheinbaren bzw. 
partiellen Annäherungen an Verfahrensweisen von Poststrukturalismus und Postmoderne bis 
heute verpflichtet. Die satirischen Mythendestruktionen, die ihr Werk mit wechselnden 
Gegenständen und sich ausdifferenzierdenden ästhetischen Verfahrensweisen leistet, sind stets 
bezogen auf ihre materialistischen Gesellschaftsanalysen und verstehen sich als aufklärerische 
Ideologiekritik” (vii) [“not just in the difficulty of the work, but also in the continual failure to 
recognize Jelinek as a political author. For this reason her feminism, as well as her location in the 
context of postmodernism and poststructuralism, is for most part falsely assessed, because her 
Marxist orientation is not taken into account. Jelinek, however, continues to be indebted to 
Marxism, despite all of her partial approaches to postmodern or poststructuralist methods. The 
satirical destruction of myth, which her work achieves with varying objects and sophisticated 
aesthetic methods, is always related to her material analysis of society, and can be understood as 
an Enlightenment ideology critique” (my translation)]. While I find Janz’s work to be a refreshing 
change from the either/or dichotomy (that is, a forced choice between Marxism and 
poststructuralism) that often characterizes the reception of Jelinek, her dependence on Barthes’ 
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Lorenz’s article cited above is a good example of how a reliance on solely 
Marxist feminist categories can produce a one-sided reading of Jelinek, as her 
focus on Jelinek’s Marxist feminism leads her to declare that Jelinek’s “works 
focus on sexual politics, the socioeconomic plight of women to which she 
subordinates the theme of the female body and sexuality” (111). It should be 
clear to anyone who has read Die Liebhaberinnen, Die Klavierspielerin, Lust or Clara 
S. (to name just a few) that Jelinek deals with the theme of the female body and 
sexuality in her work. Indeed, the novel that Lorenz is analyzing (Die 
Ausgesperrten) also treats of female sexuality in the figure of Anna and her 
attempt to define herself as both an intellectual and a woman, something 
Jelinek’s text makes explicit, when, during a sexual encounter with Hans, Anna 
realizes that her intellectual skills are of no interest to Hans and also that her 
identity as an intellectual woman is separate from her sexuality: 
Dafür hab ich jetzt den ganzen Sartre in meiner Freizeit 
gelesen, das ganze Sein und das ganze Nichts, schießt es ihr 
durch den Kopf, während sie aus der Unterhose steigt. Und 
jetzt kann ich gar nichts damit anfangen. Ich könnte 
genausogut eine sein, die niemals irgendetwas gelesen hat 
außer Bravo. Mehr ist hier nicht vonnöten. Daß sie das 
durchschaut, unterscheidet sie schon wieder von den 
                                                                                                                                                 
work on myth to read Jelinek limits, in my opinion, her otherwise insightful interpretations of 
Jelinek’s work. 
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Millionen anderer Mädchen, äußerlich sieht Hans aber leider 
nur eine wie eine Million andere auch (A, 89).4
Another problem with the classifying of Jelinek as either a Marxist or 
socialist feminist is that her interpreters often simply “take her word for it” by 
quoting one of her many interviews (see for example Jelinek, “Wut,” 89; and 
Sauter, 110), or citing her membership in the Communist Party (which she left in 
1991), as “proof” of her Marxism and/or feminism. But, as Imke Meyer has 
pointed out: 
 
It is not methodologically sound, in the majority of instances, 
to ascribe, while concerned with the interpretation of literary 
texts, the same significance to the elements that comprise the 
texts as to the facts that comprise the author’s life. Rather, a 
distinction between, for instance, a narrative voice created in 
prose fiction on the one hand and the voice of the author of 
that fictitious text on the other seems appropriate. If such 
distinctions are not made, potential pitfalls occur. For 
instance, a creative intention that an author expresses in an 
interview, might, without further investigation, be 
understood as having become fully realized in a given literary 
text. However, this need not necessarily be the case, and it 
seems, therefore, that if one wants to avoid potentially 
reductive readings of literary texts, one should not let one’s 
analysis be guided by an author’s expressed intentions (123). 
                                                 
4 “is this why I read the whole of Sartre in my spare time, all about Being and about 
Nothingness? What use is it to me now? I might just as well be a girl who’s never read anything 
but Bravo. You don’t need any more for this. The fact that she perceives this distinguishes her 
from millions of other girls, but on the outside Hans, alas, only sees a girl the same as a million 
others” (Wonderful, 85). 
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Following Meyer’s advice, what I will demonstrate in this dissertation is that, 
despite Jelinek’s personal political commitment to Marxism, there is something 
in her work that goes beyond Marxism and that we need to add psychoanalysis 
to our interpretative “tool kit” in order to read femininity in these texts. To assist 
in this effort, I draw on the work of those scholars to attempt to forge a middle 
ground in this debate, such as Brigid Haines and Margaret Littler, who view 
Jelinek’s work as exemplified by a “complexity” that “arise[s] from a basic three-
way tension between the Marxist, feminist, and post-structuralist aspects” of her 
work, and who see that tension as “continu[ing] to trouble and enrich Jelinek 
research” (40). 
Thus my position on this “debate” is similar to that of Haines and Littler, 
but has also been influenced by Verena Mayer’s and Roland Koberg’s argument 
that because Jelinek as a private citizen is politically engaged, Jelinek the writer 
does not necessarily feel the need to write unambiguously engaged literature, 
but instead reserves for herself the “right to art,” (Mayer and Koberg, 9), as well 
as by Matthias Konzett’s contention that the political import of Jelinek’s work lies 
in its investigation of Austria as symptom. He views that as taking place in two 
ways: 
1) as a case study of symptomatic expression of crisis in 
postwar affluent Western societies informed by legacies of 
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colonialism, racism, and Eurocentric claims to cultural 
supremacy; and 2) as a site of jouissance and perverse pleasure 
won from this symptomatic site of corruption and decadence . 
. . In this latter version, hyperbole rules and brings comic 
relief to the forces of repression that sustain the symptom as a 
camouflage of illness. The illness is finally allowed to 
resurface as illness (Konzett, 8-9). 
 
Konzett further views Jelinek’s work after 1991 (beginning with her play about 
Heidigger and Hannah Arendt, Totenauberg) as becoming more directly political 
in its engagement with the Holocaust, xenophobia, sport, the Iraq war, etc. 
(Konzett, 13-14).5
Agreeing with this position, I would argue that the works I read in this 
dissertation (written between 1975 and 1989) are political in Konzett’s second 
sense insofar as they investigate Austria as a “site of jouissance and perverse 
pleasure,” and that depict the symptom and the illness of Austria society. They 
do so in ways that seem less clearly political at first glance, first through their 
insistent focus on male-female relations. If Ingeborg Bachmann was correct when 
she claimed that “Der Faschismus ist der erste in der Beziehung zwischen einem 
 
                                                 
5 Here it is interesting to note that 1991 was the year that Jelinek left the Communist 
Party. Perhaps she felt the need to be more political in her work once she was no longer publicly 
affiliated with the Party. 
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Mann und einer Frau,” (Bachmann, 144)6
The second way in which these texts can be viewed as political is through 
Jelinek’s “negative aesthetics” (in the form of rewriting or negating familiar low- 
and high-culture genres).
 then these works, while at first glance 
less overtly political than Jelinek’s later work, could be seen as laying the 
groundwork for her later, more political, analysis of fascism and racism in 
Austria. 
7
In my reading of Jelinek, I have chosen to focus on the feminist corner of 
what Sture Packalén, in an article on the Nobel Prize website, calls her “triangle,” 
 Working with generic forms, she focuses on types 
instead of characters with individual identities and this is also where we can 
most clearly see that Konzett is correct when he argues that “Historical 
specificity . . . is often hard to detect in Jelinek” (Konzett, 20). Thus, for example, 
Brigitte and Paula in Die Liebhaberinnen do not necessarily represent what life 
was “really” like for women in provincial Austria in the 1970s, but instead 
function as a canvas on which Jelinek paints her version of the romance novel. 
                                                 
6 “Fascism is the first thing in the relationship between a man and a woman” (my 
translation). 
7 I will return to the question of a “negative aesthetics” in the conclusion. For now, I offer 
this definition from Hendrik Birus’s reading of Adorno: “Art must be negative in order to ‘bear 
witness to the negativity of social existence’ (Adorno, GS, 14:52, Birus’s translation)” (141). 
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a triangle “whose corners point in three different directions: towards a feminist 
perspective, a Nazi past and the contemporary political arena” (“Elfriede Jelinek: 
Provocation as the Breath of Life”). 
Generic Perversions 
The definition of genre that I use in this dissertation comes from Frederic 
Jameson, who defines genres in his book The Political Unconscious as “essentially 
literary institutions, or social contracts between a writer and a specific public, 
whose function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact” (106, 
emphasis in original). Additionally, Anne Cranny-Francis in Feminist Fictions 
argues that “feminist generic fiction . . . is a radical revision of conservative genre 
texts, which critically evaluates the ideological significance of textual 
conventions and of fiction as a discursive practice. At times this interrogation 
may transform the feminist text into a virtual parody of the genre” (9-10). The 
Jelinek texts that I read in this dissertation are parodies of genres that perform a 
materialist critique of the genres being parodied. 
Similarly, Jelinek’s “generic perversions” reveal the ways that genres 
work to cover up the lack that subjects experience due to the subject’s entry into 
the symbolic order. In this dissertation, I examine the ways that both popular 
culture generic forms (the romance novel and pornography) and a “high” culture 
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form (the Künstlerroman) work to convince the reader that lack does not exist. In 
the case of the Künstlerroman, I draw on the work of Julia Kristeva, who, in her 
book on Colette, notes that through sublimation, “a certain subject is constructed, 
one who lacks nothing, in fact, except that he lacks a lack” (161). The 
Künstlerroman, in its staging of sublimation, thus works to produce a subject who 
does not lack. Similarly, romance novels posit that the heroine’s love relationship 
will make her whole, while pornography depicts the myth of phallic jouissance 
that will allow the sexual relationship to exist. 
Popular generic fiction thus functions on the level of the imaginary, 
operating “on a metaphysics of wholeness, on the illusory identification of the 
subject with a unified body,” as Thomas Beebee notes in The Ideology of Genre 
(16), while the Künstlerroman fosters an illusion of wholeness through 
sublimation. Jelinek perverts each of these genres by showing us the lacks that do 
exist outside of them and exposing as myth that imaginary wholeness. 
Introduction to Chapters 
The dissertation is composed of three chapters, which are tied together 
insofar as each chapter investigates a central psychoanalytic concept (alienation, 
jouissance, perversion & sublimation) and reads a Jelinek text in relation to the 
genre that it is perverting, thus exposing the “obscene fantasies” that lie at the 
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heart of the genre. In the case of chapter one on Die Liebhaberinnen and alienation, 
the concept is investigated in relation to its use in other theories (Marxism, 
socialist feminism); that is not the case in the other two chapters. 
The chapters do not follow the chronological order of the texts examined. 
Instead I start with Die Liebhaberinnen, which is followed by Lust and then Die 
Klavierspielerin (Die Liebhaberinnen was written in 1975, Die Klavierspielerin in 1983, 
and Lust in 1989). I chose this order for two reasons. First, as Allyson Fiddler has 
noted, it makes sense to place the chapter on Lust directly after the chapter on Die 
Liebhaberinnen because Lust can be seen a companion piece to Die Liebhaberinnen. 
While Die Liebhaberinnen looks at romance and courtship, Lust shows us what 
happens after the “happy end” of marriage is achieved (“Reading,” 298-99). They 
are also both set in provincial Austria as compared to Vienna in Die 
Klavierspielerin 
Secondly, the order makes sense in terms of generic groupings: romance 
and pornography are both popular culture genres with roots in the eighteenth 
century, while the Künstlerroman is a “high” culture genre with roots in the 
nineteenth century. It was also during the nineteenth century that the piano 
became the “instrument of the century” (Plantinga, 1). 
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Chapter One, “Housewife or Shop Girl? Alienation and (Anti-) Romance 
in Die Liebhaberinnen” examines the ways that Jelinek depicts alienation (in the 
Marxist, socialist feminist, and Lacanian senses) in her 1975 novel Die 
Liebhaberinnen, arguing that while Die Liebhaberinnen can be read as a Marxist 
and/or socialist feminist text, depicting both alienation from labor and sexuality 
in the Marxist and socialist feminist uses of the term, it also can benefit from a 
linguistically-based psychoanalytic reading. 
Following a discussion of Marxist and socialist feminist alienation, I then 
turn to an analysis of alienation in the Lacanian sense in Jelinek’s novel. I 
conclude the chapter by arguing that what Jelinek does in Die Liebhaberinnen is to 
construct a materialist feminist version of the romance novel, one that illustrates 
the ways in which conventional romance novels work are alienating. 
In Chapter Two, “A Jouissance Beyond the Phallus? Lust and 
Pornography,” I address the question of whether Jelinek’s novel Lust, published 
in 1989, is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. Are we to understand it as a 
repudiation, mockery, and/or parody of (male) pornography and desire, or does 
Jelinek simply reproduce that which she is supposedly making fun of? To answer 
the above questions, I discuss in the chapter the complex negotiation between 
aesthetics and pornography, arguing that many Jelinek scholars have failed to 
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address these questions adequately through their collapsing of the distinction 
(complex as it may be) between mass-cultural forms of pornography and the 
type of pornography produced by writers such as Bataille and Sade. 
In order to frame the discussion, I look at definitions of “artistic 
pornography,” Angela Carter’s “moral pornographer,” linking both to the 
Marquis de Sade and the notion of a pornographic tradition that demonstrates 
Jacques Lacan’s famous declaration that the sexual relationship does not exist. I 
then offer a comparison of Lust to both Sade’s “Justine” texts and the film Deep 
Throat, as a means of demonstrating how Jelinek’s text can be seen as in dialogue 
with the type of pornography exemplified by Sade’s work, as well as engaging 
critically with the type of mass cultural pornography represented by Deep Throat 
and other filmic pornography, concluding that what Jelinek offers us is a 
pessimistic pornography without female pleasure. 
Chapter Three, “Portrait of the Artist as a (Not-So-)Young Pervert: Pianos, 
Perversion, Sublimation, and the Künstlerroman in Die Klavierspielerin,” focuses on 
Jelinek’s most famous and semi-autobiographical novel Die Klavierspielerin. 
Published in 1983, the novel relates the story of Erika Kohut, piano teacher at the 
Vienna Conservatory, her development as a (perverse) sexual subject, and her 
ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual position. 
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In this chapter I argue that Erika’s training as a pianist, the social history 
of the piano, especially as it relates to gender, and the use of pianos to represent 
female sexuality in literature are all inseparable from Jelinek’s representation of 
Erika’s perverse subjectivity and her unstable sexual position. 
My analysis of the relationship between Erika’s perversion and her piano 
playing thus also makes it possible to read Die Klavierspielerin’s in generic terms 
as an anti-Künstlerroman. After a discussion of the history of pianos, pianists and 
Jelinek’s 1982 play Clara S., I then place Die Klavierspielerin in the context of both 
the history of pianos and Jelinek’s earlier text, before turning to a discussion of 
perversion, sublimation, and the Künstlerroman. 
I conclude with the argument that perversion’s similarity to sublimation 
allows us to read Die Klavierspielerin as an anti-Künstlerroman. Doing so allows us 
to view Erika’s failure to become a concert pianist as simultaneously a failure to 
achieve sublimation, a failure which manifests itself in perversion as a means of 
obtaining the jouissance denied to her by art. We can thus see that Jelinek offers 
us an anti-Künstlerroman that stretches generic boundaries through its portrait of 
the artist as pervert rather than genius. 
In the conclusion, I argue that the scholarly significance of this dissertation 
lies in its sustained reading of these three Jelinek texts in generic terms. I also 
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examine how these works function to create an “negative aesthetics,” as opposed 
to a positive reworking of generic forms. Finally, I look at how that lack of 
positivity explains the often fraught reception of Jelinek’s work by both Marxists 
and feminists. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HOUSEWIFE OR SHOP GIRL? ALIENATION AND (ANTI-) ROMANCE IN 
DIE LIEBHABERINNEN 
 [paula] ist 15 jahre alt. sie ist jetzt alt genug, um sich überlegen zu dürfen, was sie 
einmal werden möchte: hausfrau oder verkäuferin. verkäuferin oder hausfrau. 
Elfriede Jelinek, Die Liebhaberinnen (14)1
 
 
Introduction 
In her book, Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism, 
Rosemary Hennessy criticizes what she terms “culture theory in the humanities 
[which] has emphasized the language-based construction of consciousness” 
(212). In particular, Hennessy takes to task the dismissal of the term “alienation” 
by “poststructuralists” from culture theory. As Hennessy’s critique is so 
pertinent to my argument in this chapter, I will quote her at some length: 
This work has been shaped by the presuppositions of 
poststructuralism, which stresses the radical loss of 
authenticity (a true or coherent self), not as an effect of 
capitalism’s alienating management and commodification of 
human capacities but of the subject’s entry into a symbolic 
system of representations where the subject of language is 
always so to speak “at a loss” because the subject of the 
enunciation (“I”) is always split from the “self” it refers to. 
This view dismisses a concept like “alienation” because it 
connotes either a true “self” somewhere “behind” language, 
                                                 
1 “[paula] is 15 years old. she is now old enough to be allowed to think about what she 
wants to be one day: housewife or sales assistant. sales assistant or housewife” (women, 12). 
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or suggests a utopian vision for overcoming losses that for the 
poststructuralist are irrecuperable. In the postmodern frame 
of reference, the subject’s coherence is mitigated by the radical 
difference (the loss of self-presence or a splitting of the self) 
that is the condition for taking up a position in a symbolic 
order where the instability of cultural signifiers will always 
undo any provisional or projected self-coherence. It is clear by 
now that I see these postmodern formations as extremely 
limited and actually quite conservative, because they foreclose 
ways of knowing the world that connect the symbolic order 
(culture) to material social relations that are not symbolic 
(Profit and Pleasure, 212).2
What I would like to suggest with my reading of Elfriede Jelinek’s Die 
Liebhaberinnen (English title: women as lovers, [1975]) in this chapter, however, is 
that the choice between “alienation” in the symbolic order and in material social 
relations is neither as simple nor as complete as Hennessy would have us 
believe. Rather, what we need to do is to develop an approach with which we 
can analyze both the alienation of the subject in the symbolic order via language 
and the alienation of labor and sexuality in material social relations. 
 
                                                 
2 Here it is important to note that Hennessy’s earlier work (her book Materialist Feminism 
and the Politics of Discourse, published in 1993), was much more sympathetic to postmodernism 
than her later work. In the earlier work she notes that “Materialist feminism is distinguished from 
socialist feminism in part because it embraces postmodern conceptions of language and 
subjectivity. Materialist feminists have seen in postmodernism a powerful critical force for 
exposing the relationship between language, the subject, and the unequal distribution of social 
resources” (Hennessy, Materialist Feminism, 5). As the above quote makes clear, this more 
sympathetic reading of postmodernism is largely missing from Hennessy’s later book. Jelinek’s 
text, I would argue, has more in common with Hennessy’s 1993 views than with her later more 
traditionally Marxist work. For a useful overview of materialist feminism, see Sara Lennox’s 
essay “Materialistcher Feminismus und Postmoderne.” 
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In addition, Hennessy’s critique allows me to raise the following question: 
what type of “alienation” are we dealing with in Jelinek’s text? Is the alienation 
depicted in Die Liebhaberinnen alienation from labor brought on by private 
property and capitalism, as Marx posited, and something that would be 
transcended in communism? Or is it, as some socialist feminists claim in their 
reading of Marx, the alienation of women from both their labor and sexuality, 
caused by patriarchal relations between men and women in capitalist society, to 
be overcome in a more just society?3
In this chapter I will argue that “alienation,” at least as portrayed by 
Jelinek, is all of these things, and that one therefore needs to use various methods 
(Marxism, socialist feminism and psychoanalysis) as a means of reading Jelinek’s 
depiction of alienation in all of its forms in Die Liebhaberinnen. While Die 
Liebhaberinnen can be read as a Marxist and/or socialist feminist text, depicting 
both alienation from labor and sexuality in the Marxist and socialist feminist uses 
of the term, it also illustrates “how patriarchy exerts its powerful hold through 
 Or, finally, is it, as in Lacan’s work, “an 
inevitable consequence of the process by which the ego is constituted by 
identification with the counterpart” (Evans, Dictionary, 9)? 
                                                 
3 On Marxist/socialist feminist views of alienation, see: Bartky, A. Ferguson, Foreman, 
Jaggar, and MacKinnon. 
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the symbolic” (Haines, 653), and thus can benefit from a linguistically-based 
psychoanalytic reading. My reading of Die Liebhaberinnen will seek to coordinate 
Marxist, socialist feminist and psychoanalytic theories at different textual levels: 
while Marxist and socialist feminist interpretations are useful at the narrative 
level (e.g., the plot level or that of the signified), a psychoanalytic interpretation 
can be used to read the text at the level of the writing itself (that is, the level of 
the signifier, especially in relation to Jelinek’s use of metonymy as a literary 
device). As Patricia Elliot explains in her discussion of Jacqueline Rose’s 
psychoanalytic feminism: 
the psyche can never be a direct reflection of social reality or of 
biology. In other words, psychosexuality is overdetermined. 
Biology and ideology come to “figure” in it, but there is no 
causal relationship. Rather, . . . psychical life is characterized 
by a complex process of mediation, so that femininity cannot 
be explained as a natural outcome of female anatomy or as the 
direct result of (oppressive) social relations (77, emphasis in 
original). 
In its neglect of the unconscious elements of sexuality, as they play themselves 
out in linguistic representation, the socialist feminist concept of alienation 
therefore needs to be supplemented with psychoanalysis in order to read 
Jelinek’s texts in all of their complexity. 
 In this chapter, I also read Die Liebhaberinnen in generic terms as an anti-
romance, arguing that Jelinek’s novel performs a materialist critique of the 
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traditional romance novel’s generic perversions by exposing the ways such 
novels work to construct alienated female subjectivities. Following discussions of 
Marxist, socialist feminist, and Lacanian alienation in Die Liebhaberinnen, I then 
turn to an overview of the romance genre and the ways that Jelinek’s novel 
works both with and against those generic conventions, concluding that her text 
can ultimately be read as a materialist feminist romance novel. 
“Sexuality is to Feminism What Work is to Marxism”: Alienated Sexuality 
and/as Labor in Die Liebhaberinnen 
Set in the mountains of Styria, Jelinek’s novel outlines the quest of the two 
main characters, Brigitte and Paula, to find husbands. This search is determined 
by the lack of choices for women in this part of rural Austria, as is ironically 
pointed out by the narrator in regard to Paula: “sie [paula] ist 15 jahre alt. sie ist 
jetzt alt genug, um sich überlegen zu dürfen, was sie einmal werden möchte: 
hausfrau oder verkäuferin. verkäuferin oder hausfrau” (LH, 14).4
                                                 
4 One of the elements of this novel’s style is Jelinek’s use of non-capitalization. I will 
follow the text’s use of capitalization, rather than “normal” rules when quoting. “she [paula] is 15 
years old. she is now old enough to be allowed to think about what she wants to be one day: 
housewife or sales assistant. sales assistant or housewife” (women, 12). There is, also, in Brigitte’s 
case, the option of working in the bra factory. 
 While both 
women are successful in their pursuit of husbands, even accomplishing their 
goal in the same manner (they become pregnant, which forces the men to marry 
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them), the two characters function as opposites as well: “immer abwechselnd mit 
dem guten beispiel brigittes schleppt sich das schlechte beispiel paulas dahin” 
(LH, 26).5
Der Roman destruiert den Trivialmythos “Liebe,” indem er 
das Herrschaftsverhältnis unter den Geschlechtern, aber auch 
den Widerspruch zwischen Kapital und Arbeit darstellt, also 
ganz marxistisch ausgeht von der doppelten Unterdrückung 
der Frau und der einfachen Unterdrückung des Mannes, vom 
Haupt- und vom Nebenwiderspruch. Mit der Gestalt der 
“höheren Tochter” Susi führt er darüber hinaus das Thema 
der Priorität von Klassenhierarchien über die 
Geschlechterhierarchie ein . . . An Brigitte und Paula 
demonstriert der Roman die Chancenlosigkeit von Frauen aus 
der Arbeiterklasse, die in ihrem Privatleben nur dasselbe tun 
können, was sie in der Fabrik tun: sie vermarkten ihre Körper, 
sei es als Arbeitskraft, sei es als Sexualobjekt und 
Gebärinstrument (22-23).
 Despite the contrast between the story of Brigitte, the “good” example, 
with that of Paula, the “bad” example, they share the fate of being alienated from 
both their labor and sexuality; the main difference between their stories being 
that Brigitte is the “success” story in the text. In her discussion of Die 
Liebhaberinnen, Marlies Janz makes clear the relation between women, labor and 
capital portrayed in Jelinek’s text, writing: 
6
                                                 
5 “always alternating with the good example, brigitte, paula, the bad example, trails 
along” (women, 27). 
 
6 “The novel destroys the banal myth of ‘love,’ in that in portrays relations of power 
between the sexes. It also, however, portrays the contradiction between capital and work, thus 
showing, from a Marxist perspective, the double oppression of women, and the single oppression 
of men, that is, the primary and secondary contradiction. With the figure of the ‘high-born 
 24 
 
In contrast to Janz, however, I do not think that class necessarily “trumps” sex in 
Die Liebhaberinnen; rather, I agree with Brigid Haines that it could be said that it is 
instead sex that trumps class, or as Engels put it, “Der erste Klassengegensatz, 
der in der Geschichte auftritt, fällt zusammen mit der Entwicklung des 
Antagonismus von Mann und Weib in der Einzelehe, und die erste 
Klassenunterdrückung mit der des weiblichen Geschlechts durch das 
männliche” (21: 68).7
In Brigid Haines’s words, what Jelinek gives us in her novel does indeed 
agree with Engels’s view of monogamous marriage, consisting of “an 
exaggerated Marxist-feminist account of life under capitalism, in which men and 
women are exploited and alienated by capitalism, [and] women are further 
oppressed by men as a result of capitalism” (649). As she goes on to explain, all 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
daughter,’ Susi, the novel establishes the theme of the priority of class hierarchies over those of 
sex . . . With Brigitte and Paula the novel demonstrates the lack of opportunities for women from 
the working class, who are only able to do the same in their private lives as they do in the factory: 
they sell their bodies, whether as labor or as sexual object and birthing instrument” (my 
translation). 
7 “the first class antagonism that appears in history coincides with the development of the 
antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression 
coincides with that of the female sex by the male” (129). All German quotes of Marx and Engels’s 
works will be cited from the following edition: Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Ed. 
Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 42 vols, (Berlin: Dietz, 1959-1962), and will 
be noted parenthetically in the text by volume and page number. 
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women in Die Liebhaberinnen, including Janz’s “höhere Tochter,” Susi, “will have 
to submit to the violence of patriarchy” (651), as Heinz himself realizes:  
heinz denkt, daß sich susi bald nichts mehr um den hunger in 
den welt scheißen wird, wenn sie zu gänze mit seinem hunger 
wird beschäftigt sein müssen. susis alltag wird einmal ein 
ausgefüllter werden. susi wird den schwanz fest in die möse 
und das familienleben fest in den kopf gepflanzt bekommen 
(LH, 83).8
What Jelinek accomplishes in Die Liebhaberinnen, then, is a depiction of women’s 
alienation of their sexuality both in terms of Marx’s use of alienation to describe 
alienated labor under capitalism, and of the socialist feminist revision of Marx to 
include women and their sexuality within Marx’s original framework. 
 
In Marx’s use of the term, the concept of alienation relates to the labor of 
human beings, as practiced in a society defined by private property and the 
division of labor, and it “refers not to natural objects as such but to what happens 
to the products of labour when (as a result of specific social relationships) they 
become commodities or capital” (Colletti, 16). As Marx explains in the 1844 
Manuscripts: “Die Arbeit produziert nicht nur Waren; sie produziert sich selbst 
                                                 
8 “heinz thinks, that susi will soon no longer give a shit about world hunger when she 
has to devote herself entirely to his hunger. susi’s day will then be filled up more completely. susi 
will get his cock firmly inserted in her snatch and family life firmly inserted in her head” (women, 
99, emphasis in original). I am indebted to Brigid Haines’s article for this example. 
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und den Arbeiter als eine Ware” (40: 511, emphasis in original).9
Dies Faktum drückt weiter nichts aus als: Der Gegenstand, 
den die Arbeit produziert, ihr Produkt, tritt ihr als ein fremdes 
Wesen, als eine von dem Produzenten unabhängige Macht 
gegenüber. Das Produkt der Arbeit ist die Arbeit, die sich in 
einem Gegenstand fixiert, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die 
Vergegenständlichung der Arbeit . . . der Arbeiter [verhält sich] 
zum Produkt seiner Arbeit als einem fremden Gegenstand . . . 
Die Entäußerung des Arbeiters in seinem Produkt hat die 
Bedeutung, nicht nur, daß seine Arbeit zu einem Gegenstand, 
zu einer äußeren Existenz wird, sondern daß sie außer ihm, 
unabhängig, fremd von ihm existiert und eine selbstständige 
Macht ihm gegenüber wird, daß das Leben, was er dem 
Gegenstand verliehen hat, ihm feindlich und fremd 
gegenübertritt (40: 511-12, emphasis in original).
 He goes on to 
clarify: 
10
One example of the manner in which work is depicted as alienated labor in 
Marx’s sense in Jelinek’s novel is the description of Paula’s work as a seamstress 
apprentice: 
 
                                                 
9 “Labour not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and the workers as a 
commodity” (EW, 324, emphasis in original). 
10 “This fact simply means that the object that the worker produces, its product, stands 
opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is 
labour embodied and made material in the object, it is the objectification of labour . . . the worker is 
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object . . . The externalization [Entäußerung] of the 
worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but 
that it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an 
autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile 
and alien” (EW, 324, emphasis in original). 
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zu ihrer schneiderei sagt paula nie: meine arbeit. zu ihrer 
arbeit sagt paula nie: meine. auch innerlich nicht. die arbeit, 
das ist etwas, das von einem losgelöst ist, die arbeit das ist 
doch mehr eine pflicht und geschieht daher dem nebenkörper 
. . . die arbeit, selbst wenn man sie gern macht, erleidet man. 
paula hat, trotz aller liebe zur schneiderei, gelernt, daß die 
arbeit etwas lästiges ist (LH, 32).11
It is not only the women, however, but also the men who experience 
alienation through their labor. In a manner similar to Marx’s description of 
alienated labor in Capital “in part, as the actual appearance of people who engage 
in such activity” (Ollman, 139), “both Heinz’s father and Erich’s stepfather are ill 
as a result of work” (see LH, 25 & 41, and women, 26 & 43) and 
 
both fathers are referred to metonymically by the narrator in 
terms relating to their ill health: Heinz’s father is called 
‘bandscheibn,’ since his discs have suffered as a result of his 
work as a long-distance lorry driver . . . while Erich’s 
stepfather is called ‘asthma,’ his condition a result of his work 
on the railways (Haines, 647, n. 21). 
While labor is experienced as alienating by both men and women in 
Jelinek’s novel, it is the women whose relation to work is also related to their 
sexuality. This leads to the question of how Marx’s notion of alienated labor can 
                                                 
11 “about her dressmaking paula never says: my work. about her work paula never says: 
mine. not even inwardly. work, that is something, which is detached from a person, work after all 
is more like a duty and so it happens to the second body . . . one suffers work, even if one enjoys 
doing it. paula, despite all her love of dressmaking, has learned that work is something 
burdensome” (women, 33-34). 
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be related to women’s sexuality, a relation that feminist interpreters of Marx 
have attempted to define, or, as Catherine MacKinnon once so (in)famously 
declared: “Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most 
one’s own, yet most taken away” (3). In Jelinek’s novel, this relation is shown 
through the fact that it is not simply through their work that Brigitte and Paula 
resemble Marx’s alienated workers; rather, it is the metamorphosis of love and 
sexuality into commodities to be exchanged that most clearly reveals their 
alienation, in particular from their sexuality. As Marlies Janz puts it. “Indem für 
die Frauen die ‘Liebe’ zum Ebenbild von (entfremdeter) ‘Arbeit’ wird, 
instrumentalisieren und verlieren sie ihre Körper” (26).12
                                                 
12 “Because ‘love’ for the women becomes the spitting image of (alienated) ‘labor,’ they 
instrumentalize and lose their bodies” (my translation). See also Rebecca Thomas who notes that 
“The capitalist model as perceived by Jelinek demands that everything be assigned a market 
value and reduced to its commodity function” (“(Re)-Production,” 71-72). 
 While Janz uses the 
term “love,” I am instead arguing that it is sexuality in Die Liebhaberinnen that 
functions in much the same manner as work does for Marx, that is, as something 
which is alienated by being turned into a commodity, both in its product and its 
activity. 
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For this reason, it is possible to draw a parallel between the ideological 
fiction of love13 in Jelinek’s text and money in Marx’s work.14
Das Produkt wird Ware, d.h. bloßes Moment des Austauschs. 
Die Ware wird in Tauschwert verwandelt. Um sie sich selbst 
als Tauschwert gleichzusetzen, wird sie mit einem Zeichen 
vertauscht, das sie als den Tauschwert als solchen 
repräsentiert. Als solcher symbolisierter Tauschwert kann sie 
dann wieder in bestimmten Verhältnissen mit jeder andren 
Ware ausgetauscht werden . . . Die Bestimmung des Produkts 
im Tauschwert bringt es also notwendig mit sich, daß der 
Tauschwert eine vom Produkt getrennte, losgelöste Existenz 
erhält. Der von den Waren selbst losgelöste und selbst als eine 
 This comparison is 
less far-fetched than it may seem at first glance. In another context, the parallel 
between love and money as “generalized symbolic media of communication” 
(Luhmann, 18) has been made by Niklas Luhmann (130-31, see also chapter 11, 
“The Incorporation of Sexuality”). Yet unlike Luhmann’s functionalist neutrality, 
according to which both love and money are forms of social glue, Jelinek 
preserves the alienating moment of the two. As Marx explains in the Grundrisse, 
it is the process through which a product becomes a commodity that creates 
exchange value, as measured by money: 
                                                 
13 For more on love as an ideological fiction, see the section below in this chapter on the 
romance novel. 
14 It is important to note here that I am focusing on the parallel between love and money 
as that which functions to conceal exchange value. Marx, of course, also attributed many other 
qualities to money that are not true of love. For more on Marx’s view of money, see chapter 1 of 
Capital (23: 49-98; and C, 125-77). 
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Ware neben ihnen existierende Tauschwert ist—Geld (42: 79-
80, emphasis in original).15
In Die Liebhaberinnen, it is love that takes on the symbolic form under 
which sexuality is exchanged, and which conceals the real relations between men 
and women, as expressed through the alienation of sexuality, just as, for Marx, 
money functions to conceal the real relations between workers and their 
products: “in der liebe versteht brigitte keinen spaß. es ist das ernsteste, was sie, 
so ganz ohne startkapital, für ihr eigenes geschäft tun kann . . . der körper zählt 
für brigitte als mittel zum besseren zweck” (LH, 56).
 
16
From this, one can see that the fact that love involves labor and capital is 
clear to Brigitte. Moreover, she is smart enough to invest her labor where it will 
yield the most profit, by cleaning the toilet at Heinz’s family’s house: 
 
brigitte hilft im haushalt, was das einzige ist, womit sie sich 
beliebt machen kann, das heißt sie putzt freudig mit dem 
                                                 
15 “The product becomes a commodity, i.e. a mere element of exchange. The commodity is 
transformed into exchange value. In order to equate it with itself as an exchange value, it is 
exchanged for a symbol which represents it as exchange value as such. As such a symbolized 
exchange value, it can then in turn be exchanged in definite relations for every other commodity . 
. . The definition of a product as exchange value thus necessarily implies that exchange value 
obtains a separate existence, in isolation from the product. The exchange value which is separated 
from commodities and exists alongside them as itself a commodity, this is—money (GR, 145, 
emphasis in original). 
16 “brigitte won’t stand for any nonsense when it comes to love. it is the most serious 
thing which she, entirely without start-up money, can do for her own shop . . . for brigitte her 
body counts as a means to a better end” (women, 64-65). 
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scheißebesen die klomuschel . . . zu hause hilft brigitte nichts, 
das hieße kapital und arbeitskraft in ein von vorneherein zum 
scheitern verurteiltes mit verlust arbeitendes 
kleinunternehmen zu stecken. aussichtslos. hoffnungslos. 
brigitte investiert besser, dort, wo etwas herauskommen kann. 
ein ganzes neues leben (LH, 13-14).17
Brigitte is willing to exchange her labor power when necessary for Heinz’s 
family, but not at home, where there would be no reward for it. In this way, she 
clearly resembles workers, who expend their labor power only when forced, for 
“sobald kein physischer oder sonstiger Zwang existiert, [wird] die Arbeit als Pest 
geflohen” (40: 514).
 
18
As well as portraying love and sexuality in terms of Marx’s alienated 
labor, Jelinek’s depiction of women’s sexual alienation can also be read via a 
discussion of the socialist feminist reworking of the Marxist term alienation. 
Some socialist feminists, such as Alison Jaggar, Sandra Lee Bartky and Ann 
Foreman, attempted, in the 1970s and early 80s, to appropriate and rework the 
classical Marxist concept of alienation to apply to women, arguing that the sexual 
 
                                                 
17 “brigitte is helping around the house, which is the only way she can ingratiate herself, 
which means she enthusiastically cleans the lavatory bowl with the shit brush . . . brigitte doesn’t 
help at home, that would mean putting capital and labour power into a small business which was 
working at a loss and condemned to fail from the outset. pointless. hopeless. better for brigitte to 
invest where something can come of it. a completely new life” (women, 10-11). 
18 “as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists it [work—BB] is shunned like the 
plague” (EW, 326). 
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alienation of women is structurally similar to the alienation of the worker, as 
Jaggar points out: 
men rather than women control the expression of women’s 
sexuality: women’s sexuality is developed for men’s 
enjoyment rather than for women’s. In this respect women’s 
sexual situation resembles that of wage workers who are 
alienated from the process and product of their labor (309). 
According to the socialist feminist theory of alienation, two of the major ways 
through which women are alienated from their sexuality, are: 1) sexual 
objectification of women “occurs when a woman’s sexual parts or sexual 
functions are separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere 
instruments or else regarded as if they were capable of representing her” (Bartky, 
35); and 2) the best chance for economic security for many women, marriage to 
an economically secure man, requires the “sale” of their sexuality in marriage 
(Jaggar, 308). 19
                                                 
19 These are not the only two ways in which women, according to socialist feminists, are 
alienated as women. Other examples of femininity as alienation include: being “viewed 
relentlessly as sexual objects,” being subjected “continually to sexual assaults and harassment,” 
the fact that “economic survival requires most women to present themselves in a way that is 
sexually pleasing to men: male superiors penalize women who seem to be ‘punishing’ or defying 
men through their appearance” and the reality that “much of women’s paid work is sexualized” 
(Jaggar, 308). Bartky also adds “the cultural domination of women” to her list of ways in which 
women are alienated as women, explaining that “women as women are clearly alienated in 
cultural production. Most avenues of cultural expression—high culture, popular culture, even to 
some extent language—are instruments of male supremacy. Women have little control over the 
cultural apparatus itself and are often entirely absent from its products; to the extent that we are 
not excluded from it entirely, the images of ourselves we see reflected in the dominant culture are 
often truncated or demeaning” (34-35). For other examples of femininity as alienation see: Jaggar 
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In the following passages describing the relationship between Brigitte and 
Heinz, the sexual objectification of Brigitte is made clear: 
brigitte haßt heinz unter vielem andren auch deshalb, weil er 
immer dann ein körperliches gefühl für brigitte in sich 
hochkommen läßt, wenn gitti gerade von ihren seelischen 
problemen, die ein kleines häuschen mit garten nach sich 
ziehen, plaudern möchte. immer dann, wenn brigitte ihr 
innerstes nach außen stülpen möchte und dabei den ganzen 
käse von glück, zukunft, säuglingspflege und 
waschmaschinen herausspeit, dann verhält sich heinz so, als 
ob er kein hirn hätte, sondern nur einen schwanz. 
heinz wird doch in brigitte nicht nur einen körper sehen und 
nicht die ganze vielfalt, die dahintersteckt? . . . heinz ist froh, 
endlich einen menschen zum rammeln gefunden zu haben. 
kaum wird heinz des menschen brigitte ansichtig, schon 
knöpft er sich auf und geht in startposition. während ihm 
brigitte noch erklärt, daß sie ihn liebt und gleichzeitig etwas 
wie hochachtung vor seinem beruflichen erfolg empfindet, 
während brigitte noch ihre gedanken von liebe und achtung 
bis zu hochzeit und hausrenovierung schweifen läßt, ehe sie 
sich noch vorsehen kann, schon hat sie den rammler heinz an 
ihrem leibe hängen wie einen blutegel (LH, 54).20
                                                                                                                                                 
(308), Bartky (34-35), and Foreman, who titled her book Femininity as Alienation, thus implying 
that it is simply femininity itself which is alienating. For reasons of length and clarity, I shall 
focus only on the two forms of alienation mentioned above. 
 
20 “brigitte also hates heinz among other things, because he always lets a physical feeling 
for brigitte rise, just when gitti would like to talk about her emotional problems, which involve a 
little house with a garden. whenever brigitte wants to turn her innermost to the outside and spew 
out all the crap about happiness, future, baby care and washing machines, then heinz acts as if he 
didn’t have a brain, but only a cock. surely heinz doesn’t just see a body when he looks at brigitte 
and not all the variety behind it? . . . heinz is happy at last to have found a person to rut. hardly 
has heinz set eyes on the person brigitte, than he’s unbuttoning himself and going into the 
starting position. while brigitte is still explaining to him, that she loves him and at the same time 
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Here the reader can see that, for Heinz, Brigitte is nothing more than her body, a 
body to be used by him for his sexual pleasure, while he devalues the rest of her. 
As Bartky puts it: “To be dealt with in this way is to have one’s entire being 
identified with the body . . . [sexual objectification] involves too the implicit 
denial to those who suffer it that they have capacities which transcend the 
merely sexual” (35-36). 
Jelinek’s depiction of the relationship between Brigitte and Heinz, while 
conforming to a socialist feminist definition of sexual objectification, is, 
simultaneously, more than just a criticism of this alienation. Her description of 
Brigitte’s “feelings,” those feelings which Heinz is devaluing in his appreciation 
and use of her body, make this clear. For Brigitte’s feelings for Heinz, like his 
desire for her body, are also nothing more than a desire for the commodities he 
can provide her, in this case a house, garden, and washing machine. Heinz’s 
function for Brigitte is to act as material security and future for her, while 
Brigitte’s feelings for Heinz are not based on love (rather, it is specifically pointed 
out in the text that she hates him), consequently demonstrating that she too 
esteems Heinz solely for the value he can provide. In other words, Brigitte’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
feels something like respect for his professional success, while brigitte is letting her thoughts 
wander from love and respect to wedding and house renovation, before she even has time to 
watch out, she already has heinz the rutter clinging to her body like a leech” (women, 62). 
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“capacities which transcend the merely sexual” are nothing more than the desire 
for the commodities that she can secure from Heinz, and thus related to the 
exchange value of her sexuality. 
In order to satisfy her desire for these commodities, Brigitte sets her sights 
on marrying Heinz, who hopes one day to open an electrical repair shop. Brigitte 
detests her work in the bra factory and dreams of escaping it through Heinz:  
nicht einmal bei der arbeit hat brigitte ihre ruhe. sogar bei der 
arbeit muß sie arbeiten. sie soll bei der arbeit nicht denken, 
etwas in ihr denkt jedoch ununterbrochen. brigitte kann aus 
ihrem eigenen nichts besseres machen. das bessere soll vom 
leben von heinz herkommen, heinz kann brigitte von ihrer 
nähmaschine befreien, das kann brigitte von selbst nicht (LH, 
11).21
She knows that the best way to accomplish this is through sex (or, as 
Jaggar refers to it, by selling her sexuality in marriage), which she endures in 
spite of the fact that she receives no enjoyment from it, other than the knowledge 
that sex with Heinz means securing her future: “auch ekelt brigitte vor heinz und 
seinem fetten weißen elektrikerkörper, der auch heinz heißt. trotzdem ist sie 
auch wieder froh, so froh, todfroh, daß sie ihn hat, weil er ihre zukunft ist” (LH, 
 
                                                 
21 “brigitte doesn’t even get any peace at work. even at work she has to work. she’s not 
supposed to think while she’s working, yet something inside her thinks uninterruptedly. brigitte 
cannot make something better of her own life. something better must come from heinz’s life. 
heinz can free brigitte from her sewing machine, brigitte cannot do it on her own” (women, 8). 
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32).22
ja, heinz, es ist die liebe, sagt brigitte . . . du wirst für mich 
sorgen und mich für meine liebe belohnen und entschädigen, 
nicht wahr, heinz? . . . ich liebe dich doch gerade deswegen, 
weil du ein mann bist, sagt brigitte. du bist ein mann, der 
einen beruf lernt, ich bin eine frau, die keinen beruf gelernt 
hat. dein beruf muß für uns beide reichen. das tut er auch 
spielend, weil er so ein großer schöner beruf ist. du darfst 
mich niemals verlassen, sonst würde ich sterben, sagt brigitte . 
. . ich liebe dich doch gerade deswegen, weil du mehr 
verdienst als einer, der weniger verdient (LH, 23 & 26).
 Brigitte nonetheless persists in describing her exchange of sex with Heinz 
as motivated by love, despite her reference to his earning power in her 
declaration of love: 
23
To put it another way: what Jelinek does with the figure of Brigitte is to 
expose the relation between love and economic survival for women, a relation 
that, in traditional romance novels, is obscured, as Tania Modleski illustrates in 
her discussion of Harlequin romances: 
 
While the novels are always about a poor girl finally marrying 
a rich man, preferably of the nobility, they must be careful to 
                                                 
22 “brigitte also is repelled by heinz and his plump white electrician’s body, which is also 
called heinz. despite that she is also happy again, so happy, dead happy, that she has him, 
because he is her future” (women, 34). 
23 “yes, heinz, it’s love, says brigitte . . . you will take care of me and repay and reward 
me for my love, won’t you, heinz? . . . but that’s exactly why i love you, because you are a man, 
says brigitte. you are a man, who is learning a trade, i a woman, who has not learned a trade. 
your trade must do for both of us. and it will do that easily, because it is such a beautiful trade. 
you must never leave me, otherwise i would die, says brigitte . . . but that’s exactly why i love 
you, because you earn more than someone, who earns less” (women, 22 & 26). 
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show that the girl never set out to get him and his goods. This 
is of course a simple reflection of the double bind imposed 
upon women in real life: their most important achievement is 
supposed to be finding a husband; their greatest fault is 
attempting to do so. How to get your heroine from loneliness 
and penury to romance and riches, without making her 
appear to have helped herself or even to have thought about 
the matter, is an old problem for novelists (48-49). 
This “double bind” is exactly what Jelinek thematizes through the figure of 
Brigitte, subsequently revealing women’s pursuit of marriage for what it truly is, 
an attempt on the part of women to obtain economic security for themselves. Or, 
as the narrator rather pithily points out: “vorläufig hat b. noch nichts als ihren 
namen, im lauf der geschichte wird brigitte den namen von heinz bekommen, 
das ist wichtiger als geld und besitz, das kann geld und besitz herbeischaffen” 
(LH, 10).24
Heinz, however, while he enjoys using Brigitte to satisfy his sexual needs, 
has his sights set on something better. He would prefer to marry a woman who 
can increase his social standing, and possibly provide some start-up capital for 
his business, something Brigitte cannot do. Heinz is aware that Brigitte is trying 
to “catch” him and ponders her material value, finding her lacking: “heinz fragt 
 
                                                 
24 “for the time being b. has nothing but her name yet, in the course of the story brigitte 
will receive heinz’s name, that is more important than money and property, that can procure 
money and property” (women, 6). 
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sich oft, was brigitte dann vorzuzeigen hat. heinz spielt oft mit dem gedanken, 
jemand anderen zu nehmen, der etwas zu bieten hat, wie etwa bargeld oder die 
räumlichkeiten für ein geeignetes geschäftslokal” (LH, 13).25
brigitte hat einen körper zu bieten. außer brigittes körper 
werden zur gleichen zeit noch viele andre körper auf den 
markt geworfen. das einzige, was brigitte auf diesem weg 
positiv zur seite steht, ist die kosmetische industrie. und die 
textilindustrie. brigitte hat brüste, schenkel, beine, hüften und 
eine möse. das haben andre auch, manchmal sogar von 
besserer qualität (LH, 13).
 This leads to a 
competition between Brigitte and the woman Heinz would prefer, the one who 
could offer him something other than herself, Susi. The competition takes place 
mainly on Brigitte’s side, however, as Susi has no intentions of lowering her 
social standing by marrying Heinz. As Brigitte is unaware of this, she believes 
that she must compete with Susi (and any other unknown rivals) for Heinz’s 
attention. She knows that what she has to offer him is not unique: 
26
The great number of women’s bodies on the market means that Heinz has 
a large selection to choose from, and, as a consequence, helps to reinforce 
 
                                                 
25 “heinz often asks himself, what brigitte has to show for herself. heinz often plays with 
the idea of taking someone who has something to offer, as for example, cash or suitable premises 
for a shop” (women, 9-10). 
26 “brigitte has a body to offer. apart from brigitte’s body many other bodies are flooding 
the market at the same time. the only thing that positively stands by brigitte on this path, is the 
cosmetics industry. and the textile industry. brigitte has breasts, thighs, hips and a snatch. others 
have that too, sometimes even of a better quality” (women, 10). 
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Brigitte’s status as a body (commodity) to be exchanged.27 In addition, it shows 
that women, as commodities, suffer the same fate as Marx’s workers, as 
described in the 1844 Manuscripts: “Als Kapital steigt [der] Wert des Arbeiters 
nach Nachfrage und Zufuhr, und auch physisch ward und wird gewußt sein 
Dasein, sein Leben [als] eine Zufuhr von Ware wie jeder andren Ware” (40: 523, 
emphasis in original).28
Just like the worker, Brigitte’s value as a commodity also declines in 
relation to the supply, or the number of women’s bodies on the market that 
Heinz can choose from. Furthermore, Brigitte’s value is continually decreasing, 
for “brigitte wird immer älter und immer weniger frau, die konkurrenz wird 
immer jünger und immer mehr frau” (LH, 13),
 
29
                                                 
27 For an analysis of Die Liebhaberinnen and the exchange of women as commodities, see 
Haines’s article, in which she reads Jelinek’s novel through Irigaray’s analysis of women as 
objects of male exchange. 
 and old women are not 
particularly valuable, as can be seen through the example of Paula’s 
grandmother: “die oma [hat] ihr einziges kapital, eine vielleicht einmal 
28 “As capital, the value of the worker rises or falls in accordance with supply and 
demand, and even in a physical sense, his existence, his life, was and is treated as a supply of a 
commodity, like any other commodity” (EW, 335, emphasis in original). 
29 “brigitte grows ever older and ever less woman, the competition grows ever younger 
and ever more woman” (women, 10). 
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vorhandengewesene schönheit, längst verloren. sie wurde entwertet” (LH, 70).30 
It is not just old age that reduces the value of women, but also their lack of 
virginity, as exemplified by Paula: “paula geht manchmal auf den tanzboden, 
wenn ein fest stattfindet. manchmal wird paula von einem besoffenen 
tanzbodenbesucher wieder in den wald weggeführt, was keiner sehen darf, weil 
es ihren marktwert gleich ins bodenlose sinken lassen würde” (LH, 30).31
To further extend the comparison between workers and women, Brigitte’s 
precarious status as a commodity of declining value forces her to compete with 
others in her quest for Heinz, which in turn kills any feelings of commonality 
with other women: “in brigittes kreisen haßt man jede konkurrenz. in brigittes 
kreisen wird haß groß geschrieben. brigitte kann keine liebe zu ihresgleichen 
aufbringen, das ist alles kaputtgemacht” (LH, 65-66).
 
32
                                                 
30 “the granny has long ago lost her only capital, a beauty which was perhaps present. 
granny was devalued” (women, 82). 
 Solidarity among women 
like Brigitte is impossible because she knows that “es gibt so viele frauen, die 
sich eine fremde, ihre, brigittes zukunft zu einer eigenen machen möchten” (LH, 
31 “paula sometimes goes onto the dance floor, is there’s a party. sometimes paula is led 
away into the woods again by a drunk dance floor visitor, which no one must see, because that 
would immediately cause her market value to go through the floor” (women, 32). 
32 “in brigitte’s circles one hates any competition. in brigitte’s circles hate is writ large. 
brigitte cannot summon up any love for her fellow women, it has all been destroyed” (women, 77). 
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55),33
Eine unmittelbare Konsequenz davon, daß der Mensch dem 
Produkt seiner Arbeit, seiner Lebenstätigkeit, seinem 
Gattungswesen entfremdet ist, ist die Entfremdung des 
Menschen von dem Menschen . . . Die Entfremdung des 
Menschen, überhaupt jedes Verhältnis, in dem der Mensch zu 
sich selbst [steht], ist erst verwirklicht, drückt sich aus in dem 
Verhältnis, in welchem der Mensch zu d[em] andren 
Menschen steht. Also betrachtet in dem Verhältnis der 
entfremdeten Arbeit jeder Mensch den andren nach dem 
Maßstab und dem Verhältnis, in welchem er selbst als 
Arbeiter sich befindet (40: 517-18, emphasis in original).
 thereby illustrating Jaggar’s point that “sexual competition between 
women often makes them unable to perceive their underlying shared interests, 
just as wage workers are often unable to perceive the interests they share with 
their co-workers” (310). Or, as Marx puts it:  
34
In the competition for the security marriage provides, Brigitte is the 
“success story” in the text, and it is her success which more properly reveals the 
function of love in Jelinek’s text as referred to above. After she becomes 
pregnant, Heinz marries her, they have two children, open an electrical repair 
 
                                                 
33 “brigitte knows, there are so many women who would like to turn a stranger’s, her, 
brigitte’s future into one of their own” (women, 63). 
34 “An immediate consequence of man’s estrangement from the product of his labour, his 
life activity, his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man . . . Man’s estrangement like 
all other relationships of man to himself, is realized and expressed only in man’s relationship to 
other men. In the relationship of estranged labour each man therefore regards the other in 
accordance with the standard and the situation in which he as a worker finds himself” (EW, 329-
30, emphasis in original). 
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shop and buy a house, giving Brigitte the fate she was seeking, a fate she 
managed to achieve solely through the use of her body: “brigittes los war ein 
haupttreffer, sie kann sich nicht beklagen, brigitte hat das mit der kraft ihres 
unterleibs allein zusammengebracht . . . aber wozu haben wir frauen schließlich 
unsren charme?” (LH, 143).35
Despite having achieved her goal of marrying Heinz and getting out of 
the factory, Brigitte is still unhappy: “die ehe schlägt ihr gut an, das sieht man. 
sie strahlt mit ihren küchenkästen um die wette. der haß hat sie innerlich schon 
ganz aufgegessen. aber die freude am besitz ist ihr geblieben. daran klammert sie 
sich mit eiserner faust” (LH, 142).
  
36 Brigitte’s role as wife and mother has left her 
eaten up by hate. The only joy still available to her is the joy of ownership, an 
ownership which she procured by turning herself into property, since, as Marx 
once wrote, marriage is also “eine Form des exklusiven Privateigentums” (40: 534, 
emphasis in original),37
                                                 
35 “brigitte’s fate was the jackpot, she can’t complain, brigitte managed it all with the 
strength of her womb alone . . . but then what is our women’s charm for anyway?” (women, 175). 
 thus illustrating Marlies Janz’s point that both Brigitte 
36 “the marriage is filling her out, one can see that. she beams in competition with the 
baking tins. hate has quite eaten her up inside. but the pleasure of ownership has remained. she 
clings to it with an iron fist” (women, 173). 
37 “a form of exclusive private property” (EW, 346, emphasis in original). 
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and Paula “wollen besitzen, weil sie nichts haben, und beide machen sich zum 
Besitz von Männern, um etwas zu haben” (26-27).38
Brigitte’s continued unhappiness also demonstrates, according to Allyson 
Fiddler, that love is the main theme of Die Liebhaberinnen, despite Jelinek’s 
seeming emphasis on work: 
 
Work can be seen to function rather as a focal point or sub-
theme within a wider theme, which is: love, or the 
demystification of what the concept of love generally implies. 
Love is mistakenly perceived by the girls as that which will 
save them from what they think is the source of their misery. 
They fail to recognise that the true source of their oppression 
lies in the very institutions of marriage and the family and in 
the gender-roles which those inscribe. In the world-view 
presented in Die Liebhaberinnen, the simple substitution of 
marriage and family for employment . . . is a step out of the 
frying pan into the fire (Rewriting, 72). 
What this shows is that while Brigitte has managed to rid herself of the alienation 
of labor in the factory, she has simply exchanged one oppression for another. 
What Jelinek depicts, then, in Die Liebhaberinnen is the brutality instituted under 
monogamy as a constitutive element of the relations between men and women, 
                                                 
38 “Both want to possess, because they have nothing, and both turn themselves into 
possessions of men, in order to have something” (my translation). 
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focusing on the way that occurs in the working (Brigitte and Paula) and lower-
middle classes (Heinz and his family).39
A comparison of the other main figure in Die Liebhaberinnen, Paula, to 
Brigitte, may also help to clarify the role of love in Jelinek’s text. Like Brigitte, 
Paula succeeds in “catching” her man, although she is not as lucky as Brigitte in 
finding one able to support her. Paula, in an attempt to escape the 
“Hausfrau/Verkäuferin” choice offered to women, undertakes training as a 
seamstress. Once she falls in love with Erich, a forester, she gives up her 
apprenticeship and marries him, after giving birth to his child. Erich, however, is 
an alcoholic, and spends all of their money on alcohol, finally forcing Paula into 
prostitution to support the family. After Erich finds out, he leaves her, and her 
children are taken away to live with her parents. To support herself, Paula must 
go to work in the same factory from which Brigitte, through her “good” 
marriage, managed to escape, with the following result: “aus dem 
hoffnungsvollen lehrmädchen der schneiderei im ersten lehrjahr ist eine 
 
                                                 
39 Jelinek, of course, is not alone in this particular feminist critique of Engels’s 
perspective, as his formulation of working-class marriage has been criticized by many feminist 
interpreters. See, for example, Barrett (48-49), Ferguson (25), Hartmann (4-5), Jaggar (63-79), and 
Vogel (73-92), who terms Engels’s view a “defective formation.” 
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zerbrochene frau mit ungenügenden schneidereikenntnissen geworden” (LH, 
154).40
In opposition to Brigitte, whose notions of “love” are always practical and 
related to Heinz’s future earning power and the security he can provide for her, 
Paula “is closer to the conventional protagonists in love-stories, as she is swayed 
by the sheer power of physical attraction” (Fiddler, Rewriting, 73). For Paula, 
Erich’s good looks have the power of blinding her to his shortcomings: 
 
erich ist nämlich der schönste im dorf. erich ist zwar ein 
lediges kind mit drei weiteren geschwistern, die alle von 
einem andren vatter sind, was schlechte ausgangsposition 
schafft, wie man weiß, aber er ist schön. bildschön wie ein 
bild mit seinen schwarzen haaren und blauen augen, so recht 
zum verlieben . . . wichtig ist nur, daß die liebe endlich 
gekommen ist, und daß sie nicht zu einem häßlichen, 
abgearbeiteten, versoffenen, ausgemergelten, ordinären, 
gemeinen holzarbeiter und ihr, sondern zu einem schönen, 
abgearbeiteten, versoffenen, stämmigen, ordinären, gemeinen 
holzarbeiter und ihr gekommen ist (LH, 38, emphasis 
added).41
                                                 
40 “the girl in the first year of her dressmaking apprenticeship, who was full of hope, has 
become a broken woman with inadequate dressmaking skills” (women, 189). 
 
41 “because erich is the handsomest in the village. admittedly erich is an only child with 
three other siblings each with a different dada, which makes for a poor starting position, as one 
knows, but he is handsome. as handsome as a picture with his black hair and blue eyes, just the 
one to fall in love with . . . all that matters is that love has come at last, and that it hasn’t come to 
an ugly, worn out, drunken, exhausted, vulgar, common woodcutter and her, but to a handsome, 
worn out, drunken, strong, vulgar, common woodcutter and her” (women, 41-42, emphasis 
added). 
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In this passage, Jelinek parodies the calculated self-interest often found in 
marriage choices, as if to show that Paula thinks she is smarter than she really is. 
For Paula, the important thing is that love came to her via a handsome 
and strong woodcutter, rather than one who is ugly and emaciated; the fact that 
Erich is, despite his good looks, nothing more than a common and vulgar 
drunkard is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, it is the experience of love itself that is important, although 
Paula, like Brigitte, also realizes that love will free her from work: 
über allem ist die liebe, die das beste ist, sagt paula darauf. 
paula ist besser [than the housewives on the bus with her—
BB], weil sie eine liebe in sich haben wird, wenn der richtige 
augenblick gekommen sein wird. zuerst ist paula wegen der 
schneiderei besser, anschließend wird sie von der liebe 
veredelt werden. die liebe wird die schneiderei ablösen . . . 
daß paula die liebe mit sinnlichkeit verbindet, ist eine folge 
der zeitschriften, die sie gerne liest (LH, 27 & 30).42
Hence it is clear that, in regard to Paula’s views of what “true love” consists, that 
she “has no inner core to which she can remain true, her core is the ideology of 
love out of which she has been constructed” (Haines, 649, emphasis in original), 
an ideology that she learns, as in Madame Bovary, from reading, in this case 
 
                                                 
42 “but above everything is love, which is best of all, replies paula. paula is better [than 
the housewives on the bus with her—BB] because of dressmaking, subsequently she will be 
ennobled by love. love will take the place of dressmaking . . . that paula connects love with 
sensuality, is a result of the magazines, which she likes to read” (women, 28 & 31). 
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women’s magazines, rather than novels. Paula, constructed as she is by the 
external mediations of her dressmaking and then by the discourse of love, does 
not experience love as anything other than ideology.43
Once again, this brings us back to a comparison between love and money, 
women and workers. In relation to money and its function as mediator, Marx, in 
the Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy, writes:  
 
Das Wesen des Geldes ist . . . die vermittelnde Tätigkeit oder 
Bewegung, der menschliche, gesellschaftliche Akt, wodurch 
sich die Produkte des Menschen wechselseitig ergänzen, 
entfremdet und die Eigenschaft eines materiellen Dings außer 
dem Menschen, des Geldes wird . . . Durch diesen fremden 
Mittler—statt daß der Mensch selbst der Mittler für den 
Menschen sein sollte—schaut der Mensch seinen Willen, seine 
Tätigkeit, sein Verhältnis zu andren als eine von ihm und 
ihnen unabhängige Macht an. Seine Sklaverei erreicht also die 
Spitze . . . Sein Kultus wird zum Selbstzweck. Die 
Gegenstände, getrennt von diesem Mittler, haben ihren Wert 
verloren (40: 445-46, emphasis in original).44
                                                 
43 In this we can see the tension between Jelinek’s views and those of her characters, as 
Rebecca Thomas points out in her reading of Die Liebhaberinnen: “In a pure identification with 
media images, Paula posits both herself and Erich as possessing a heroic potential for selfhood 
and individuality that Jelinek vehemently rejects . . . This tension produces an effect that is 
simultaneously ridiculous and potentially tragic. Whereas Jelinek has created Paula as an 
example without individuality, the character Paula strains against this negation towards some 
assertion of herself as a self” (“(Re)-Production,” 71). That Paula attempts to assert her 
individuality through her a view of love constructed by the mass medium of romance novels is, 
of course, highly ironic. 
 
44 “the nature of money is . . . the mediating function or movement, human, social activity, 
by means of which the products of man mutually complement each other, is estranged and 
becomes the property of a material thing external to man, viz. money . . . Through this alien 
mediator man gazes at his will, his activity, his relation to others as at a power independent of 
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For Paula, love operates in much the same way as Marx describes money; 
that is, as a “mediating function,” for it is love which is the cult that “becomes an 
end to itself” and which mediates the relationship between Paula and Erich. That 
it is something external to her is clear through its dissemination via the mass 
media, media that Paula eagerly consumes.  
Finally, while the situation of women in patriarchal romantic relations 
may indeed parallel that of wage workers under capitalism, as I have argued 
above, it is not necessarily capitalism alone that is responsible for their plight in 
Die Liebhaberinnen. That this is the case means that the Marxist/socialist feminist 
analysis of Jelinek outlined above is necessarily incomplete, as I discuss below. 
Problems with the Marxist/Socialist Feminist Analysis of Jelinek 
One problem, however, with the application of the socialist feminist 
appropriation of Marx’s theory of alienation to Jelinek’s texts is that, despite their 
claims to the contrary, Jaggar’s and Bartky’s use of the term alienation still seems 
to indulge in a continued reliance on the notion of a human essence or the 
possibility of a coherent self. As another socialist feminist, Ann Ferguson, has put 
it: 
                                                                                                                                                 
them and of himself—instead of man himself being the mediator of man. His slavery thus reaches 
a climax . . . His cult becomes an end in itself. Separated from this mediator, objects lose their 
worth” (EW, 260, emphasis in original). 
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some socialist feminist perspectives, though they give us 
important insights about the reproduction and persistence of 
male dominance . . . fail to explain unconscious, irrational and 
libidinal forces that keep both the oppressed and oppressors 
from re-negotiating gendered, racial and class interaction (33). 
Jaggar herself is aware of this problem: “In spite of its promise as a critical tool, 
‘alienation’ is a somewhat problematic concept for Marxists because it may be 
taken to presuppose a human essence from which people under capitalism are 
alienated, and the concept of a human essence seems quite at odds with the 
conception of human nature as a product of history” (57, emphasis added).45 
Despite this realization, however, Jaggar never adequately explains how the 
socialist feminist use of the term alienation will be able to avoid this possible 
pitfall. Rather, in her description of the alienation caused by conformity to 
prevailing gender norms, she claims that due to alienation, “both sexes have 
been prevented from the full and free development of their productive 
capacities. Both sexes are fragmented distortions of human possibility,” (316).46
                                                 
45 One should also note here that critiques of “essentialism” in Marx are not necessarily 
correct. I am, however, referring here to socialist feminists and their use of Marx. 
 
46 In addition, Jaggar’s endorsement of feminist standpoint theory at the end of her book 
comes close to claiming an essence for women, albeit one based on social conditions: “The 
concept of women’s standpoint . . . asserts that women’s social position offers them access to 
aspects or areas of reality that are not easily accessible to men . . . Thus the standpoint of women 
provides the basis for a more comprehensive representation of reality than the standpoint of men 
. . . The standpoint of women reveals more of the universe, human and non-human, than does the 
standpoint of men” (384-85). While she does acknowledge that there may, indeed, be problems 
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Like Jaggar, Bartky is also unable to resolve this problem as is clear in her 
description of alienation: 
Alienation in any form causes a rupture within the human 
person, and estrangement from self . . . In many ways, psychic 
alienation and the alienation of labor are profoundly alike. 
Both involve a splitting off of human functions from the 
human person, a forbidding of activities thought to be 
essential to a fully human existence. Both subject the 
individual to fragmentation and impoverishment . . . To be a 
victim of alienation is to have a part of one’s being stolen by 
another (31-32). 
The socialist feminist concept of alienation, as described by Jaggar and Bartky, is 
thus one which relies on the notion that there is a whole self that precedes 
alienation, and to which one could return if social conditions were changed to 
eliminate alienation.47
                                                                                                                                                 
with feminist standpoint theory (especially in terms of the subsuming of difference), Jaggar 
nonetheless declares that: “In spite of this unavoidable looseness, I think that the concept of 
women’s standpoint is sufficiently specific to provide a way of evaluating the real strengths and 
weaknesses of the feminist theories presently available. In particular, I think that it provides a 
way of justifying the socialist feminist approach to theory and of indicating further directions for 
theoretical development . . . socialist feminism offers the best available representation of reality 
from the standpoint of women” (387 & 89). 
 
47 For an example of a socialist feminist, whose use of alienation is not dependent on the 
concept of a human essence, see Ann Ferguson’s Blood at the Root: Motherhood, Sexuality & Male 
Dominance, in which she outlines alienation as the following: “a mode of sex/affective production 
can be described as alienated if 1) there are contradictory values built into the social construction 
of its sexual symbolic codes; 2) sexual roles require an either/or choice of sexual values which an 
alternative social construction of sex (one which is historically possible to achieve) would make 
unnecessary; and 3) social structures in the present social formation make it impossible to achieve 
all the aims and objects of sexuality as socially constructed (thus implying the need for radical 
changes in the structure in order to achieve values promised by the society)” (153-54). 
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That this view (that is, the notion of a whole self preceding alienation) is 
not present in Jelinek’s texts can be seen in the passages such as the one quoted 
above on page 46 of this chapter (“über allem ist die liebe. . .” LH, 27; women, 28) 
and the following: 
daß paula die liebe mit sinnlichkeit verbindet, ist eine folge 
der zeitschriften, die sie gerne liest (LH, 30).48
As noted above, these passages demonstrate that Jelinek’s figures “are not 
‘rounded’ or autobiographically based characters with whom the reader is asked 
to empathize . . . but one-dimensional, unsympathetic figures” (Haines and 
Littler, 39).
 
49
In addition to the lack of unity experienced by Jelinek’s figures, my use of 
psychoanalysis to supplement my Marxist/socialist feminist reading of Jelinek 
exposes another problem with the application of the theory of alienation as 
outlined by Jaggar and Bartky to Jelinek’s texts, for, if as Lacan and Althusser 
argue, this notion of an undivided self can be seen to be imaginary, a product of 
 
                                                 
48 “that paula connects love with sensuality, is a result of the magazines, which she likes 
to read” (women, 31). 
49 Haines and Littler also note in their chapter on Die Liebhaberinnen that this type of 
character made for “surprisingly uncomfortable reading for its early feminist readers” (39). That 
discomfort is, I find, also reflected in the difficulty of applying a purely second wave feminist 
analysis to the text. 
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language and/or ideology, how are we then to view the alienation of Jelinek’s 
figures? Both Lacan and Althusser define the subject’s unity in terms contrary to 
those used by Jaggar and Bartky, and this lack of unity caused by the symbolic is 
present in Jelinek’s work, as Brigid Haines has noted: 
Jelinek thus shows that women’s exploitation, their alienation 
from each other, from desire, and from the symbolic order are 
not explicable by the mechanics of capitalism alone but can 
also be explained in terms of their status as commodities 
within a patriarchal economy. That these often overlap . . . 
shows that capitalism has taken over and reinforced pre-
existing practices. This takes us beyond a Marxist analysis and 
back into the realm of the symbolic (653, emphasis added). 
It is for this reason that I will now turn to an analysis of alienation in the 
Lacanian sense in Jelinek’s novel. For if Marx and socialist feminists can help us 
to interpret the alienation of labor and sexuality undergone by Brigitte and 
Paula, Lacan can help us to read the “realm of the symbolic,” as Haines puts it. 
Lacanian Alienation and Metonymy in Die Liebhaberinnen 
In what follows, I will return to the reading of Die Liebhaberinnen given 
above, this time drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis and its definitions of 
alienation and subjectivity, as a means of teasing out and illuminating the 
contradictions and complexity of this text. A Lacanian analysis of alienation will 
be deployed in order to demonstrate how Jelinek’s figures experience not just 
 53 
 
their labor or sexuality as alienated, but also suffer from alienation in the 
Lacanian sense.50
As Lacan explains in his article on the mirror stage, alienation results from 
the fact that the individual believes her or himself to be the coherent whole 
reflected in the mirror: 
 
The mirror stage is a drama . . . which manufactures for the 
subject . . . the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality . . . and lastly, 
to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, 
which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire 
mental development (E, 4). 
Furthermore, “this Gestalt . . . symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the 
same time as it prefigures its alienating destination” (E, 2, emphasis in original). 
This coherent self reflected in the mirror is, according to John Muller and 
William Richardson, “a total unity that replaces [the] earlier experience of 
fragmentation,” (30) and, as such 
                                                 
50 Althusser occupies a complementary position here, in his intent “to forestall the use of 
the early, Hegelianizing Marx, the Marx of the theory of alienation, against the later Marx of 
Capital” (Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory, 109). He also relates the mirror stage to ideology, 
writing: “We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in 
the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly 
speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. Which 
means that all ideology is centered, that the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the 
Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects to the Subject, while 
giving in them the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and 
future) the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him” (180, emphasis in original). The 
question of ideology is one I shall return to later in this chapter. 
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becomes idealized into a model for all eventual identification . 
. . This model, however, although it “fixes” the subject in a 
certain permanence . . . does so in a form that initially . . . is 
“other” to the subject, exterior to it, hence an “alienation” of it. 
The stability of this form, contrasting as it does with the 
instability of the initial fragmentation, assumes a tensile 
strength that eventually becomes rigid and armorlike (Muller 
and Richardson, 30-31, emphasis in original). 
As a consequence, this coherent self reflected in the mirror is nothing originally 
given since it is found first in the mirror image, which is a méconnaissance 
“constitut[ing] the ego” and an “illusion of autonomy” (E, 6) and later through 
the same process of misrecognition of oneself as reflected in others. Here it is 
important to note that for Lacan, alienation is a necessary step in achieving 
subjectivity insofar as it “represents the instituting of the symbolic order . . . and 
the subject’s assignation of a place therein” (Fink, Lacanian Subject, 52). It is only 
one step, however, and the second step (and not one that all subjects manage to 
get to) is separation, in which “the subject attempts to fill the mOther’s lack” 
(Fink, Lacanian Subject, 54; see also S11, Chapter 16). In other words, through 
separation, the subject becomes aware that the mother also has lack. Alienation 
and separation are later terms for what Lacan earlier referred to as metaphor and 
metonymy (Laurent, 21). 
In the following passage from the novel, the sexual objectification of 
Brigitte, which results in the type of sexual alienation discussed above, is made 
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clear: “brigitte hat nichts davon [sex with Heinz—BB] außer einer vagen 
hoffnung. brigitte hat außerdem eine vagina. gierig schnappt brigittes vagina 
nach dem jungen unternehmer” (LH, 56).51
By doing so, Jelinek exposes the relationship that exists between Brigitte’s 
hope and her vagina as alienated labor or commodity, showing that, for Brigitte, 
her hope (of a secure future) is based on how well she can use her vagina. What 
we see in this passage, however, is not only alienation is the Marxist or socialist 
feminist sense as discussed above, but also, in Jelinek’s use of the “part for the 
 Here the reader can see that Brigitte, 
represented as she is by her vagina, has undergone the fragmentation of her 
body that Jaggar and Bartky view as an instance of alienating femininity. It is 
also an example of the alienation women undergo in their search for an 
economically secure marriage partner; while Brigitte is not yet married to Heinz, 
she is “selling” her sexuality to him in the hope that it will lead to a future 
marriage between them. (Here we also see a more Marxian or socialist feminist 
variant of Jelinek’s alienation at work). 
                                                 
51 “brigitte gets nothing out of it apart from a vague hope. apart from that brigitte has a 
vagina. which she makes use of. brigitte’s vagina snaps greedily at the young entrepreneur” 
(women, 65). 
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whole” a Lacanian metonymy,52
In Lacan’s definition, metonymy comes to figure as that which Freud 
termed displacement.
 which thus works to undermine alienation. In 
terms of metonymy, this passage can also be read, via the Lacanian definition of 
metonymy, as a form of displacement. 
53
                                                 
52 Anika Lemaire’s definition of metonymy in the Lacanian sense (which differs 
somewhat from other uses of the term) is useful here: “[metonymy] substitutes one term for 
another on the basis of a link of proximity, of connexion in meaning between the two terms” (42). 
For more on metaphor and metonymy in Lacan, see also: Grigg, especially chapter 11; and 
Ragland-Sullivan (233-58). 
 In his discussion of metonymy in Seminar III, Lacan 
makes this clear, stating: “One thing is named by another that is its container . . . 
In general what Freud . . . calls displacement is metonymy,” also pointing out 
that “the signifier is the instrument by which the missing signified expresses 
itself” (S3, 221). Lacan’s term is an expanded use of metonymy, meaning both 
part for whole and one thing for another. In the case of the quote from Jelinek’s 
53 See, for example, Die Traumdeutung, in which Freud defines displacement as follows: 
“Unter den Gedanken, welch die Analyse zutage fördert, finden sich viele, die dem Kern des 
Traumes ferner stehen und die sich wie künstliche Einschaltungen zu einem gewissen Zwecke 
ausnehmen. Der Zweck derselben ergibt sich leicht: gerade sie stellen eine Verbindung, oft eine 
gezwungene und gesuchte Verbindung zwischen Trauminhalt und Traumgedanken her . . . Der 
Erfolg dieser Verschiebung ist, daß der Trauminhalt dem Kern der Traumgedanken nicht mehr 
gleichsieht, daß der Traum nur eine Entstellung des Traumwunsches im Unbewußten 
wiedergibt” (GW, 2: 312-13) [“Among the thoughts that analysis brings to light are many which 
are relatively remote from the kernel of the dream and which look like artificial interpolations 
made for some particular purpose. That purpose is easy to divine. It is precisely they that 
constitute a connection, often a forced and far-fetched one, between the dream-content and the 
dream-thoughts . . . The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer 
resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of 
the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious” (SE, 4: 306-07, emphasis in original)]. 
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text, the vagina is the signifier, while the missing signified is not just Brigitte, but 
also the commodification of her vagina into a “vague hope.” Brigitte thus does 
not possess any coherent subjectivity; rather, she comes to figure as a subject 
through her (or, more properly, her vagina’s) desire, which, for Lacan, is 
metonymic. As John Muller and Paul Richardson explain: “The mode of 
metonymy . . . functions through the processes of desire . . . desire . . . seeks its 
term by ‘eternally stretching forth towards the desire for something else’ (Lacan, E, 
167, emphasis in original), where the ‘something else’ is related to a previous 
‘something else’ by means of metonymy” (168-69). What Jelinek does in her 
novel is to thus relate this Lacanian metonymy back to Brigitte’s social status as 
lower-class woman: in other words, she contextualizes psychoanalytic 
metonymy in Marxian and feminist social terms. 
Here, Gilbert Chaitin’s gloss on the Lacanian notion of metonymy may be 
helpful in clearing up what is a rather abstract position: 
if . . . any expression may be used to signify something ‘other 
than what it says,’ then clearly meaning does not inhere in 
signifiers. It may always be displaced from one set to another. 
Metonymy is therefore the equivalent of the primary process 
of displacement . . . In short, displacement/metonymy brings 
about the detachment of the subject from its attributes—the 
loss of meaning. Metonymy is essential to the unconscious, 
because . . . the unconscious is precisely that which escapes 
expression in language . . . The only way to designate that for 
 58 
 
which the word is lacking is to refer to it by another name, by 
allusion (50). 
What this means is that, in the writing of the text, the meaning of either 
the “vague hope” or Brigitte’s vagina is not an innate quality of the signifiers 
used to designate them; rather, it is the juxtaposition of the terms that produces 
meaning and exposes the detachment of the subject (in this case, Brigitte) from its 
attributes, thus revealing the unconscious dimensions of alienation. If metaphor, 
for Lacan, is a paternal signifier of repression tied to the Name-of-the-Father, 
metonymy is what tends to slip away from this through desire. As a 
consequence, the alienation in the above passage is found not just in Brigitte’s 
reduction to a body part or the sale of her sexuality (in the narrative), but is also 
revealed by Jelinek’s use of metonymy in the writing, for it is through this use of 
metonymy that the instability of the signifier and the fiction of the ego (as the site 
of alienation) as whole is exposed, naming as it does by allusion (the “vagina” for 
Brigitte or the “vague hope”). 
Jelinek’s use of metonymy therefore functions to expose the alienating 
fiction of the whole ego by making clear the displacement of meaning that takes 
place in the unconscious (a displacement that Brigitte naturally does not 
recognize). As Lacan points out in “Agency of the letter in the unconscious,” the 
ego’s function is precisely to cover up this displacement: “For this ego, which is 
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notable in the first instance for the imaginary inertias that it concentrates against 
the message of the unconscious, operates solely with a view to covering the 
displacement constituted by the subject with a resistance that is essential to the 
discourse as such” (E, 169). The function of the ego, then, is to deny the “message 
of the unconscious,” as constituted through metonymy, allowing the subject to 
experience imaginary wholeness through others: 
heinz tut manchmal direkt so, als ob er und brigitte nicht ein 
mensch wären, was sie aber sind. sehen denn diese frauen 
nicht, daß wir in wirklichkeit eins sind, eins geworden sind, 
untrennbar, fragt brigitte verwundert, wenn andre frauen 
heinz als einen eigenen körper mit einem eigenen geist 
ansehen (LH, 53-54).54
The imaginary wholeness of Brigitte’s ego is consequently found through her 
identification vis-à-vis Heinz, but is exposed by Jelinek as fictional. Lacan 
discusses this romantic myth of wholeness in the Other at length in Seminar VIII, 
devoted to Plato’s Symposium (on this, see Z. M. Marks). By contrast, the irony of 
Jelinek’s metonymies has a dehumanizing quality, reducing Heinz and Brigitte to 
puppets rather than whole Menschen. 
 
                                                 
54 “sometimes heinz plainly acts as if he and brigitte were not one person, which they are 
however. do these women not see that in reality we are one, have become one, inseparable, asks 
brigitte in astonishment when other women look at heinz as a separate body with a separate 
spirit” (women, 61). 
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Moreover, Jelinek refuses to allow the reader identification with Brigitte 
for the same reason: identification is the site of the imaginary, the ego and thus 
alienation. This refusal can be found in the following descriptions of Brigitte and 
Heinz’s sexual relationship: 
auch ekelt brigitte vor heinz und seinem fetten weißen 
elektrikerkörper, der auch heinz heißt. trotzdem ist sie auch 
wieder froh, so froh, todfroh, daß sie ihn hat, weil er ihre 
zukunft ist (LH, 32).55
zwischen brigitte und heinz ist eine körperliche vereinigung 
in gange. brigitte sagt, mir ist es so schön, daß man sterben 
möchte . . . mit dir ist es so schön, heinz, daß man sterben 
könnte. bei der arbeit jedenfalls möchte ich nicht sterben, 
heinz, wenn schon, dann wenigstens vorher (LH, 56).
 
56
In the second passage, Jelinek is playing with romance novel conventions 
(as she does throughout the whole novel; see Fiddler, Rewriting, 72, and above 
for a discussion of Brigitte and Paula as “typical” and “atypical” romance 
heroines, as well as below for more on the romance novel); the phrase “it’s so 
good with you, I could die” is something straight out of a traditional romance 
 
                                                 
55 “brigitte also is repelled by heinz and his plump white electrician’s body, which is also 
called heinz. despite that she is also happy again, so happy, dead happy, that she has him, 
because he is her future” (women, 34). 
56 “a physical union is in process between brigitte and heinz. brigitte says, it’s so good 
with you, that one would like to die . . . it’s so good with you, heinz, that one would like to die. at 
any rate i would not like to die at work, heinz, if it has to be, then let it be before that at least” 
(women, 65). 
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novel. In a traditional romance, however, this phrase would be followed by a 
description of spectacular sex, allowing the reader to identify with the character 
and her pleasure. Jelinek, however, disallows that pleasure by following this 
sentence with a reference to work and death, thereby implying a metonymic 
equivalence between death by sex and death by work (and also destroying the 
cliché of sex to die for), while the use of the word “todfroh” in the earlier passage 
also implies the death of Brigitte, this time by happiness. In doing so, Jelinek 
unpacks both the meaning of happiness (Brigitte is happy because she will 
escape the factory, not because of love for Heinz), and the traditional metaphor of 
sex as “little death” (the most obvious example being la petite mort for orgasm in 
French). As Marlies Janz points out, death and dead bodies haunt Die 
Liebhaberinnen, with the result that “Die Verdinglichung des weiblichen Körpers 
in der Sexualität wie in der Arbeit also ist für die Frauen der Tod” (25).57 Jelinek’s 
linking of sexual death to this reification of women’s bodies shows how Brigitte’s 
desire for Heinz is in fact deadly.58
                                                 
57 “The reification of women’s bodies, both through sex and work, results in death for the 
women” (my translation). 
 
58 Indeed, as Janz points out: “Von Anfang an ist in Die Liebhaberinnen von toten Frauen 
die Rede” [“From the very beginning, women as lovers speaks about dead women” (my translation 
25)]. She goes on to give several examples from Jelinek’s text. 
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To clarify: Brigitte’s desire for Heinz is self-destructive, a desire which will 
ultimately lead to a deadly result, since “humans are actually driven by a death 
principle” as both Freud and Lacan insisted in their work (Ragland, 84-85). Here 
as elsewhere, the ironic brutality of Jelinek’s writing lies in the literalness with 
which she exposes this connection. Lacan illustrates this association with the 
myth Plato puts into the playwright Aristophanes’ mouth in the Symposium,59
Aristophanes’ myth pictures the pursuit of the complement 
for us in a moving, and misleading, way, by articulating that 
it is the other, one’s sexual other half, that the living being 
seeks in love. To this mythical representation of the mystery 
of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the 
subject, not of the sexual complement, but of that part of 
himself, lost forever, that is constituted by the fact that he is 
only a sexed living being, and that he is no longer immortal 
(S11, 205).
 
namely that all lovers seek their ideal and fulfilling complement in the beloved: 
60
What Lacan means by this is that “the living being, by being subject to sex, 
has fallen under the blow of individual death.” In other words, for Lacan (as for 
Jelinek) the drive “is profoundly a death drive” (S11, 205). What we see, then, in 
 
                                                 
59 See Plato’s Symposium, in which the character of Aristophanes states that “Love is born 
into every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature; it tries to make one out of 
two and heal the wound of human nature” (27). According to this myth, the wound had 
developed when Zeus had split humans, who were originally composed of two beings, into two 
halves. 
60 This is, of course, the central myth of the Western romance novel – that one can find 
one’s complement or “other half” through romantic love. 
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Jelinek is a grotesque parody of the romance novel, one that “[undermines] at 
every turn the ethos of romantic love by showing the economic reasons for 
marriage and the brutal reality of sexual relations” (Haines and Littler, 42), and 
that equates love and marriage with death for women (and men [Haines and 
Littler, 45]).61
“Reading the (Anti-)Romance”: Die Liebhaberinnen and the Romance Novel 
 In the following section, I will read Die Liebhaberinnen in generic 
terms as an anti-romance. 
First, however, it may be helpful to offer a definition of the genre. Scholars 
of the romance novel tend to agree that the romance novel is one that tells a 
(often, but not always, heterosexual) love story. This love story is central to the 
development of the heroine’s identity, contains barriers that must be overcome in 
order for the couple to find true love, and tends to result in upward social and 
financial mobility for the heroine. Consider, for example, the following 
definitions: 
A romance novel is a work of prose fiction that tells the story 
of the courtship and betrothal of one or more heroines 
(Juhasz, 14). 
 
                                                 
61 In this respect, Jelinek’s work also parallels that of Denis de Rougemont, who, in his 
book Love in the Western World, put forward the thesis that “Passion has thus only played the part 
of a purifying ordeal . . . in the service of transfiguring death” (Rougemont, 46; Qtd. in Pearce, 15-
16). 
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Zwei Partner (Mann und Frau) werden nach Überwindung 
von Widerständen gemeinsam glücklich (Peter Nusser qtd. in 
Thiel, 7).62
 
 
the most striking characteristic of the ideal romance [is] its 
resolute focus on a single, developing relationship between 
heroine and hero (Radway, 122). 
 
Harlequin novels . . . [tell] the story of how a modern young 
woman succeeds in marrying a handsome, desirable, and 
wealthy man . . . Put more polemically, popular romance tells 
the story of how the heroine gains access to money – to power 
– in patriarchal society . . . romance tells over and over a story 
about power deeply encoded within a story about love (Cohn, 
3). 
 
Working with the above definitions, it is clear that Jelinek’s text both draws from 
and transcends the traditional romance novel, as I shall explore in more detail 
below. What she does, I argue, is to construct a materialist feminist63
Viewed in this way, we can see how the contrasting stories of Brigitte and 
Paula have the effect of demonstrating Jelinek’s transformation of romance novel 
 version of 
the romance novel, one that illustrates the ways in which conventional romance 
novels work are alienating. 
                                                 
62 “Two partners (man and woman) will be happy together after overcoming obstacles” 
(my translation). 
63 My definition of materialist feminism is taken from Sara Lennox’s chapter on 
Bachmann and materialist feminism in her book Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters: Feminism, 
History, and Ingeborg Bachmann, in which she defines materialist feminism as a methodology that 
“combined post-Althusserian Marxism with postmodern discourse theories” (Cemetery, 298). 
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conventions. While Jelinek plays with the romance form in her text, Die 
Liebhaberinnen should, however, in Allyson Fiddler’s words, more properly be 
seen as an “anti-romance,” since Jelinek “uses the stories of her two protagonists 
to ridicule the myths of ‘true love’ and ‘passion’ propagated by the happy-end 
school of popular fiction” (Rewriting, 72). Because Die Liebhaberinnen is an anti-
romance, the figure of Brigitte “has no potential for fitting the classic heroine’s 
role. The value of her own ‘happy end’ is degraded by the motivations which the 
reader knows have led to her choice of husband and by the crude and 
unromantic reality of her sexual and social interaction” (Fiddler, Rewriting, 73). 
Traditional romance heroines are not supposed to be actively looking for 
marriage, especially an economically successful one, despite the fact that “it is a 
commonplace of romance that the heroine will marry well, a given that the hero 
will be rich” (Cohn, 127).64
the heroine’s accomplishment . . . her success in marrying 
well, must seem almost an accident; it is never her purpose. 
The idea of a romance heroine setting out to marry 
successfully is doubly denied. She never seeks marriage in 
any form, and when she finds her hero, she is never drawn to 
him by the signs of his economic power. The heroine is 
defined by her apparent passivity and disinterestedness; she 
 Additionally, 
                                                 
64 See also: (P. Marks) for a discussion of the “good provider” in romance novels; and 
Dubino, who claims that “All varieties of the romance contain the pattern of ‘heroine gets rich 
through love’ “ (103, emphasis added). 
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is a negation of the purposeful, self-interested, mercenary 
woman . . . This strategy . . . attempts to disguise both the 
heroine’s real goal and the profound association between 
sexual and economic power that lies at the heart of the 
romance (Cohn, 127).  
In this respect, we can see that Paula truly is a romance heroine, albeit a 
failed one, as she, unlike Brigitte, who deliberately “trapped” Heinz because she 
knew he was the best she could get, is a far more passive participant in the 
process of finding love: 
paula wartet darauf, daß sie ausgewählt wird, worauf es 
ankommt. es kommt darauf an, vom richtigen ausgewählt zu 
werden. paula hat niemals gelernt, selber auszuwählen und 
zu bestimmen. paula erlebt alles in der leideform, nicht in der 
tätigskeitform (LH, 30).65
Precisely by having Paula fail where Brigitte succeeds, Jelinek undoes romance 
conventions, with the result that the relation of sexual and economic power that 
traditional romance novels suppress is brought to the fore in Jelinek’s text. 
 
Jelinek’s transformation of the romance novel form does not, however, 
take place simply at the formal or plot level, but also at the level of the writing 
itself, that is, in the text’s signifying practice. In terms of the writing, traditional 
romance novels tend use a mode of writing that fosters readers’ identification 
                                                 
65 “paula is waiting to be chosen, which is what really matters. what matters is to be 
chosen by the right man. paula herself has never learned to choose and to decide. paula 
experiences everything in the passive voice, not the active voice” (women, 31). 
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with the romance heroine (or hero, as the case may be).66
all of the women I spoke to . . . admitted that they wanted to 
identify with the heroine . . . What they [romance readers] 
enjoy most about romance reading is the opportunity to 
project themselves into the story, to become the heroine . . . 
readers project themselves into the story by identifying with 
the heroine as she responds to the hero with all of her 
“strongly passionate nature” (64, 67 & 69). 
 In her study of 
romances and their readers, Janice Radway discusses the identification that 
readers experience through “reading the romance”: 
Radway’s observations raise the question of precisely how this identification 
between reader and romance heroine comes about, a question Radway addresses 
in her chapter on language and narrative discourse in the romance novel. 
As she explains, the “contemporary romance’s prose is dominated by 
cliché, simple vocabulary, standard syntax, and the most common techniques 
associated with the nineteenth-century realist novel” (Radway, 189). The effect of 
these techniques is that the contemporary romance is able to maintain the 
“illusion that language is a transparent window opening out onto an already 
existing world” (Radway, 189); with the result that romance readers “come to the 
romantic text, then, with the understanding that language is there to describe, in 
                                                 
66 For a discussion of romance readers’ ability to identify with both the heroine and the 
hero, see (Kinsdale). 
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simple and unambiguous terms, events that for all intents and purposes, were 
‘completed’ just before the fictional narrator described them” (Radway, 190). 
Moreover, because romance novelists also share this belief with their readers, 
they write texts designed to be read in this straightforward 
manner. The characteristic verbal structure of the 
contemporary romance thus conveniently lends itself to this 
kind of interpretation by refusing to present the reader with 
anything capable of disorienting her or of forcing her to 
attend differently to the substance and organization of signs 
that cannot be taken so easily as simple, referential gestures 
(Radway, 191). 
Radway’s position is supported by at least two romance writers, Jayne 
Ann Krentz (who writes under the pseudonyms Amanda Quick, Jayne Castle, 
and Stephanie James, among others), and Linda Barlow who claim that: 
The author of a romance novel and her audience enter into a 
pact with one another. The reader trusts the writer to create 
and recreate for her a vision of a fictional world . . . The 
romance writer gives form and substance to this vision by 
locking it in language, and the romance reader yields herself 
to this alternative world in the act of reading, allowing the 
narrative to engage her mind and her emotions and to 
provide her with a certain intensity of experience. She knows 
that certain expectations will be met and that certain 
conventions will not be violated (15-16). 
The type of language used to create this “intensity of experience” is, in their 
view, a “figurative language . . . rich, evocative diction that is heavy-laden with 
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familiar symbols, images, metaphors, paradoxes, and allusions to the great 
mythical traditions” (16). 
Barlow and Krentz go on to add that “the language of romance is more 
lushly symbolic and metaphorical than ordinary discourse” (22) because “lush 
use of symbols, metaphors, and allusion is emotionally powerful as well as 
mythologically evocative” (24). As an example of such lushly allusive and 
metaphorical language, consider the following:  
He returned his gaze to his wife’s face and lost himself in the 
soft liquid eyes that beheld him. He was barely conscious of 
his actions as he leaned forward, almost mesmerized by the 
deep pools of blue. His free hand slipped through her hair to 
the nape of her neck and still she stared, and then his mouth 
found hers and eyelids lowered. He felt her lips slacken and 
begin to tremble and then open as his mouth moved upon 
hers. He tasted response, sweet, warm and clinging and was 
aware of the rapid beat of her heart beneath the fingers resting 
on her breast (Woodiwiss, 351). 
In particular, I wish to draw attention to the use of the phrase “sweet, warm and 
clinging” to describe Heather’s response to the kisses bestowed upon her, as this 
description is actually a replacement for Heather herself, one that allows the 
“reader [to] actively [insert] herself in the relations of signification and the 
subject positions ideology articulates in the text,” to borrow from Teresa Ebert 
(“Romance,” 38). 
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For while Heather’s response could indeed be “sweet, warm and 
clinging,” the phrase also functions in a manner similar to that of Hugo’s line 
(“His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful” [Qtd. in: E, 156]) cited by Lacan as 
an example of an identificatory metaphor.67
                                                 
67 It should be noted here that Lacan is using the term metaphor in a way that is similar to 
how others have used metonymy. What is important for my purposes is that when Lacan says 
“metaphor,” he means identification and alienation as well. As Dylan Evans notes, “Metaphor is 
also the structure of identification, since the latter consists in substituting oneself for another” 
(Dictionary, 113; see also S3, 218). For more on metaphor and metonymy in Lacan, see also: 
(Grigg, especially chapter 11, and Ragland-Sullivan, 233-58). 
 As Lacan explains, “If . . . his sheaf 
does refer us to Booz, and this is indeed the case, it is because it has replaced him 
in the signifying chain at the very place where he was to be exalted” (E, 157). 
Similarly, Heather, is replaced in the signifying chain above by her response. 
This, then, allows the reader to identify with Heather through the 
metaphor/identification of her response, for it is “the structure of the signifier 
[e.g., the replacement of the signifier Heather with the signifier of her response—
BB] which makes possible the transfer of meaning, and thereby the identification, 
understood in the psychoanalytic sense of the creation of the new identity of the 
subject” (Chaitin, 45), in this case the romance reader. Since identification, as 
defined by Lacan, consists of “the transformation that takes place in the subject 
when he assumes an image” (E, 2), we can presume that the assumption of this 
image on the part of the reader will also lead to the creation of an identification 
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as “sweet, warm and clinging.” We can thus see how the traditional romance 
functions to produce “gendered subjects, especially female ones, in male-
dominated heterosexual couples” (Ebert, “Romance,” 19). Working in opposition 
to the traditional romance, Jelinek’s text instead functions to disrupt the 
production of gendered subjects through caricaturing and overdoing the 
identificatory metaphors of the romance novel and she creates a text that exposes 
the ways in which the romance novel is ideological in the sense that Teresa Ebert 
uses the term. As Ebert defines it 
ideology is the organization of material signifying practices 
that constitute subjectivities . . . Subjectivity is thus the effect of 
a set of ideologically organized signifying practices through 
which the individual is situated in the world and in terms of 
which the world and one’s self are made intelligible 
(“Romance,” 23-24, emphasis in original). 
As a result, ideology functions as the “agency of the symbolic order,” using the 
forms and representations of the imaginary on behalf of the injunctions of the 
symbolic. Ideology harnesses the unconscious—the impetus of desire—in order 
to engender subjects and secure them in the relations of power and subjugation 
generated by the symbolic order (Ebert, “Romance,” 25, emphasis in original). 
As we have seen, the chief literary agent of this subjugation is 
identification, which would secure the subject in an alienating fiction of 
imaginary ego wholeness and identification (Brigitte’s “vage Hoffnung” or the 
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used metaphor of sex-as-death); and it is precisely such metaphors which 
Jelinek’s writing practice refuses to confirm, relying instead on the metonymic 
unpacking of such metaphoric meaning. 
Jelinek’s “textual politics,” therefore, are more clearly located in her 
writing practice than at the plot level. In contrast to a writer like Brecht, whose 
comments [of the narrator—BB] show the false consciousness 
depicted to be correctable, Jelinek’s narrator speaks from a 
position much closer to her protagonists and deliberately 
refrains from stating the essence of what is being depicted, 
thus making the reader work harder and denying him/her the 
catharsis resulting from a clear analysis . . . the narrative voice 
shifts, sometimes appearing complicit in patriarchal ideology, 
thus turning the reader into a voyeur . . ., sometimes directly 
mimicking it in order to open it up to scrutiny . . ., and 
occasionally drawing an unambiguous moral, as in the key 
passages above concerning Paula (Haines, 654).68
It is, then, Jelinek’s literary technique that makes the reader work for the insight. 
 
One example of Jelinek’s use of varying narrative techniques in Die 
Liebhaberinnen can be found in the following passage, a passage that once again 
                                                 
68 Haines’s examples of these passages concerning Paula, include, among others: “dieser 
roman handelt vom gegenstand paula” (LH, 130) [“the subject of this novel is paula” (women, 
158)]; and “über den gegenstand paula bestimmt erich, über dessen körperkräfte wieder andre 
bestimmen, bis sich seine eingeweide einem frühen tod entgegenzersetzen, bei dem der alkohol 
das seine leistet” (LH, 130) [“erich makes the decisions for the subject paula, and yet others make 
decisions about his physical strength, till his innards decompose towards an early death, in 
which alcohol does its bit” (women, 158)], thus clearly demonstrating, as Haines points out, the 
“hierarchical structure of domination” (651). 
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makes evident how Jelinek’s transformation of romance novel conventions 
serves to prohibit the reader an identification with the heroine: 
kaum schießt heinz zur türe herein, schon zielt er auf das sofa, 
noch ehe er den pullover ausgezogen hat, schon hechtet er 
blindlings los, brigitte fängt den ansturm mit ihrem leibe auf. 
vielleicht hat heinz einmal schon soviel schwung, daß er 
durch brigitte einfach hindurch und auf der andren seite 
durch die mauer rast. heute hat heinz gerade nur soviel 
schwung, daß er ihn in brigitte gekonnt hineinplaciert. es ist 
eine meisterleistung an präzision. es ist eine qual für brigitte 
(LH, 55).69
That Jelinek is mimicking what Haines refers to as “patriarchal ideology” can be 
seen if one compares her text to an excerpt from a traditional romance novel: 
 
‘Ring was on top of her in a second. All two hundred pounds 
of him hit her and knocked her to the floor—and his aim was 
perfect. His mouth hit hers precisely, and all his maleness 
entered her femaleness in one smooth move. Out of instinct 
her legs went around his waist as he began to move within 
her . . . “Yes,” she said, and took his earlobe in her teeth. 
“Yes.” She stuck her tongue in his ear and he slammed into 
her with such blinding force, that for a second she couldn’t 
see as she saw bright white light and her body rocked in 
tremors (Deveraux, 272). 
                                                 
69 “hardly has heinz shot through the door, than he’s already aiming at the settee, even 
before he’s taken off his pullover, he’s already taking a blind leap, brigitte cushions the onslaught 
with her body. perhaps one day heinz will have so much momentum that he simply tears 
through brigitte and through the wall on the other side. today heinz has only just enough 
momentum, so that he skillfully positions it in brigitte. it is a masterpiece of precision. it is torture 
for brigitte” (women, 63). 
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These examples make clear that Jelinek must have been familiar with the writing 
techniques of romance novelists while working on Die Liebhaberinnen, for her text 
precisely parallels that of Deveraux’s, but with one major difference: rather than 
following up her description of Heinz’s grand achievement in managing to place 
himself precisely in Brigitte with a description of the exquisite pleasure Brigitte 
receives from this act as Deveraux does, she describes it as torture for Brigitte. 
While what Jelinek does here is a mimicry of the language of romance, she also 
states the moral clearly in this case. That she does not always make the moral of 
her text this clear has been shown above in the discussion of Brigitte’s “vage 
Hoffnung”, thus showing that what she accomplishes in her text is a deft 
combination of narrative and didactic techniques to make the reader (sometimes) 
work for the insight. 
To conclude, I would like to return to the discussion of Hennessy’s 
critique outlined at the beginning of this chapter. This analysis of Jelinek’s text is 
not meant to demonstrate that she is what Hennessy refers to as a 
poststructuralist who “denies that the differences out of which meaning is made 
have any referent outside these unstable relations among signifiers” (Profit and 
Pleasure, 19), for it is clear the differences which produce meaning in Jelinek’s text 
do indeed have outside referents, for example in the relation of Brigitte’s and 
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Paula’s desire for love and marriage to the alienated form their labor takes in the 
bra factory, or to what they read in the mass media. Rather, what I have shown is 
that we do not have to (indeed, must not) choose between the symbolic and the 
material, and that Jelinek participates in what Teresa Ebert has termed 
“materialist critique,” that is, a critique which she defines as: 
a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the 
silence and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the 
concealed operations of power and the socioeconomic 
relations connecting the myriad details and representations of 
our lives . . . In sum, materialist critique disrupts “what is” to 
explain how social differences . . . have been systemically 
produced and continue to operate within regimes of 
exploitation (Ludic, 7). 
It is just such an operation that Jelinek’s use of metonymy performs; by linking 
Brigitte, her vagina and her hope together through metonymy, Jelinek exposes 
the “suppressed or missing,” that is, the connection between these things which 
usually goes unsaid.  
Moreover, since “patriarchy acts on individuals to reproduce gendered 
subjectivities through the consumption of commodities, notably texts,” as Ebert 
notes, and these texts are an important site for “reproducing gender distinctions” 
(“Romance,” 21), the choice that Hennessy offers us can be viewed as a false one. 
For while the material relations of labor and sexuality, and the alienation 
produced by those relations under capitalism, are indeed oppressive to women 
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(and men) and must be changed, it is also true that the “subject’s entry into a 
symbolic system of representations” (Hennessy, Profit and Pleasure, 212) plays a 
role in producing female subjectivities that are equally repressive. Or, as Luce 
Irigaray once put it: women “must go through a complex and painful process, a 
real conversion to the female gender” (Je, tu, nous, 21). In order to change this 
process, a focus on economics is not enough, for culture, too, plays its role, as 
Irigaray maintains: 
Social injustice is due not only to economic inequalities in the 
strict sense . . . Social justice, and especially sexual justice, 
cannot be achieved without changing the laws of language 
and the conceptions of truths and values structuring the social 
order. Changing the instruments of culture is just as important 
in the medium to long term as a redistribution of goods in the 
strict sense. You can’t have one without the other (Je, tu, nous, 21-
22, emphasis added). 
It is for this reason that I see my use of both socialist feminist and psychoanalytic 
theory as a means of furthering Sandra Bartky’s contention that a socialist 
feminist theory of alienation will not only have to “[uncover] all the modes of 
alienation [and examine them] in both their relationships to one another and to 
the modes of estrangement described by Marx” but will also have to reveal “the 
structuring of the unconscious both in men and women which facilitates the 
reproduction of alienated modes of existence” (36). 
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CHAPTER 2 
A JOUISSANCE BEYOND THE PHALLUS? LUST AND PORNOGRAPHY 
There is a jouissance . . . a jouissance of the body that is . . . a jouissance beyond 
the phallus. . . 
Jacques Lacan, Encore, Seminar XX (74) 
 
Introduction: An Artistic (Anti-) Pornography? 
It has become something of a “Gretchenfrage”1
                                                 
1 I have borrowed this phrase from Allyson Fiddler, who uses it to refer to the question of 
“what position, if any . . . [Jelinek’s] texts occupy within the postmodern debate on literature” 
(“There Goes. . .” 129). A quick glance at Jelinek criticism, however, shows that the question of 
pornography has become just as germane a “Gretchenfrage” as that of her Marxist versus 
postmodernist positions. Indeed, Jelinek’s oeuvre as a whole is often categorized by her 
detractors as pornography, and many of her works other than Lust do contain pornographic 
elements I will focus my discussion of Jelinek’s appropriation and subversion of the genre of 
pornography in this chapter on Lust as a paradigmatic text because it does not contain other 
generic elements, but is rather almost exclusively “pornographic.” For discussions on the relation 
of pornography to Jelinek’s work as a whole and/or other texts, see (among many others) Fiddler, 
Rewriting, Finney, Hanssen, Levin, and Lücke. 
 in Jelinek criticism to ask if 
Lust is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. Are we to understand it as a 
repudiation, mockery, and/or parody of (male) pornography and desire, or does 
Jelinek simply reproduce that which she is supposedly making fun of? In their 
eagerness to defend Jelinek from charges of pornography, many scholars have 
claimed that Lust is a repudiation of male pornography, and have failed to take 
seriously just how indebted Jelinek is to the Western tradition of literary 
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pornography, in particular that of the Marquis de Sade.2 Although many 
commentators have pointed out that Jelinek takes over and transforms the 
conventions of “traditional” pornography, they use as their point of reference 
“low” culture, or mass-market pornography, rather than “high” culture or 
literary pornography.3
                                                 
2 In this chapter, I will focus on Jelinek’s relationship to a male history of literary 
pornography, as those are the works on which Lust draws. It is important to note, however, that 
despite Jelinek’s (and other’s) dismissal of women’s pornography as “kaum literarisch 
interessant” (“Sinn des Obzönen,” 102-03) [“hardly interesting as literature” (my translation)], 
women were important to the development of the pornographic novel, which in the “mid- to late 
eighteenth century grew directly out of women’s fiction” (Mudge, 29). 
 To my knowledge, no one has yet discussed Jelinek’s 
affinity with Sade, other than in passing; there have been several comparisons 
drawn between Lust and Bataille’s Story of the Eye, but several critics have made 
the mistake of assimilating Bataille’s work to “pornography” as an undefined 
3 For readings of Lust that do take seriously Jelinek’s relationship to literary pornography, 
see Baackmann, Hartwig, Höfler (“Sexualität”), Janz, and Luserke. Ultimately, however, most of 
these scholars conclude that Lust is anti-pornographic, with the exceptions of Hartwig and 
Luserke, who concludes that Lust is neither pornography nor anti-pornography, but rather a “bis 
an die Grenzen des Möglichen und Machbaren reichende Ästhetik des Obszönen, zu dem die 
Macht, der Kapitalismus, die Sprache und der Sex, eben das Patriarchat, gehören” (98) 
[“aesthetics of obscenity that extends to the limits of the possible and feasible, and to which 
power, capitalism, language, sex, precisely patriarchy belong” (my translation)]. In this chapter, I 
argue that Jelinek’s text forces us to expand our definition of pornography to include precisely 
this “aesthetics of obscenity.” Also, none of these scholars read Jelinek with Sade, other than in 
passing. 
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whole, neglecting the differences between Bataille’s work and mass-market 
pornography.4
The distinction I draw here (and elaborate in more detail below) between 
mass cultural and high art forms of pornography is not meant to imply that there 
is no relation between the two, nor that the distinction can always be clearly 
delineated. Indeed, as Allison Pease has noted in respect to Joyce, Beardsley, and 
D.H. Lawrence, modernist writers were “not everywhere in opposition to mass 
culture, but in specific ways they appropriated it, incorporating the images and 
representational techniques of one very significant mass-cultural product: 
pornography” (xiii). She goes on to further note, however, that these artists were 
nonetheless successful at “courting high-art status” despite the introduction of 
“explicit pornographic tropes into their works” (xiv). In some ways, Pease views 
the modernist appropriation of pornography as that which enabled the later 
academic discussion of pornography as a genre to be taken seriously: “This book 
 
                                                 
4 A mistake that Jelinek herself makes (at least when writing about pornography, 
although not in Lust as I shall show), when she claims that “Der männliche Blick auf die Frau . . . 
ist immer verachtend. Pornografie ist nicht die Darstellung einer Handlung sondern der 
Erniedrigung. Eine pornografische Darstellung ist immer auch eine geschichtslose Darstellung” 
(“Sinn des Obzönen,” 102) [“The male gaze at the woman is always one of disdain. Pornography 
is not the representation of an act, but of humiliation. A pornographic representation is also 
always an ahistorical representation” (my translation)]. In the same essay she designates her own 
work as “Anti-Pornografie,” a designation which sscholars have uncritically accepted and 
repeated. See also Fiddler, “Porn,” Höfler, “Vergrößerungsspiegel,” and Janz. 
 80 
 
serves as proof . . . of the continued impact of modernism’s complex negotiation 
between aesthetics and pornography. If pornography has gained a place in 
serious academic discourse in the last ten years, it has done so because 
modernism first demanded that it be taken seriously, and showed us how” (xv). 
Pease does not, however, maintain that one can collapse the distinction between 
the mass cultural and high art forms of pornography, since pornography 
“remained quite distinct from the aesthetic in that it elided the reflective or 
contemplative distance invoked by [the aesthetic]” (3). 
It is precisely this complex negotiation between aesthetics and 
pornography, as outlined by Pease, that I address in this chapter and that, I 
argue, many Jelinek scholars have failed to address through their collapsing of 
the distinction (complicated as it may be) between mass-cultural forms of 
pornography and the type of pornography produced by writers such as Bataille 
and Sade. Thus, for example, Allyson Fiddler concludes that Lust is an anti-
pornographic work because compared “to Bataille’s or other pornographers [it] 
in fact tries to say something about sex not with sex but with language, and often 
in particular with the language of sex” (“Porn,” 411, emphasis in original). She 
argues further that in the case of Lust, 
the characteristics of pornography are only vestigial. At first 
sight they appear to conform to a standard erotic scenario, but 
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it becomes clear that Jelinek uses them in order to subvert and 
frustrate the reader’s expectations. Jelinek’s text is therefore 
not pornographic. What Lust does become is a parody of 
pornography, a work of anti-pornography (“Porn,” 413, 
emphasis in original). 
While I agree in general with Fiddler’s conclusions that Lust subverts and 
frustrates its reader’s expectations regarding pornography, I quarrel with her 
claim that the texts of the “other pornographers” to whom she refers (and in 
whose group she presumably includes Sade as well as Bataille) are “narrated 
quite economically and are largely uncluttered by the feelings and opinions of 
the characters” (“Porn,” 411). I disagree as well as with Fiddler’s assertion that 
Jelinek’s text, in its attempt to “say something about sex not with sex but with 
language” (“Porn,” 411, emphasis in original) thus differs from the texts of those 
“other pornographers.” In making these claims, Fiddler draws on the authority 
of Susan Sontag, who points out in her essay “The Pornographic Imagination” 
that one of the distinctions made between pornographic writing and “literature” 
is that “pornography . . . possesses only one ‘intention’ [to sexually arouse the 
reader—BB], while any genuinely valuable work of literature has many” (39). 
There are two problems with Fiddler’s conclusions regarding what she 
views as the difference between Lust and “other pornography.” The first problem 
is that Fiddler fails to note that Sontag, in fact, goes on to posit both Bataille and 
 82 
 
Sade as writers whose works do not fit into the category of mass-market, easily 
consumable pornography, the very same distinction that Fiddler claims for 
Jelinek’s text. Fiddler’s second problem is that by arguing that Lust differentiates 
itself from pornography through its attempt to “say something about sex with 
language,” she overlooks the complex history of literary pornography, and the 
ways in which it, too, 
works to write the body in as many minute variations as 
possible, to evoke its materiality and palpability for the sexual 
imagination of its readers. While Steven Marcus contends that 
pornography constantly tries to escape language, such an 
assertion seems counter to the entire project of written 
pornography which, by writing the body and sexual acts, 
extends, proliferates and continues the body and the sexual 
acts in a never-ending stream of words (Pease, 6).5
In other words, based on Fiddler’s arguments, we can just as easily also 
claim Sade as an anti-pornographer, since he, like Jelinek, is a writer whose texts 
“refuse mimesis as a principle of imitation and identification that guides the 
reader’s relation to the text” (Judovitz, 173), and it is precisely this refusal of 
mimesis that Fiddler claims disrupts the pornographic narrative of Lust, thus 
resulting in an anti-pornographic novel. Given that there is a general consensus 
 
                                                 
5 In this respect, we could also borrow Deleuze’s term “pornology” to describe Jelinek’s 
text. “Pornology” is his term for the works of Sade, Sacher-Masoch, Bataille, and others; its 
applicability of Jelinek’s work lies in Deleuze’s definition of “pornological literature” as that 
which “is aimed above all at confronting language with its own limits” (22). 
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that Sade’s works constitute “pornography,” his work can also be seen as 
anticipating the same dilemma regarding Jelinek’s text posited at the beginning 
of this chapter: is it or is it not pornography? My answer is that Lust, like Sade, 
requires us to expand our definition of pornography, precisely in the way 
Jelinek’s novel works with and through different aspects of pornographic 
traditions. Certainly Lust is anti-pornographic if we take the goal of pornography 
to be solely the “sexual excitement of the reader” (Goulemot, “Sadean Novels,” 
71), because it is clear that Lust refuses to participate in such a project. However, 
Lust is simultaneously a pornographic text in the tradition of Sade (whose texts 
also make difficult, if not impossible, the sexual excitement of the reader), and 
his modernist successors. What this means is that we need to talk about two 
distinct pornographic traditions when we talk about Jelinek’s relationship to 
pornography: a mass cultural tradition, including film, that exists for the 
“specific purpose of sexually stimulating [its] readers” (Pease, 5), and a high 
culture literary pornographic tradition. 
Peter Michelson offers further clarification of the latter, a high culture 
literary pornographic tradition, defining it as “artistic pornography,” a 
pornography, that “may and frequently does represent explicit genital sex but 
integrates sexuality as a theme or rhetoric into an aesthetic context for an 
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aesthetic purpose” (xii), and one which incorporates what he terms an “aesthetics 
of obscenity” (xii). This type of aesthetic 
implies a perceptual alteration whereby the obscene, a species 
of the ugly, is reconstituted to a function akin to that of the 
beautiful. In that sense it is a contemplation of the unspeakable 
and counterpoints traditional aesthetic assumptions . . . A 
poetics of obscenity, then, describes speaking the unspeakable 
and is defined by the artistic strategies used to change 
assumptions and perceptions. These will vary according to 
artist, but what they will have in common is the disposition to 
make the obscene function aesthetically (xi-xii, emphasis in 
original).6
This tradition of artistic pornography could perhaps also be viewed as including 
that “anti-pornography” for which so many Jelinek scholars seem to be 
searching. Sade serves as a paradigmatic example of this (anti-)pornographic 
tradition, for as Jean Goulemot has noted, “there exists in Sade a frank recourse 
to the most classical type of pornography, whose literary methods he uses and 
whose objectives he apparently espouses. But Sade rather quickly diverts this 
pornography from its objective of sexual excitement” (“Sadean Novels,” 64). It is 
within this second tradition of literary or artistic pornography that I situate 
 
                                                 
6 See also Pease, who describes the “aesthetic of the obscene” as “a mode of sexual 
representation that, while potentially affecting the sensual interests of its readers, does not, as 
opposed to pornography, seek sexual arousal as its main purpose . . . In contrast to the 
pornographic, the aesthetic of the obscene seeks to be accepted into the cultural mainstream, and 
it does so by mediating its own materialist interests with idealist artistic techniques that promote 
the kind of consumptive practices associated with the aesthetic” (34-35). 
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Jelinek’s Lust. That this tradition also has a political history (one in which both 
Jelinek and Sade participate) has been made clear by Lynn Hunt, who has 
observed: 
If we take pornography to be the explicit depiction of sexual 
organs and sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual 
feelings, then pornography was almost always an adjunct to 
something else until the middle or end of the eighteenth 
century . . . between 1500 and 1800, pornography was most 
often a vehicle for using the shock of sex to criticize religious 
and political authorities (10). 
In terms of sexual politics, the major similarity that I find in the work of 
Sade and Jelinek, and that I would claim as a characteristic of the type of literary 
pornography I have been speaking of, is their depiction of sexuality as based on 
inequality and as inherently violent (in this respect, Sade has more in common 
with his critic, Andrea Dworkin, than Dworkin would perhaps care to admit).7
Sadean pornography . . . may make sexual explicitness look 
like a symbolic weapon . . . sexuality, from this position . . . 
establishes inequality as a necessary, rather than incidental, 
element of pleasure. The sexual exchange that seems to 
narrow the sexual contract to its most basic units does not . . . 
 
As Frances Ferguson has made clear, 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Dworkin’s chapter on Sade in her Pornography: Men Possessing Women, 
in which she claims: “[Sade] both embodies and defines male sexual values . . . In his work he 
relentlessly celebrated brutality as the essence of eroticism; fucking, torture, and killing were 
fused; violence and sex, synonymous” (70). Finally, Dworkin’s definition of sex as power implies 
an affinity with Sade, albeit one she would reject. 
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produce loving mutuality in a private encounter that is a 
refuge from and counter to a public and unjust world. Rather, 
inequality begins in sexuality (4-5). 
Ferguson goes on to note that the violence and inequality inherent in sexuality is 
precisely what Bataille’s work on Sade elaborates. As Bataille claimed in regard 
to Sade: 
The kind of sexuality [Sade] has in mind runs counter to the 
desires of other people . . . they are to be victims, not partners 
. . . if eroticism leads to harmony between the partners its 
essential principle of violence and death is invalidated. Sexual 
union is fundamentally a compromise, a half-way house 
between life and death. Communion between the participants 
is a limiting factor and it must be ruptured before the true 
violent nature of eroticism can be seen (167).8
In other words, what Sade demonstrates for us, according to Bataille, is not just 
the lack of reciprocity in the sexual relationship, but also that which Lacan once 
described as the fact that “sex and its significations are always capable of making 
present the presence of death” (S11, 257). 
 
It is precisely this link between the sexual drive and the death drive that 
constitutes an important aspect of the sexual politics of Sade’s and Jelinek’s 
                                                 
8 Bataille, of course, is important not only for Jelinek, given her claim that Lust originated 
as a “feminine counterpart” to his Story of the Eye (see Fiddler, Rewriting, 153), but also for the 
way Lacan uses the term jouissance in his later work. As Dylan Evans has noted, “the shift 
towards the sexual connotations of the term after 1965 may be inspired by the work of Georges 
Bataille” (“Jouissance,” 4). 
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“pornology,” namely, their portrayal of sexuality in terms of jouissance instead of 
pleasure. This depiction of jouissance instead of pleasure is where I find both Sade 
and Jelinek to be what I am defining as anti-pornographic or pornological rather 
than pornographic writers, for pornography is about pleasure (the possibility of 
having a sexual relation) whereas what Sade and Jelinek show us is the inherent 
impossibility in sexual relations and the link of the sexual drive to the death 
drive, or jouissance, which Lacan defines as involving “precisely the acceptance of 
death” and as something in which “pleasure and pain are presented as a single 
packet to take or leave” (S7, 189, emphasis in original; see also Dean, Beyond 
Sexuality, 125). The major difference is that if Sade demonstrates for us what 
Lacan once termed the “right to jouissance,” (“Kant with Sade,” 71), a right that 
Sade viewed as available to both sexes, provided that they were on the side of 
vice rather than virtue, Jelinek’s text makes it clear that in her view of the world, 
the “right” to jouissance is a phallic one and thus one which excludes women (see 
below for more on jouissance in Jelinek’s novel). 
By reading Jelinek and Sade within this tradition of high-culture literary 
and political pornography that goes beyond the goal of simply exciting the 
reader sexually, both authors can be seen as “moral pornographers,” to borrow 
Angela Carter’s term. A moral pornographer, according to Carter, is one who 
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“might use pornography as a critique of the current relations between the sexes” 
(19). A moral pornographer possesses the power to change the way we think 
about relations between the sexes: “Nothing exercises such power over the 
imagination as the nature of sexual relationships, and the pornographer has it in 
his power to become a terrorist of the imagination, a sexual guerilla whose 
purpose is to overturn our most basic notions of these relations” (21). 
Carter goes on to claim Sade as precisely this type of pornographer, 
maintaining that he “was unusual in his period for claiming rights of free 
sexuality for women, and in installing women as beings of power in his 
imaginary worlds” (36) and further that she “would like to think that [Sade] put 
pornography in the service of women, or, perhaps, allowed it to be invaded by 
an ideology not inimical to women” (37). This, of course, is where Jelinek and 
Sade part ways; if Carter, as a feminist on the “libertarian” side of the sex wars, 
can enthuse over Sade’s libertine women’s right to “fuck as actively as they are 
able” (27), Jelinek is much more pessimistic in her view of women’s ability to 
determine and control their own sexuality. In regard to women’s power (or lack 
thereof) to determine and control their sexuality, Lust sometimes seems to be 
closer to the position of the anti-pornography side of the feminist debate on 
pornography, as exemplified by Luce Irigaray in her short piece on pornography, 
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entitled “‘Frenchwomen,’ Stop Trying.” Irigaray’s title is an obvious reference to 
Sade’s pamphlet “Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become 
Republicans,” included in Philosophy in the Bedroom (296-339). In her essay, 
Irigaray asserts that “In the pornographic scene, there is nothing for me to say . . . 
[Women’s] training is designed to subject them to an exclusively phallocratic 
sexual economy” (This Sex, 198-99). This is not to claim that Jelinek vacillates 
between the two dichotomous positions of the feminist sex wars of the 1980s; 
rather, what she accomplishes with her text is to “significantly [stretch] the limits 
of the pornography debate” (101), as Ulrich Struve has rightly claimed.9
The Misfortunes of Justine and Gerti: Reading Jelinek with Sade 
 
In this section I explore the affinity between Sade and Jelinek, and the 
ways in which their works differ from those pornographic texts that exist solely 
for the purpose of sexual excitement. Specifically, I undertake a comparison of 
one of Sade’s Justine texts (The Misfortunes of Virtue) and Jelinek’s novel Lust. For 
if Sade entitled his first version of Justine the “Misfortunes of Virtue,” Jelinek’s 
Lust could just as easily be subtitled the “Misfortunes of Love,” as it is in their 
blind faith in the bourgeois values of virtue and love that Sade’s heroine most 
                                                 
9 For more on the sex wars in both the U.S. and Germany, see “PorNo” and “Frauen 
gegen Pornographie” (both published in Emma), Assiter and Carol, Duggan and Hunter, Gehrke, 
Gibson and Gibson, Rick and Treudl, and Segal and McIntosh. 
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resembles Jelinek’s Gerti.10
However, in order to illustrate the ways in which the artistic pornography 
of Sade and Jelinek differs from that of other mass-market pornographers, it is 
first necessary to offer a brief description and example of how the pornographic 
narrative functions. As a paradigmatic example of a text that works more clearly 
than Jelinek’s or Sade’s to fulfill an erotic function, I shall focus on John Cleland’s 
Fanny Hill or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1748/49).
 In each case, the figure’s suffering is directly caused 
by her refusal to give up this faith, whether in virtue or in love. Moreover, it is in 
the presentation of the character’s misfortune as “an ultimate challenge to any 
possible identification on the part of the reader” (Judovitz, 173) where Jelinek’s 
resemblance to Sade can best be seen, as a close reading of passages from The 
Misfortunes of Virtue and Lust will demonstrate. 
11
                                                 
10 Sade’s character is known alternately by the names Sophie (in Misfortunes), Thérèse (in 
Justine) and Justine (in both Misfortunes and Justine). In the interest of clarity, I shall refer to the 
character as Justine when writing of her; the names Sophie and Thérèse will appear only in 
quotes from Sade’s texts and interpretations of his works. 
 Fanny Hill contains the 
11 It is useful to bear in mind here Jean Goulemot’s caution that “there are no (or only 
very exceptional cases of) strictly pornographic works of fiction. Pure pornography is an extreme 
case . . .; a challenge that cannot be met” (“Libertine Fiction,” 134). Given Fanny Hill’s importance 
in the development of the novel (see Mudge, 199-213, and Wagner, 237-46) and its curious blend 
of “natural sexuality” and an “aesthetic framework incorporating the current of sentimentalism” 
(Wagner, 243), it cannot be considered “pure” pornography. It does, however, conform more 
noticeably to a standard erotic scenario than Jelinek’s and Sade’s texts do. Fanny Hill is also an 
important work to read with Sade and Jelinek as it is considered to be part of the anti-Pamela 
wave of the eighteenth century, as are Sade’s “Justine” texts (Mudge, 199 and 232-33); Jelinek’s 
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three elements that most critics agree are essential to creating a pornographic or 
erotic narrative. First, “if any tendency distinguishe[s] this category as a whole, it 
[is] voyeurism” (Darnton, 72; see also Goulemot, Forbidden Texts, Goulemot 
“Libertine Fiction,” Goulemot, “Sadean Novels,” and Pease). Two other elements 
necessary to create what Steven Marcus has termed “pornotopia” are “an 
enormous erect penis,” which functions as an “object of worship” (272) and the 
solicitation of “confessions of the hidden secrets of female pleasure” (L. Williams, 
53). As Linda Williams notes, such confessions of pleasure are often “elicited 
involuntarily,” resulting in scenes of rape and ravishment in which the 
“unwilling victim’s eventual manifestations of pleasure are offered as the genre’s 
proof of a sincerity that under other conditions might seem less sure” (50). 
The presence of all three of these elements of the pornographic narrative 
can be found in one of Fanny Hill’s early scenes, in which Fanny, hidden in a 
closet, watches as Mrs. Brown (the procuress with whom she is living) has sex 
with a horse-grenadier. Because this is such an exemplary scene in terms of its 
functioning as an erotic narrative, I shall quote it at some length: 
                                                                                                                                                 
novel, in its critical investigation of love and anti-sentimenatlism, could also be viewed as part of 
an anti-Pamela tradition. 
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I [Fanny—BB] instantly crept softly, and posted myself so 
that, seeing everything minutely, I could not myself be seen . . 
. 
Her sturdy stallion had now unbuttoned, and produced 
naked, stiff, and erect, that wonderful machine, which I had 
never seen before, and which, for the interest my own seat of 
pleasure began to take furiously in it, I stared at with all the 
eyes I had. However, my senses were too much flurried, too 
much concentered in that now burning spot of mine, to 
observe anything more than in general the make and turn of 
that instrument, from which the instinct of nature, yet more 
than all I had heard of it, now strongly informed me I was to 
expect that supreme pleasure which she has placed in the 
meeting of those parts so admirably fitted for each other . . . 
Whilst they were in the heat of the action, guided by nature 
only, I stole my hand up my petticoat, and with fingers all on 
fire, seized and yet more inflamed that center of all my senses; 
my heart palpitated, as if it would force its way through my 
bosom; I breathed with pain; I twisted my thighs, squeezed 
and compressed the lips of that virgin slit, and following 
mechanically the example of Phoebe’s manual operations on 
it, as far as I could find admission, brought on at last the 
critical ecstasy, the melting flow, into which nature, spent 
with excess of pleasure, dissolves and dies away (61-63). 
Here we see all of the elements coming together to create the “mise en scène of the 
erotic novel” (Goulemot, Forbidden Texts, 43): the description of the horse 
grenadier’s penis as “stiff, and erect, that wonderful machine”; Fanny’s 
involuntary, “natural” response to her witnessing of the sexual act, and most 
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importantly, Fanny’s positioning as simultaneously voyeur, narrator, and 
participant (via masturbation) in the sexual act she is witnessing. 
Indeed, it is the positioning of the reader as a voyeur via Fanny that 
makes Cleland’s text pornographic,12
The voyeur figure . . . offers a model for the reader to engage 
with, and reproduce for his or her private use, the pleasures 
of the seen and heard . . . pornography invites readers to 
indulge their own sensations through a mimetic imaginative 
practice extended and complemented by the physical act of 
masturbation (7-8). 
 for it is through identification with her that 
the reader is enabled to experience the physical desire which the pornographic 
narrative exists to elicit, as Allison Pease explains in her commentary on this 
scene: 
As we shall see, it is precisely in refusing the reader this “mimetic imaginative 
practice” that demonstrates the similarity between Sade’s and Jelinek’s texts. In 
the following reading of Sade’s and Jelinek’s novels, I will discuss the ways in 
which this refusal takes place at two textual levels: at the narrative or plot level, 
and at the level of the writing or form. 
                                                 
12 There are many other instances of Fanny as voyeur in Fanny Hill. For example, she and 
Phoebe watch another young woman in the house have sex with her client (66-71); she spies on 
her lover, Mr. H., while he dallies with her maid (104-05); and she observes two men engaging in 
sex through a peephole in the wall of her room in an inn (193-96). 
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In terms of both narrative and form, Jelinek in Lust and Sade in The 
Misfortunes of Virtue employ “strategies that disrupt identification with both 
mimetic and moral referents” (Judovitz, 174). In terms of the narrative, one way 
in which they achieve this disruption is by presenting “the reader with an 
implausible plot: that of the relentless, exaggerated, and caricature-like 
description of the heroine’s misfortunes” (Judovitz, 174). In the same manner as 
Gerti, the “heroine” of Lust, Justine is “shown to be suffering from her 
unsuccessful attempts to reconcile her own beliefs and her worldly experiences” 
(Judovitz, 176). Consequently, Justine’s unwavering belief in virtue and the 
possibility of meeting with others endowed with that quality causes her to 
continually trust people, despite the substantial accumulation of evidence to the 
contrary. Near the end of her tale of woe, Justine is arrested for the accidental 
death of an infant she was attempting to save from a fire (this after having 
endured a catalogue of insults, ranging from arrest for crimes she did not commit 
to rape, and being held captive as a sex slave by a group of perverted monks, 
among other horrors). 
In spite of all her contradictory experience, Justine nonetheless persists in 
believing that her virtue will endear her to someone, and turns, after her final 
arrest, for help to Father Antonin, one of the monks who had previously held her 
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captive as an unwilling participant in their debauched orgies. As Justine explains 
to her sister Juliette, her reason for depending on someone she knows to be on 
the side of vice is her stubborn persistence in clinging to and believing in virtue: 
Long grown accustomed to slander, injustice, and misfortune, 
and used since childhood to the idea that I never could yield 
to any virtuous impulse without being certain to find thorns 
somewhere in it, my affliction made me feel more bewildered 
than anguished . . . However, it being natural for any 
suffering creature to grasp at every possible means by which 
he might climb out of the abyss into which misfortune has 
cast him, I thought of Father Antonin (Sade, Misfortunes, 138). 
That Justine’s confidence is misplaced is shown by the friar’s answer: 
You see where your notions have brought you, for now you 
have adequate leisure to convince yourself that they have 
served no purpose but to tip you into one abyss after another. 
So if you wish your neck to be saved, abandon them for once 
in your life . . . One of the holy Brothers here in Lyons is a 
close relative of both the Governor and the King’s Intendant . . 
. By promising to pack you off in a convent for the rest of your 
life, I am certain that he will prevent matters being taken any 
further . . . But during your detention, you will belong to me. I 
make no bones of it: you will be a slave and subject to my 
whims which you will satisfy without demur (Sade, 
Misfortunes, 138-39). 
Justine is, of course, properly horrified at such an offer and rejects it out of 
hand, preferring death to the surrendering of her virtue, claiming, “you are a 
monster to take such cruel advantage of my situation to force me thus to choose 
death and dishonour! . . . I shall die innocent, but I shall at least die without 
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remorse!” (Sade, Misfortunes, 139). To further illustrate his point that virtue will 
get one nowhere, however, Sade then has the monk nearly rape her: “My 
resistance excited the villain who thereupon was bold enough to show me just 
how inflamed his passions were . . . if he did not quite consummate his crime, 
then at least he left me bearing marks so unambiguous that I could have no 
possible doubts as to the abhorrent nature of his intentions” (Sade, Misfortunes, 
139). He then leaves Justine to her fate and “dumbfounded by his sheer 
impudence and licentiousness” (Sade, Misfortunes, 140). By acting in a manner 
that invites the reader to consider her stupid (how, after all, could she have 
expected Antonin to help her after her experience with him at the monastery?), 
Sade thus disrupts a potential identification on the part of the reader with either 
Antonin (who wants to be as merciless as he?) or Justine (identifying with her 
victimhood would make the reader feel as stupid as she). As Dalia Judovitz puts 
it,  
The reader is trapped, since s/he cannot identify with either 
character without a sense of moral complicity with one or the 
other side—vice or virtue . . . By compulsively upholding an 
ideal standard of behavior, Justine/Sophie invites 
transgression. The desiring structure of the text is constituted 
around the adventures of virtue, the narration of its consistent 
violation. The reader is thus freed from identification with the 
discourse of victimization, and made aware of the complicity 
involved in the act of reading (177). 
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Jelinek presents her “heroine,” Gerti, in a similar manner. In Jelinek’s case, 
however, it is Gerti’s persistent belief in the power of love that gets her into 
trouble, particularly when she goes “looking for love” outside of her marriage, a 
marriage that has become nothing other than sexual bondage for her. As readers, 
we have no way of knowing whether Gerti’s decision to marry Hermann was 
based on love or whether it was pure economic calculation, but her affair with 
Michael is clearly posited as a misguided search for love. In either case, Jelinek, 
like Sade, “categorically refuses to stylize [Gerti] as an absolute victim” 
(Ockenfuss, 75). Instead, Gerti is depicted in a manner similar to Sade’s 
presentation of Justine, as complicit in her victimization, at least as far as her 
treatment by her husband is concerned:  
Diese Frau hat sich erst letzte Woche einen Hosenanzug in 
der Boutique gekauft . . . Drei neue Pullover versteckt sie im 
Schrank, um keinen Anlaß zum Mißtrauen zu geben, sie wolle 
mit ihrer blutigen Furche sich einen neuen Wonnemonat 
bereiten. Doch sie pflückt nur die gütige Frucht Geld vom 
Baum ihres Mannes . . . Das Wirtschaftsgeld wird der Frau 
ausgezahlt und mehr! (L, 45).13
                                                 
13 “Only last week the woman bought herself a trouser suit in the boutique . . . Three new 
pullovers she’s purchased she hides away in the cupboard, so that she offers no purchase to 
mistrust, no occasion for the suspicion that she’s using her bloody groove as a ticket to a month 
of pleasures. The fact is that all she picks from the tree of her Man is that goodly fruit, money . . . 
The woman’s housekeeping money is paid out to her and more!” (Lust, 39). 
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While Gerti may be portrayed as complicit in regard to the bargain struck 
with her marriage, the text is more ambiguous about her status as a victim in her 
attempt to find “true” love through an adulterous relationship with Michael. 
This “relationship” begins when she runs away from home drunk and meets a 
young student, who offers to take her home, and then half seduces, half rapes 
her. After this event, dreams of romance immediately awaken in her and she 
views Michael as the man who will save her from her miserable existence, while 
he is thinking only of sex:  
Noch ehe der Minutenzeiger des Glücks die beiden streichelt, 
ist bereits eine Flüssigkeit aus Michael ausgetreten . . . Nichts 
weiter. Doch in der Frau, die das Höchste erleben und 
erledigen wollte, sind kernlose Werke in Kraft getreten 
worden. Ein Quellgebiet ist erschlossen, von dem sie 
jahrzehntelang heimlich träumte . . . Und die Frau gehört der 
Liebe (L, 116).14
Just as Justine mistakenly believes those she meets to be virtuous, Gerti persists 
in believing she has found love where she has only found sex. 
 
If, however, the reader may be inclined to feel some sympathy for Gerti in 
this first encounter with Michael, this sympathy becomes harder to maintain as 
                                                 
14 “Even before the minute hand of happiness can stroke the two of them, Michael has 
emitted a fluid, and that’s it. But, in the woman, nuclear energy is powering her higher. These are 
the headwaters of which she’s secretly dreamed for decades . . . This woman belongs to love” 
(Lust, 96-7). 
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the novel progresses. For Gerti, in the same stubborn and misguided fashion as 
Justine, continues to believe in Michael as a “knight in shining armor” despite his 
less-than-tender treatment of her, which ultimately culminates in a gang rape of 
Gerti by Michael and his friends on the ski slope (see L, 195ff and Lust, 159ff). 
Finally, she attempts yet again to run away to Michael, as she is unable to resist 
her feelings for him: “Zwanglos verstreut sie sich in ihren Gefühlen. Michael: 
jetzt gehen wir ihn wieder holen aus seinem Haus, bevor er erkaltet. Gleich wird 
diese Frau, von Sinnen getrieben, vor einem fremden Haus heulen, weil niemand 
da ist” (L, 213).15
It is in this refusal of the text to allow the reader to identify with the 
heroine where I locate what I earlier called the anti-pornographic impulse found 
in both Sade and Jelinek. The strategies that are used at the narrative or plot level 
to hinder an identification on the part of the reader with either Justine or Gerti 
are further complemented by the form of the texts. Specifically, both authors use 
 Once again, just as with Justine, the reader finds her- or himself 
confronted with the suspicion that Gerti is just not all that clever; surely, 
interpreting a gang rape as a sign of love is not something a wise person would 
do? 
                                                 
15 “Free and easily she indulges her feelings. Michael: now we’ll go and fetch him out of 
his house before he goes cold. Presently this woman, impelled by her senses, will be howling 
outside a strange house because no one’s at home” (Lust, 173). 
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narrative intrusions, which function to disrupt the “mimetic imaginative 
practice” of voyeurism, which, as discussed above, is one of the traditional and 
essential elements of the pornographic text. 
The function of these narrative intrusions, as Jean Goulemot in his work 
on Sade has pointed out, is to 
[disrupt] the already unsteady mechanism of erotic 
transference. Rather than being seized, as in the pornographic 
narrative, with the desire to have an orgasm, the reader is 
doomed to listen, reason and keep a cool head. All of this is 
quite foreign to the high pitch of excitement to which, 
traditionally, the pornographic narrative tries to lead the 
reader (“Sadean Novels,” 73). 
That the use of this technique of narrative disruption is apparent in the works of 
Sade as well as of Jelinek demonstrates the danger of speaking of “pornography” 
rather than pornographies when trying to determine Jelinek’s relationship to 
these traditions. A thorough discussion of these narrative devices necessitates a 
psychoanalytic reading of the way in which they function to preclude 
identification on the part of the reader. 
As I argued in my discussion of Die Liebhaberinnen (see chapter one), 
identification, according to Lacan, takes place in the loci of the imaginary and the 
ego. This identification is produced through the “transformation that takes place 
in the subject when he assumes an image” (E, 2). In regard to pornography, the 
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assumption of an image takes place through an identification with the 
protagonist or voyeur figure, drawing the reader or viewer via this imaginary 
identification into the erotic scenario through the voyeuristic nature of the text. 
Mark Bracher’s discussion of pornography concludes that the “arousal of desire 
and the production of jouissance for heterosexual men” (85)16 is achieved in the 
imaginary register in two forms: “1. The image of a woman’s body functioning as 
a sexual object, and 2. The image of the desiring male protagonist, functioning as 
either alter ego or rival” (85). These two images serve to establish the desiring 
subject position17
the Imaginary other [with whom the reader/viewer 
identifies—BB] can also function as the subject of desire, 
through being the object of the audience’s identification. This 
 of the male heterosexual reader/viewer of pornography 
because the subject assumes those images through the act of reading or viewing. 
The use of rape is particularly important in terms of establishing the desiring 
subject position of the reader/viewer of pornography in the imaginary register, 
for, as Bracher goes on to note 
                                                 
16 While Bracher does not make explicit which type of jouissance he is referring to when 
using the term “sexual jouissance,” I presume that he means phallic, or what Lacan refers to as 
the “jouissance of the Idiot” (S20, 81). For more on the different types of jouissance and their 
relationship to Jelinek’s text, see below. 
17 I take the term “subject position” from theories of film spectatorship (see, for example, 
Heath, “On Suture” (101-07); that the question of the subject’s position is relevant to Jelinek’s 
positioning of the reader via the text shall be made evident through my reading of Lust. 
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form of the desire of the Imaginary other—the desiring body 
of the male protagonist as alter ego of the (male) audience—is 
present whenever a heterosexual male protagonist is 
represented as desiring . . . rape is a powerful instance, for in 
presenting an image of the desire of the male body as 
monolithic (only one thing can satisfy it) and irrepressible 
(nothing can stop it), the rape provides the male audience 
with an Imaginary other in whom they can recognize and 
consolidate their own sexual desire—such Imaginary 
identification being, as Lacan notes, a fundamental way in 
which desire comes to be constituted in the first place 
(Bracher, 91, emphasis in original). 
In addition, rape scenes, which often result in the woman’s involuntary pleasure 
of the sexual act, serve to demonstrate hard core pornography’s desire of 
“assurance that it is witnessing not the voluntary performance of feminine 
pleasure [which can be faked—BB], but its involuntary confession” (L. Williams, 
50).  
Thus, for example, Walter, the protagonist in the Victorian pornographic 
novel, My Secret Life, repeatedly rapes and ravishes women, allowing the (male 
heterosexual) reader to identify with Walter and feel that he, too, has aroused 
involuntary desire in the women being raped and is himself desired. One 
example of many in the novel is Walter’s encounter with a virginal servant 
named Jenny. Approximately three chapters are devoted to Walter’s attempts to 
wear down Jenny’s resistance to his seduction attempts. At first, he tries simply 
talking to her about his marital problems; when this fails, he resorts to bribery 
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with new garters; and finally he reads Fanny Hill to her, in the hope of exciting 
her interest through the reading of a pornographic novel (thus we have 
pornography within pornography—Walter is positioned simultaneously as 
consumer of pornography and as the desiring subject in his own pornographic 
narrative). Finally, Walter manages to lure her into bed, where he commits the 
deed, which Jenny, despite her earlier protests, enjoys immensely: 
I had got her somehow on to the bed, she was helpless . . . I 
shoved . . . A mighty straight thrust; and the virginity was 
gone at that one effort. 
. . . Then I came to my senses; where was I? had she let me, or 
had I forced her violently? 
. . . She lay still, in the enjoyment of a lubricated cunt, 
distended by a stiff, hot prick. Soon she was sensitive to my 
moments, her cunt constricted, a visible pleasure overtook 
her, her frame began to quiver, and the soft murmurs of 
spermatic effusion came from her lips (Anonymous, 192-93). 
Afterwards, they look at the illustrations in Walter’s copy of Fanny Hill 
again and Jenny emerges as one contented with her fate as Walter’s lover. While 
Walter does evince a twinge of conscience (“had she let me. . .?”), the switch to 
the description of Jenny’s reaction as one of pleasure serves to reassure both 
Walter and the reader that she did really desire Walter sexually, despite her 
protests. As he comments in his diary: “After the first fuck she was like a well-
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broken horse; she obeyed me in everything, blushed, was modest, humbled, 
indifferent, conquered, submissive” (Anonymous, 195). 
In the case of My Secret Life, Walter is positioned less as a voyeur and 
more as the subject of desire (and thus object of identification for the reader) that 
Bracher describes. Nonetheless, his role as alter ego or subject of desire fulfills 
the same function as the voyeur figure and also serves to make the text 
pornographic, for he too acts as a mediator who “digests the sexually exciting 
material in advance of a reader/viewer in order to stimulate a similar response in 
him or her” (Pease, 93). As we have seen, this voyeur or narrator figure functions 
in “classic” pornographic texts such as Fanny Hill and My Secret Life to allow the 
reader to identify with the erotic scenario. In the artistic (anti-) pornography of 
Sade and Jelinek, however, this identification process is disrupted, resulting 
(hopefully) in the production of a different type of reading subject, one who 
(presumably) has a more critical distance to the text.18
                                                 
18 I add the qualifiers “hopefully” and “presumably” because one can never be sure that 
the distancing effects employed by Sade and Jelinek will work, depending as they do on a critical 
reader. As Allison Pease notes in her discussion of the use of pornographic tropes in Joyce and 
Beardsley: “If a reader is not complicitous with the parodic attitude, unable to understand the 
tropes as deconstructed, such technique may work against the agent of parody, for parody 
equally highlights its own artifices in such a way that the parodic text becomes a site of 
contestation, despite the mutually constitutive nature of such parody” (81-82). 
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In what follows, I shall focus on two paradigmatic (non-)voyeuristic 
scenes from Sade’s and Jelinek’s texts: Justine’s encounter with the aristocrat 
Bressac in The Misfortunes of Virtue and the gang rape of Gerti by Michael and his 
friends on the ski slope in Lust. The first, Justine’s encounter with Bressac in The 
Misfortunes of Virtue, takes place after she has escaped from Dubois and her gang 
of thieves. Previously, Dubois had helped Justine escape from prison (where she 
had been imprisoned for refusing to help her employer rob his neighbor) by 
setting the prison on fire. While grateful to her benefactress for saving her life, 
Justine is horrified at the thought of having to “oblige the four lusty lads” (Sade, 
Misfortunes, 26) who make up the rest of Dubois’ gang; while the men quarrel 
over who gets to ravish Justine first, she makes her escape. Deep in the woods, 
she hides herself in a thicket to sleep, and is later awakened by the arrival of 
Bressac and his valet, who have come into the woods so that Bressac can 
sodomize his valet away from the watchful eyes of his mother. The sound of 
their voices awakens Justine and she finds herself an unwilling voyeur to the sex 
scene enacted. 
Sade, however, presents neither the sex scene, nor Justine’s consumption 
of it in a manner that conforms to the standard pornographic scenario. Instead, 
Justine views the scene in a way that disrupts the voyeurism one would expect to 
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find in a pornographic narrative, first by having Justine interrupt her description 
of the scene and secondly by omitting altogether the description of the sex that 
she witnesses. In her recounting of the episode to her sister, she states: 
They drew near and halted so exactly opposite to me that 
nothing of what they said, nothing of what they did escaped 
me and I saw. . . 
“Great Heavens, Madame,” said Sophie, breaking off her tale, 
“can it be possible that fate has always placed me in such 
uniformly parlous situations for it to be as testing to ordinary 
decency to hear of them as it is for me to describe them? The 
horrible offence which outrages both Nature and established 
law, the heinous crime upon which the heavy hand of God 
has so often descended, I mean that infamy which was so new 
to me that I could scarcely conceive of it, was there, before my 
very eyes, consummated with all the impure refinements and 
dreadful proceedings which the most considered depravity 
could inject into it” (Misfortunes, 29). 
Here the disruption of the pornographic narrative is complete—the reader is not 
even given a description of the sex that has taken place; rather, what we 
experience is Justine’s condemnation of it without the use of erotic vocabulary 
that we would normally expect to encounter.19
                                                 
19 In his later version of this novel, Justine, or Good Conduct Well Chastised, this scene 
becomes more explicit. In her description of the sex act to Juliette, Justine states: “the young 
master seemed prepared unhesitatingly to brave the shaft that was presented to him . . . the 
infamous creature writhed and struggled under the iron” (Justine, 504). As Goulemot notes, 
however, the description of the act in Justine, while specific, “does not satisfy our curiosity 
because of a decidedly unrealistic vocabulary; there is nothing but spears, iron shafts. These are 
terms that divert or suspend the pornographic effect” (“Sadean Novels,” 68). 
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Justine, while positioned as voyeur, thus refuses the reader the possibility 
of identifying with her voyeurism, resulting in a lack of the two elements 
described by Bracher as the means by which the consumer of pornography is 
able to obtain an imaginary identification with the pornographic protagonist. For 
indeed, here we find neither a woman’s body as sexual object nor an image of a 
desiring male protagonist; Justine functions as the subject of the scene, not its 
object; and Bressac, while desiring, is excluded from the text by the ellipse that 
takes the place of the pornographic narrative one would expect to find in 
Justine’s description of the event she witnessed. Instead, the reader is invited to 
identify with Justine as a victim of the violence depicted in the text. As Dalia 
Judovitz notes: 
Sade demonstrates that there can be no exterior or privileged 
position for Sophie or, for that matter, the reader as a voyeur 
to the scene . . . By identifying with the heroine, the reader 
becomes a victim as well, since the act of reading, governed 
by the mimetic relation of reader and text, implies the risk of 
being marked by the punitive logic of the text. The physical 
violence unleashed by the text is thus directed not merely 
towards the heroine, but rather at the traditional conventions 
that govern the classical novel (177-78). 
Finally, Sade’s use of disruptive techniques reveals the complicity of Justine and 
the reader in the violence she both observes and experiences: 
As an unconscious exponent of popular ideology, Justine 
persists in refusing either to reflect or learn from her 
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misadventures, or to admit to being marked by competing 
negative ideologies . . . Passing from the position of spectator 
to that of unsuspecting actor, Justine is shown to be playing 
the role of the victim whose innocence becomes the stage for a 
trial of complicity (Judovitz, 178). 
In identifying with Justine, then, the reader is also forced to become aware 
of her/his own complicity in the act of the consumption of pornography. We are 
a long way from the uncritical voyeuristic consumption of an erotic scenario 
produced for the reader/viewer of “pure” pornography. 
Justine’s death at the end of The Misfortunes of Virtue completes the process 
of depicting her (and the reader’s) complicitous relationship to the violence of 
sexuality. Again, Dalia Judovitz’ reading of Misfortunes is useful: 
Justine/Sophie’s death by a thunderbolt . . . reflects her 
complicitous relation to popular ideology: her identification 
with the order of representation based on conventional moral 
principles. She represents the bad reader, the reader who 
mistakes the material and signifying levels of the text . . . 
Insofar as the heroine herself is a representation of the reader, 
it is her bad faith as a reader and good faith as a character that 
constitute the plot of the text and the texture of her 
misfortunes (181). 
This complicity of the heroine and the reader is portrayed even more strongly by 
Jelinek in Lust. In comparison with The Misfortunes of Virtue, which alternates in a 
fairly stable fashion between Justine’s first-person narration and a third-person 
omniscient narrator, the narrative voice in Lust is, as Gertrud Koch has noted, a 
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“fragiles literarisches Geschöpf” (135),20 one that is constantly vacillating 
between different narrative positions. This vacillation has the effect, as in Sade 
(albeit in a different way), of interrupting the pornographic narrative and 
making the reader aware of her/his complicity in the act of reading. To achieve 
this effect, Jelinek doubles the voyeuristic gaze of the pornographic text, thereby 
deconstructing the traditional voyeuristic position of the reader of pornography: 
“Die Dekonstruktion der Vorlagen geschieht mittels Verdoppelung des 
männlichgeilen Blickes: wo immer die Sicht auf die nackte Frau frei ist, merkt der 
Leser, daß jemand mitschaut, der unbestechlich, meist satirisch das Geschehene 
übersieht” (Höfler, “Sexualität,” 106).21
The description of the gang rape of Gerti by Michael and his friends on the 
ski slope shows the vacillating narrative positions and the doubling effect of the 
voyeuristic gaze described by Höfler. As it is such an exemplary scene, I shall 
quote it at some length before returning to my reading: 
 
Die Buben halten [Gerti] die lebendigen Hände oben über 
dem Kopf zusammen. Niemand könnte in dieser Stellung 
                                                 
20 “fragile literary creation” (my translation). 
21 “The deconstruction of the models [of pornography] occurs through the means of 
doubling the lecherous male gaze: whenever the gaze is openly turned on the naked woman, the 
reader notices that there is someone who watches with him or her, someone who 
uncompromisingly, mostly satirically, views the proceedings” (my translation). 
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seiner Familie über den Bildschirm hinweg zuwinken . . . Das 
Seidenkleid wird bis zur Taille hinaufgeschoben und das 
Hoserl, mit dem sie zufrieden war, hinunter. Und jetzt kitzeln 
wir die Dunkelheit, bis sie krachend über uns 
zusammenbricht . . . Jetzt werden also diese Fußlappen, diese 
Abtreter, die alle vier unser sind, auseinandergezogen, bis 
Gerti aufheult . . . Es ist unglaublich, was man mit den 
dehnbaren Schamlippen alles anfangen kann, um sie, als 
wär’s ihr Schicksal, in der Form zu verzerren. Man kann sie 
z.B. zusammendrehen wie eine spitzige Tüte, und vom 
Oberland biegt sich das Gebirge aus Gertis Kleid. Das tut 
doch weh, denkt keiner daran? . . . 
Haben Sie eben den Donner gehört? Na also, warum treten 
Sie dann nicht zurück und lassen mich auch einmal im Video 
zornig ihre Geschlechter aufplusternde Menschen anschauen? 
. . . 
Tun wir so, als erblickten wir, einander schauend, einen Film, 
der einfach einschlägt (einen einschlägigen Film) . . . Und in 
Gerti prasselt noch immer ein hübsches Feuer, das durch das 
Gestalt einer Meterwurst in ihrem Mund dargestellt wird. Na, 
meine Herren und Helden, lassen Sie mich einmal durch den 
Sucher schauen, Sie haben doch selber jeder ein spannendes 
Glied! (L, 196-97,98 & 202-03).22
                                                 
22 “The lads hold her living hands together above her head. In that position, nobody 
could wave to her family via the TV screen . . . The silk dress is shoved up to the waist and the 
panties, which she was perfectly satisfied with, are shoved down. And now we’ll tickle the 
darkness till it collapses upon us with a crash . . . So now these footcloths, these doormats, all four 
of them ours, are parted. Making Gerti howl . . . It’s unbelievable how you can stretch and flex 
the labia to change their shape, as if that were what fate intended for them. For instance, you can 
pout them into a pointed pouch. And from the higher ground the hills are bowing down from 
Gerti’s dress. That hurts, doesn’t that occur to anyone? . . . 
 
Did you hear the thunder just now? So why not get out of the way and let me have a look 
at the video people wrathfully plumping up their genitals? . . . 
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Just in these few pages, the narrative voice fluctuates several times: what 
starts out as a seemingly typical voyeuristic narration in the third-person 
singular (“Die Buben halten. . .”) changes to the second-person plural (“jetzt 
kitzeln wir. . .”), back to the third-person singular, but now with a direct address 
to the reader (“Das tut doch weh. . .”), before fluctuating again between the “we” 
(“Tun wir so. . .”) and the third-person direct address (“lassen Sie mich einmal. . 
.”). The first direct address to the reader is a critical commentary on the 
happenings, and disrupts the potential erotic transfer. Rather than describing 
Gerti’s pleasure in the sex scene that is taking place, Jelinek points out that the 
roughness of the others’ treatment of her causes pain, not pleasure, thus forcing 
the reader to reflect on the narrator’s commentary as opposed to simply 
consuming an erotic scenario. In addition, the end of this passage demonstrates 
the accuracy of Höfler’s claim regarding the doubling of the voyeuristic gaze, as 
the narrator turns her (his?) gaze on the consumers of this scene, for they are 
now the ones being looked at, rather than simply looking themselves. The 
narrator, instead of functioning as a model for the reader to identify with, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Let’s pretend, as we watch each other, that we’re looking at a movie. Really moving . . . 
And meanwhile in Gerti a fine fire is still crackling, a whole metre of pork sausage like a fire hose 
in her mouth. Well now, gentlemen, heroes all: let me take a look down my sights, and see if you 
haven’t all got a cock of your own, cocked and ready to fire!” (Lust, 160-61, 62 & 64-65). 
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assumes a critical position, forcing the reader to reflect critically on her or his 
own voyeuristic pleasure. 
Finally, the references to television and film make it even more clear that 
Jelinek is undermining the traditional voyeuristic nature of pornography (in both 
its written and visual forms). As Susanne Baackmann has pointed out in her 
reading of Lust, the text itself is organized like a pornographic videoclip (180); in 
many ways, the structure of Jelinek’s text resembles that of the early “stag films,” 
which tended to consist of a “haphazard stringing together of explicit hard-core 
scenes” (L. Williams, 63). This technique results in a “radical narrative 
discontinuity” as Linda Williams has termed it (63). In the case of Lust, however, 
the narrative discontinuity produced by the narrator’s direct address to the 
reader about the “film” that she/he is participating in, serves to disrupt the 
pleasure involved in forming a “gender-based bond with other male spectators” 
(L. Williams, 73), one of the functions of the stag film. Indeed, given that the sex 
of the narrator cannot be firmly established (see Baackmann, 182), the gender-
based male bonding described by Williams is definitively broken, resulting 
instead in a narrative voice, which “schießt ebenfalls über die Immanenz der 
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‘traditionellen’ pornographischen Phantasie hinaus. Anstatt den Leser sexuell zu 
stimulieren, distanziert sie ihn von der erzählten Handlung” (Baackmann, 181).23
What we see, then, in Lust is how Jelinek, similarly to Sade in Misfortunes 
of Virtue, also disrupts the imaginary identification between the reader and 
protagonist that Bracher describes as an important element of pornographic 
writing. While Jelinek takes over many of the other elements of the pornographic 
narrative, such as the language of obscenity, the endless repetition of the sexual 
act, and the permanent erection of the man, her transformation of two of the 
most important pornographic conventions, the voyeur figure and insatiable 
female desire,
 
24 does indeed result in Carter’s “moral pornography.”25
                                                 
23 “goes beyond the immanence of the ‘traditional’ pornographic fantasy. Instead of 
sexually stimulating the reader, it [the narrative voice] distances the reader from the action 
depicted” (my translation). 
 Through 
her simultaneous use and transformation of pornographic techniques, Jelinek 
becomes precisely the type of moral pornographer as terrorist or sexual guerilla 
that Carter describes, especially in her depiction of female sexuality, to which I 
now turn. 
24 See Hartwig (249-51) for an analysis of Jelinek’s refusal of the pornographic portrayal 
of female desire. 
25 See above in this chapter for a definition of Carter’s term. 
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Female Sexuality and Jouissances 
In her discussion of Lust, Ina Hartwig describes the way in which Jelinek’s 
text “erzähl[t] höhnisch die Verwechslung des Penis mit dem Phallus” (256, see 
also 51-59).26 While Hartwig discusses this misrecognition in the context of 
Jelinek’s critical engagement with Freudian psychoanalysis, referring to Jelinek’s 
use of psychoanalytic theory in Lust as “ein psychoanalytisches Theorem après la 
lettre” (251),27
Indeed, it is possible to read Jelinek’s text as an extended meditation on 
Lacan’s statement that “the sexual relationship cannot be written” (Lacan, S20, 
35), with one important difference, however: while the view of female sexuality 
offered in Lust has clear affinities with Lacanian definitions of female sexuality, 
 in this section I will discuss the confusion of the penis for the 
phallus in relation to pornography, especially filmic pornography (as 
exemplified by a “classic” feature-length narrative pornographic film, Deep 
Throat [1972], directed by Gerard Damiano). I will also demonstrate how Lacan’s 
views of female sexuality and jouissance can be used to illuminate Jelinek’s 
critical investigation of the mass cultural form of pornography. 
                                                 
26 “mockingly portrays the misrecognition of the penis for the phallus” (my translation). 
27 “a psychoanalytic theory après la lettre” (my translation). Interestingly, Hartwig does 
not refer to Lacan in her discussion of Jelinek’s relationship to psychoanalysis, other than in 
passing (see 255-56). 
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Jelinek’s depiction of female sexuality could perhaps best be described as “Lacan 
without feminine jouissance.” In other words, whereas Lacan allows some space 
for female pleasure and in fact claims that women may have access to a non-
phallic jouissance that men do not have, Jelinek’s text repudiates Lacan’s notion of 
a “supplementary” jouissance “beyond” the phallus available to women (S20, 73-
74). Lacan’s use of the term jouissance, like most other Lacanian concepts, shifts 
over the years and can be difficult to pin down (See: Evans, “Jouissance,” Levy-
Stokes, “Jouissance,” and Macey, 200-06). It is, however, possible to outline some 
basic parameters for my use of the term to illuminate Jelinek’s work. 
Translating from the French, jouissance can be rendered literally as 
“enjoyment,” “both in the sense of deriving pleasure from something, and in the 
legal sense of exercising property rights” (Evans, “Jouissance,” 1). The term has 
sexual connotations as well, as it can mean orgasm in French. Lacan’s first use of 
the term jouissance can be found in the seminar of 1953-54, where it appears just 
twice (S1, 205 & 23) and is used only in relation to Hegel’s dialectic of the master 
and the slave. Here Lacan equates jouissance with pleasure, noting the “relation 
between pleasure [jouissance] and labour” and notes that “a law is imposed upon 
the slave, that he should satisfy the desire and pleasure [jouissance] of the other” 
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(S1, 223). Until Seminar IV (1956-57), jouissance meaning simply “pleasure” is 
Lacan’s only and infrequent use of the term. 
In his early work, Lacan’s notion of jouissance, while not a Freudian term, 
has parallels to Freud’s concept of the drive (see Levy-Stokes, “Jouissance,” 102). 
After 1957, the sexual connotations of the word move to the forefront, and in 
1958, he first uses jouissance to refer explicitly to orgasm (see Evans, Dictionary, 
91). Thus, in 1958, Lacan speaks of “masturbatory jouissance,” which he attributes 
to the phallic stage and the “imaginary dominance of the phallic attribute” (E, 
282). 
After 1958, Lacan begins to distinguish between jouissance and pleasure. 
This can be found in Seminar VII (1960-61), where Lacan discusses jouissance as 
an ethical stance in relation to Kant and Sade. In this phase of his work, jouissance 
comes to figure as that which Freud referred to as “beyond” the pleasure 
principle or, as Lacan puts it, “jouissance . . . is suffering” (S7, 184). In relation to 
Kant’s example of the man who refuses a night of pleasure with a woman if the 
price to be paid is death, Lacan remarks that, while that may be true for the man 
in pursuit of pleasure, the man in pursuit of jouissance (as Sade’s figures are) will 
accept death as the price to be paid for jouissance: “one only has to make a 
conceptual shift and move the night spent with the lady from the category of 
 117 
 
pleasure to that of jouissance . . . for the example to be ruined” (S7, 189). In the 
acceptance of death as the price, the subject experiences jouissance, in which 
“pleasure and pain are presented as a single packet to take or leave” (S7, 189). 
Despite these earlier references, it is not until 1960 that Lacan gives his 
first structural account of jouissance. In “Subversion of the Subject,” he posits 
pleasure as that which “sets the limits on jouissance” (E, 319). The sacrificing of 
jouissance also becomes here, for the first time, a necessary condition for 
subjectivity—the subject, by submitting her- or himself to the symbolic order 
must sacrifice some jouissance since “jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks” 
(E, 319). In this, Lacan rewrites Freud’s theory of the castration complex: 
“Castration means that jouissance must be refused” (E, 324). The sacrificed (or 
“alienated”) jouissance becomes the object a, that which is the cause of desire but 
never attainable. 
Finally, in the 1970s, especially in Seminar XX (1972-73), Lacan brings to 
the forefront his distinction between masculine and feminine jouissance. While he 
had discussed jouissance in conjunction with femininity as early as 1958, it is only 
in Encore that Lacan first comes to speak of a qualitatively different type of 
feminine jouissance. He posits feminine jouissance against that of the phallic, 
termed the “jouissance of the Idiot” (S20, 81). In Encore, Lacan defines phallic 
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jouissance (which he sometimes refers to as sexual jouissance) as that which “is 
marked and dominated by the impossibility of establishing as such . . . the One of 
the relation ‘sexual relationship’” (S20, 6-7). Lacan’s use of the term “One” refers 
to mathematical logic (Frege), to the Platonic myth of the lovers’ unity in the 
Symposium,28
                                                 
28 See chapter one of this dissertation for a discussion of Lacan’s use of Plato’s myth of the 
lovers’ unity, as well as Lacan’s Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (S11, 
205). 
 and also to the (presumed) unity of the (male) subject in a 
philosophical sense. Phallic jouissance is thus seen as a barrier to these forms of 
unity. Or, to put it another way, “Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to 
which man does not come . . . to enjoy woman’s body, precisely because what he 
enjoys is the jouissance of the organ . . . Jouissance, qua sexual, is phallic—in 
other words, it is not related to the Other as such” (S20, 7 & 9). The term “Other” 
here refers both to the linguistic Other (see Dean, “Two Kinds,” 919-20, for more 
on the linguistic Other) and to the Other sex, e.g., woman. It is precisely man’s 
experience of phallic or sexual jouissance that “covers or poses an obstacle to the 
supposed sexual relationship” (S20, 9), because in phallic jouissance, it is man’s 
organ and not he as subject who “enjoys.” The phallus thus gets in between the 
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two sexes presumed to have a relation.29
phallic or sexual jouissance . . . being dependent on the phallic 
signifier, is completely determined by language . . . This kind 
of jouissance . . . is located outside the body; it is attached to 
the body only by the slender thread of the sexual organ or the 
phallicized image of the bodily form . . . The relation of the 
speaking being to jouissance is, therefore, fundamentally 
insecure. For the jouissance he can derive from the sexual 
relation is never the kind he needs, in the sense that it always 
bears witness to the disjunction of the body and the genitals 
and constantly poses an obstacle to the establishment of a true 
sexual relation between one sex and the other (André, 236-37). 
 This phallic or sexual jouissance ends up 
being displaced onto the penis (as a poor substitute for the phallus) and is 
dependent on the phallic signifier: 
While women have, according to Lacan, access to a jouissance that is 
beyond the phallus, men, by virtue of the fact that it is “through the phallic 
function that man as whole acquires his inscription” (S20, 79), have to make do 
with inadequate phallic or sexual jouissance, one which causes him to be unable 
to “attain his sexual partner . . . except inasmuch as his partner is the cause of his 
desire” (S20, 80). A further cause of the inadequacy of phallic jouissance is its 
                                                 
29 It is important to point out here that the terms “male”/”masculine” and 
“female”/”feminine” do not, in Lacan, refer to anatomy, but rather to subject positions: “It is a 
difference in the relation of the speaking being to jouissance which determines his being man or 
woman, not anatomical difference”(Levy-Stokes, “Jouissance,” 105). Or, as Lacan puts it: “One 
ultimately situates oneself there [under the sign of the phallic function—BB] by choice—women 
are free to situate themselves there if it gives them pleasure to do so. Everyone knows there are 
phallic women . . . It is, nevertheless, the phallic function that helps [men] situate themselves as 
men and approach women” (S20, 71). 
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incompatibility with feminine jouissance, thus posing an obstacle to the sexual 
relationship. 
Feminine jouissance differs from masculine or phallic jouissance through its 
relation to the Other, especially the Other sex, which for Lacan means woman. 
While in his earlier work, Lacan attributed to women a jouissance associated with 
the phallic stage and the clitoris (E, 282), his work of the 1970s moved away from 
that position. In particular, Lacan posits for women a specifically feminine 
jouissance which is “beyond the phallus” (S20, 74). Women have access to both 
phallic, or sexual, jouissance, and also to a supplementary form of jouissance by 
virtue of being not wholly subsumed by the phallic function as men are: “being 
not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic 
function designates by way of jouissance” (S20, 73). It is, however, impossible to 
know anything about this other jouissance other than that some women (and 
men) experience it. Lacan’s paradigmatic example of feminine jouissance is that of 
mystics such as Hadewijch d’Anvers, Saint John of the Cross, and Saint Teresa, 
thus relating feminine jouissance to God. As he asks in relation to mysticism: 
“Doesn’t this jouissance that one experiences and knows nothing about put us on 
the path of ex-sistence? And why not interpret one face of the Other, the God 
face, as based on feminine jouissance?” (S20, 77). This specifically feminine 
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jouissance (including that of the mystics) is almost always equated with feminine 
sexuality in Lacan’s work. More importantly for my discussion of Jelinek’s work 
and pornography, “jouissance [in the context of femininity—BB] is to be 
understood as the achievement of some form of sexual satisfaction, often (but not 
always) equated with orgasm. The distinction between male and female 
jouissance thus depends on the assumption that there are distinct forms of sexual 
satisfaction for men and women” (Evans, “Jouissance,” 9). 
It is these distinct forms of sexual satisfaction that contribute to the 
incompatibility of phallic and feminine jouissances, which in turn leads to the 
inadequacy of phallic jouissance discussed above. The inadequacy of phallic 
jouissance and the incompatibility of phallic and feminine jouissances are, 
however, precisely what pornography functions to hide and what Jelinek’s text 
exposes. In this respect, Deep Throat is a paradigmatic example of pornography in 
that it attempts to portray phallic and feminine jouissances as complementary and 
capable of unity. 
This is not to claim, as other feminists have, that Deep Throat and other 
pornographic films of the 1970s are nothing more than exercises in misogyny 
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that have no interest in the question of female pleasure.30
                                                 
30 See, for example: Dworkin, Dworkin and MacKinnon, MacKinnon and Dworkin, and 
the essays in Lederer. 
 Indeed, it is possible, as 
Laurence O’Toole and others have pointed out, to read Deep Throat’s narrative as 
predominantly organized around the question of “female pleasure: the getting of 
it, the enjoying of it” (74). At the time of its release (1972), the sexual revolution 
was in full swing and many hard core films began to problematize the question 
of how to attain better sex. Deep Throat, as a typical film of its era (and the first to 
show the “money shot” on a big screen), thus participates in the discourse 
around the obtaining of better sex, specifically engaging with the question of 
female sexual pleasure: “The ‘problem’ of female sexual pleasure is central to 
Deep Throat and many other porn movies of its era. A problem in terms of the 
dramatic structure that is in need of fixing, but also a problem in terms of the 
search for some kind of visible sign of a solution” (O’Toole, 74). The visible 
solution that Deep Throat was the first feature-length pornographic film to offer is 
the “money shot” or the displaying of male ejaculation as the narrative 
conclusion to a sex number. Further, Deep Throat and other hard core films of the 
1970s also insist “that this visual confession of a solitary male ‘truth’ coincides 
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with the orgasmic bliss of the female” (L. Williams, 101), thus reinforcing the 
notion of male and female sexual pleasure as complementary. 
It is the money shot as “solution” to the question of sexual pleasure that 
leads to Deep Throat’s central (and for many feminists problematic) plot motive: 
the locating of the central female protagonist’s (played by Linda Lovelace) 
clitoris in her throat. The plot proper begins with Linda’s complaining to a friend 
that she doesn’t enjoy sex, experiencing only a “tingling” when what she had 
expected from sex was “bombs bursting in air.” In an attempt to help her, 
Linda’s friend invites a number of men to their apartment and a long number31 of 
Linda’s having sex with several men follows.32
                                                 
31 For a discussion of sexual “numbers” in porn films as similar to numbers in a musical 
and the way sexual numbers function generically, see Linda Williams (130-34). 
 None, however, are able to help 
her achieve the orgasm she is seeking, so she finally visits a doctor (played by 
Harry Reems). The doctor discovers that Linda’s inability to achieve sexual 
satisfaction results from the fact that her clitoris is located in her throat. The 
32 It is also significant to note here that this scene contains no “money” shot, but focuses 
rather on the “meat” shot of early stag films. A “meat” shot is a “close-up of penetration that 
shows that hard-core sexual activity is taking place” (L. Williams, 72) and constituted the 
narrative closure of a sex number in the stag film. Feature-length hard core films of the seventies, 
however, shifted to using the “money” shot instead of the “meat” shot to signify the end to a sex 
number and to signify that satisfaction had occurred (for more on the difference between “meat” 
and “money” shots, see L. Williams, 72-74). Deep Throat does not contain any “money” shots until 
Linda has achieved her goal of sexual satisfaction. 
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solution? Linda must learn how to perform “deep throat,” a certain technique in 
performing fellatio, which the doctor teaches her. Overwhelmed with the feeling 
of being satisfied for the first time in her life, Linda proclaims that she wants 
nothing more than to marry the doctor and become his “slave.” Instead, 
however, he makes a sex therapist of her and sends her out to “treat” a series of 
men with various sex problems. The film ends with Linda’s planning to marry 
Wilbur, who has a thirteen-inch penis, thus making him the man of her dreams. 
While Deep Throat, through its concern with the location of Linda’s clitoris, 
does attempt to argue for a notion of women’s pleasure as distinct from that of 
men’s, it ultimately fails in its quest as the film is unable to imagine a pleasure 
located outside phallic jouissance. Indeed, it is precisely Deep Throat’s obsession 
with the clitoris and its assumption that the act of fellatio will be what it takes to 
satisfy Linda (solely through clitoral contact) that demonstrates the assimilation 
of Linda’s pleasure into a phallic sexual economy, since, as Lacan has noted, the 
locating of “jouissance for the woman in the clitoris [thus raises] it to the function 
of the phallus” (E, 282). Following Lacan, we can see that Deep Throat’s obsessive 
focus on the clitoral pleasures of Linda causes her to remain trapped in the 
phallic stage and thus demonstrates the film’s inability to resolve “the 
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contradiction between clitoral pleasure and the male inability to imagine female 
pleasure outside a phallic regime” (McClintock, 120-21). 
In other words, it is the positing of fellatio as the solution to the 
incompatibility of masculine and feminine jouissances that most clearly 
demonstrates the failure of the sexual relationship, despite the film’s attempt to 
convince us that the sexual relationship does exist. Again, I turn to Lacan, who 
notes in Encore: “what is known as sexual jouissance is marked and dominated 
by the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere in the enunciable, the sole 
One that interests us, the One of the relation ‘sexual relationship’ “ (S20, 6-7). By 
relying solely on the money shot, “the most blatantly phallic of all hard-core film 
representations” (L. Williams, 95), to depict the jouissance of both Linda and her 
partners, Deep Throat thus attempts to establish the “One” that Lacan claims is 
impossible. The establishment of the sexual relationship fails through its reliance 
on phallic jouissance because “Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to which 
man does not come . . . to enjoy woman’s body, precisely because what he enjoys 
is the jouissance of the organ” (S20, 7). The money shot can thus be seen as 
reinforcing Lacan’s claim that phallic jouissance causes the man to enjoy only the 
jouissance of the organ and not the woman’s body as the man must withdraw 
from the woman in order for the audience to see his ejaculation take place. In this 
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way, the money shot, rather than establishing a sexual relationship between the 
performers, instead “substitutes for the relation between the actors the more 
solitary (and literally disconnected) visual pleasure of the male performer and 
the male viewer” (L. Williams, 101). 
To conclude my discussion of Deep Throat, I return to the question of the 
confusion of the penis for the phallus, which is also demonstrated through the 
film’s reliance on the money shot. This reliance on the money shot leads the film, 
despite all of its talk about the clitoris to “visually fetishize the penis” (L. 
Williams, 112), and to imply that the penis is the phallus. Even Linda’s first 
orgasm, during her session with the doctor, is portrayed as a montage of phallic 
symbols (bombs bursting, fireworks, and firing missiles). Nonetheless, the film is 
not without its anxieties regarding male potency, as is shown through the 
doctor’s predicament: near the end of the film, the doctor, who has been 
providing “therapy” to both Linda and his nurse throughout the film, ends up in 
bed with a bandage around his flaccid penis, unable to keep up with Linda’s 
demands for more “deep throat.” As Linda Williams points out, this incident 
invokes the “specter of the insatiable woman” (111), whose jouissance cannot be 
satisfied by a mere penis. 
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In this way, the film acknowledges Lacan’s notion of the incompatibility 
of men and women in sexual relations. In Encore, he turns to the story of Achilles 
and the tortoise to demonstrate this claim: 
Achilles and the tortoise, such is the schema of coming for one 
pole of sexed beings. When Achilles has taken his step, gotten 
it on with Briseis, the latter, like the tortoise, has advanced a 
bit, because she is “not whole,” not wholly his. Some remains. 
And Achilles must take a second step, and so on and so forth . 
. . It is quite clear that Achilles can only pass the tortoise—he 
cannot catch up with it (S20, 8). 
Harry Reems, lying in bed with a bandage around his penis, can thus be seen as 
Achilles, who is unable to catch up with the tortoise of female desire, as depicted 
through Linda’s insatiable need for more and more “deep throat.” The paradox 
of Deep Throat thus lies in the manner in which it acknowledges the inadequacy 
of phallic jouissance for women, while simultaneously disavowing this 
inadequacy through its final solution to Linda’s problem. As pointed out earlier, 
the film ends with Linda’s planning to marry Wilbur, the man of her dreams 
with a thirteen-inch penis. It is thus the introduction of a “bigger, better penis” 
(L. Williams, 111) that solves the problem of Linda’s insatiable desire, thereby 
reinforcing the conflation of the penis with the phallus. Wilbur, it seems, unlike 
Achilles, is able to catch up to the tortoise with the help of his superior member.  
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The problem with Deep Throat, then, lies less with the questions the film 
poses, but with the solution it offers insofar as the film is ultimately unable to 
imagine female sexual pleasure outside of Freud’s “economy of the one” (see L. 
Williams, 133). It is precisely this phallic economy and the confusion of the penis 
for the phallus that Lust exposes as incapable of fulfilling or depicting female 
sexuality, and her text consistently works to undermine such notions in its 
portrayal of female sexuality. 
Conclusion: A Pessimistic Pornography Without Pleasure 
Just as Jelinek’s text can be seen as in dialogue with the type of 
pornography exemplified by Sade’s work, so too can it be viewed as engaging 
critically with the type of mass cultural pornography represented by Deep Throat 
and other filmic pornography. As Günter Höfler has noted, “Sinnliches Begehren 
wird nämlich . . . bei Jelinek als immer schon von Bildern beherrscht angezeigt, 
der Mensch ist bei ihr absolut von Medienphantasmagorien und Trivialmythen 
abhängig, deren Dominanz in der Pornographie am deutlichsten zutage tritt” 
(“Sexualität,” 106-07).33
                                                 
33 “Sexual desire is always portrayed by Jelinek as determined by images; her characters 
are entirely dependent upon media fantasies and mythologies, whose dominance can currently 
most clearly be found in pornography” (my translation). 
 To cite just two examples of the way in which 
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pornographic and other images from mass culture determine the sexuality of 
Jelinek’s figures in Lust: 
In saftiger Ruhe schiebt der Mann das Bild seiner Frau in den 
Schlitz des Betrachters. Schauernd greifen die Wälder nach 
dem Haus, in dem die Bilder der Videos, eine bepackte Herde 
von Zeugungsfähigen, vor den Augenzeugen über den 
Schirm ziehen. An ihren Fesseln werden die Frauen ins Bild 
gezerrt, nur ihre tägl. Gewohnheiten sind erbarmungsloser (L, 
53).34
Doch jetzt schon schreit diese Frau nach dem Götterbild 
Michael, der ihr auf Fotos, die ihm ähnlich sehen, verheißen 
worden ist . . . Wie ist es mit den Damen? Das unvergängliche 
Abbild ihrer Vergnügungen gilt ihnen mehr als das 
vergängliche Original, das sie früher oder später der 
Konkurrenz des Lebens aussetzen müssen . . . Jedes Bild ruht 
besser im Gedächtnis als das Leben selbst (L, 118-19).
 
35
What these two examples demonstrate is the way in which the desires produced 
by mass-produced images differ according to gender: while the men in Lust 
receive their image of woman as sexual object from pornography, the women 
 
                                                 
34 “Juicily, calmly, the man inserts the image of his wife into the slit of the viewer. With a 
shudder the woods reach out for the house, where the video images, a herd of creatures capable 
of reproduction, are moving across the screen in front of eye witnesses. The women are dragged 
into the pictures by their fetters. Only their daily routine is more merciless” (Lust, 45). 
35 “But the woman is crying out loud for her idol Michael, long promised her in 
photographs that look like him . . . You know how it is with the ladies: the immortal image of 
their pleasures means more to them than the mortal original, which sooner or later they will have 
to expose to life. To competition . . . Every one of these images is better accommodated in 
memory than life itself” (Lust, 98-99). 
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view the men as the idealized image of men found in romance novels and 
magazines. 
It is, however, in the sex scenes in Lust where we can most clearly see the 
way in which Jelinek’s text both resembles and differs from filmic pornography. 
While she does take over certain pornographic conventions such as the cliché of 
the man as constantly potent and ready for sex, describing Hermann as “Der 
Mann ist immer bereit und freut sich auf sich” (L, 16),36
Gerti spricht von ihren Gefühlen und bis wohin sie ihnen 
folgen möchte. Michael staunt, langsam erwachen, was für 
eine Hand ihm da ins Geschoß gefallen ist. Sofort möchte er 
wieder herumknallen, schiebt die Hand weg and zeigt seinen 
 her text does not 
participate in hard core’s main organizing fantasy of the “assurance that it is 
witnessing not the voluntary performance of female pleasure, but its involuntary 
confession” (L. Williams, 50). Rather, female pleasure is depicted as a void, as 
something that does not exist; instead of the compatibility of male and female 
pleasure that Deep Throat offers, Lust contains sex scene after sex scene in which 
phallic jouissance is shown as incapable of satisfying women. One of the sex 
scenes between Gerti and Michael demonstrates this incompatibility quite 
clearly: 
                                                 
36 “The Man is perpetually ready to go. Greedy for his pleasure. To pleasure himself” 
(Lust, 15). 
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fesselnden Riemen. Er zerrt die Frau an den Haaren herüber, 
bis sie wie ein Vogerl darüber flattert. Gleich will die Frau, 
aus der Geschlechtsnarkose erwacht, wieder zügellos den 
Mund zum Sprechen benutzen. Sie muß sich statt dessen 
aufsperren und den Schwanz Michaels in das Kabinett ihres 
Mundes einlassen (L, 120).37
What we see in this passage is how Michael’s jouissance is a phallic one 
insofar as he relates to Gerti as that which Lacan “refers to as object a, that partial 
object that serves as the cause of desire: our partner’s voice or gaze that turns us 
on, or that body part [in this case, Gerti’s mouth—BB] we enjoy in our partner” 
(Fink, Letter, 159). Gerti, on the other hand, attempts to speak, which is 
simultaneously an attempt to achieve feminine or Other jouissance, as the 
“satisfaction of speech” (S20, 64) is part of the ineffable feminine jouissance that is 
opposed to phallic jouissance. Lacan goes so far as to claim that “to speak of love 
is in itself a jouissance” (S20, 83); it is precisely this feminine jouissance of speech, 
however, that Gerti is denied through Michael’s act of inserting his penis into her 
mouth at precisely the moment she wishes to speak. We can thus see how in Lust 
 
                                                 
37 “Gerti speaks of her feelings and how far she’d like to follow them. Michael gapes as he 
realizes what he’s landed. Time to get out the rod and go fishing again. He hauls the woman 
round by the hair till she’s flapping above him like a great bird. The woman, awoken from the 
sedation of sex, is about to use her gob for uninhibited talking, but while it’s open Michael can 
think of better things to do with it and shoves his corncob in, amazing” (Lust, 99-100). 
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the act of fellatio functions, in contradistinction to Deep Throat, to suppress rather 
than enhance woman’s pleasure. 
This refusal to portray feminine pleasure or jouissance, along with the 
unmasking of pornography’s failure in regard to female sexuality, is what makes 
Jelinek’s text pessimistic pornography, at least in regard to its views on female 
sexuality for what her text demonstrates is that it is women’s sexuality that 
pornography as a genre does not symbolize. What Lust instead portrays is the 
material effects of the inability to symbolize women and their pleasure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A (NOT-SO-)YOUNG PERVERT: PIANOS, 
PERVERSION, SUBLIMATION, AND THE KÜNSTERLERROMAN IN DIE 
KLAVIERSPIELERIN 
Sie hat Kenntnis von der Sonatenform und dem Fugenbau. Sie ist Lehrerin in 
diesem Fach. Und doch: ihre Pfoten zucken dem letzten, endgültigen Gehorsam 
sehnsüchtig entgegen. 
(Elfriede Jelinek, Die Klavierspielerin, 106)1
 
 
Introduction 
Die Klavierspielerin (English title: The Piano Teacher [1983]) relates the story 
of Erika Kohut, piano teacher at the Vienna Conservatory, her development as a 
(perverse) sexual subject, and her ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual 
position. In Lacanian terms, a sexual position as “male” or “female” is not related 
to biology or identification with the mother or father (as it was for Freud); rather, 
it is the “relationship with the phallus which determines sexual position” (Evans, 
Dictionary, 178). Developing a stable sexual identity is difficult for both sexes, but 
especially so for women, since, as Lacan notes, women face a “detour” 
(identification with the father) in their path through the Oedipal complex (see 
                                                 
1 “She knows about the form of the sonata and the structure of the fugue. That’s her job, 
she’s a teacher. And yet, her paws ardently grope toward ultimate obedience” (PT, 102). 
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Evans, Dictionary, 179, and Lacan, S3, especially chapters XII and XIII on the 
hysteric’s question. I discuss this in more detail below in this chapter). 
In other words, for Lacan, as for Jelinek, becoming a “woman” is no easy 
process. Indeed, Die Klavierspielerin (and the later novel Lust; see chapter 2 for 
more on Lust) can in some respects be read, as Allyson Fiddler has noted, as a 
“putting-into-practice or fictional working-through and problematising of 
psychoanalytic theories of gender and subjectivity” (Rewriting, 160). That Die 
Klavierspielerin dramatizes Erika’s failure to achieve a stable “feminine” sexual 
identity has been frequently commented upon.2
What has been less commented on in Jelinek scholarship, however, is 
Erika’s training as a pianist as a possible causal factor of her perversions and lack 
of sexual identity.
 
3
                                                 
2 See Mahler-Bungers’ article, where she writes: “Es gelingt ihr [Erika] nicht, eine 
weibliche Identität zu finden” (80) [“Erika is unable to achieve a feminine identity” (my 
translation)]. Others who also make this point are Hedwig Appelt (118-21), Allyson Fiddler 
(Rewriting, 135ff) and Marlies Janz (72ff).  
 Indeed, at first glance, the fact that Erika is a pianist seems to 
be unrelated to her lack of a stable sexual position and her perverse sexuality, 
which manifests itself in various ways, including voyeurism, fetishism, and 
masochism. Discussions of the novel have instead tended to focus on the mother-
3 For an exception, see Appelt (119-20). 
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daughter relationship as the primary determinant of Erika’s perversion and 
unstable sexual position.4
In this chapter, however, I argue that Erika’s training as a pianist, the 
piano’s role as a “symbol of social behavior and social distinction” (Parakilas, 5), 
the history of its central role in the education of girls, and the use of pianos to 
represent female sexuality in literature are all inseparable from Jelinek’s 
 
                                                 
4 See, for example: Critchfield, Fiddler, Rewriting, Janz, Kecht, Klages, Kosta, “Inscribing,” 
and Kosta, “Muttertrauma”). Many of these discussions employ psychoanalytic feminist object 
relations theory (for example, the work of Jessica Benjamin and Nancy Chodorow) as their 
theoretical framework and thus focus on the pre-Oedipal mother-daughter bond and Jelinek’s 
critique of the institution of mother hood. Thus Barbara Kosta concludes that “Jelinek breaks into 
the sacrosanct territory of motherhood and critically exposes its cultural standing” (Kosta, 
“Inscribing,” 231) While I agree with many of the conclusions regarding motherhood that Kosta 
and others employing a feminist object relations framework draw, I find a Freudian/Lacanian 
framework ultimately more convincing as Jelinek’s figures can be viewed as also “exposing the 
fiction of subjectivity upon which a patriarchal social order is founded,” as Richard Allen (50) 
describes Lacan’s project. Conversely, feminist object relations relies on a conception of the 
subject as one possessing a coherent ego, a fiction that Jelinek (like Lacan) rejects. 
For discussions of Die Klavierspielerin from a Freudian/Lacanian perspective, see: Appelt, 
Lücke, Wright, “Aesthetics,” and Wright, Speaking Desires. Also, Mahler-Bungers offers a reading 
of Die Klavierspielerin that views mourning for the lost father as one of the central structuring 
elements of the text, while Jelinek offers an autobiographical psychoanalytic reading in her 
interview with Adolf-Ernst Meyer (Jelinek, Heinrich, and Meyer, 51-52). In addition to 
psychoanalysis, other perspectives used by scholars to read Die Klavierspielerin include film 
theory (Wilke and Maltzan); Marxist (DeMeritt and Young); Deleuzian (Berka, Fiddler, Rewriting, 
and Kosta, “Inscribing”); autobiographical (Barthofer, Critchfield, Meyer, and Swales); and as 
demythification in the Barthian sense (Brunner, Doll, Hanssen, and Janz). Another popular 
approach is the discussion of musical discourse and intertexts (see, for example, Doll, 86-99; Janz, 
and Solibakke). Ma , Riemer , Wigmore (“Sex”), and Wood also discuss the role of music in 
Haneke’s film. For discussions of the role of music in general in Jelinek’s works, see Fuchs and 
Janke, “Elfriede Jelinek und die Musik.” 
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representation of Erika as a perverse subject and her failure to achieve a stable 
sexual position. 
My analysis of the relationship between Erika’s perversion and her piano 
playing thus also makes it possible to read Die Klavierspielerin in generic terms as 
an anti-Künstlerroman. For if Erika’s story is on the one hand the story of the 
“failings of feminine desire,” it is simultaneously the story of her inability to 
sublimate, to use the piano as an “artistic outlet beyond perverted obsessions 
and behaviors” (Sjöholm, 151). In this way, Erika’s story deviates from the 
traditional Künstlerroman by demonstrating the similarities (and differences) 
between the artist and the pervert. 
By addressing the role of the piano and the generic aspects of Die 
Klavierspielerin, this chapter fills an important gap in Jelinek scholarship. To my 
knowledge, the only scholar to discuss the piano’s role in Erika’s development as 
a perverse subject is Hedwig Appelt, and her treatment of the subject is relatively 
short (118-21). Similarly, while many scholars (see footnote 4 in this chapter) 
stress the importance of a Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalytic reading for 
Jelinek’s text, few engage Lacan’s work in a significant way (for exceptions, see 
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Appelt, Lücke, Wright, “Aesthetics,” and Wright, Speaking Desires)5
The Androgynous Piano: Women’s Piano Playing as Feminine and Masculine 
 and none 
discuss the structural similarities between perversion and sublimation. Finally, 
while a few scholars (Bandhauer, Fiddler, Rewriting, Hanssen, and Wigmore, 
“Power”) mention Die Klavierspielerin’s status as an anti-Künstler or –
Bildungsroman, no scholar offers a sustained reading of the text in generic terms. 
My hope for this chapter is that it advances scholarly discussion of Die 
Klavierspielerin by tying together the seemingly disparate threads of the novel. 
Piano historians date the invention of the pianoforte to 1700, with the first 
such instrument built in Italy by Bartolomeo Cristofori. Scholarship on the 
history of the piano generally falls into three areas: the technological 
development of pianos; performance, pedagogy, and repertoire; and the social 
history of the piano.6
                                                 
5 For this reason I have found the scholarship on Michael Haneke’s film adaptation of 
Jelinek’s novel generally more useful than the scholarship on the novel. Scholars whose work has 
been particularly influential in my reading of Die Klavierspielerin are Champagne, Restuccia, 
Wyatt, and Wrye. None of these scholars address the question of sublimation, however, and only 
one briefly discusses Erika’s role as a pianist (see Champagne), while another notes the film’s 
connection to an “ever-expanding cycle of piano films,” that use the piano “as a locus of the 
thwarted, muted, and repressed desires of female pianists” (Ma, 297). 
 In this section, I will focus on social histories of the piano, 
6 For the history of the technological development of the piano, see the following: Cole, 
Dolge, Ehrlich, Good, Harding, Parakilas (especially chapter two), Pollens, Rowland (chapters 1-
3), and J.-P. Williams. 
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in particular the following four elements that that social history emphasizes: 
music as a female accomplishment and its role in the domestic life of the 
bourgeois family; the importance of piano playing in the development of a 
certain type of middle-class femininity; the piano’s role in courtship (focusing 
especially on upward mobility through marriage and female visual display); and 
the “masculine” nature of female concert pianists (e.g., those whose playing took 
place in the public sphere versus the private). Another important topic for the 
social history of the piano and one that this chapter shall only briefly touch on is 
the history of visual and literary representations of the piano and its (female) 
players.7
                                                                                                                                                 
For histories of performance, pedagogy, and repertoire, see: Citron, Dahlhaus, Gramit, 
Czerny, Grover, Letňanová, Reich, “European Composers,” Rowland (chapters 7-12), Todd 
(chapters 2-11), and Weitzmann. Note that this list focuses primarily on the nineteenth-century as 
that is the century during which the piano, became, in Leon Plantinga’s term “the instrument of 
the century” (1, Laura Vorachek also borrows this term for the title of her article on pianos and 
female sexuality). For a feminist perspective on music pedagogy in Germany, see Rieger . 
 
The literature on the social history of the piano and/or music is vast, but some of the 
more important sources are: Burgan, Davis, Ellis, Gramit, Cultivating Music, Green, Hanson, 
Hildebrandt, Hoffmann, Laing, Leppert, Music and Image, Leppert, Sight of Sound, Loesser, 
Parakilas, Post, Ritchie, Sabin, Smith, Solie, and Vorachek. 
7 See, for example: Mary Burgan, whose article on women and music in nineteenth-
century fiction is still considered the standard work on the topic of literary representations ; and 
Parakilas (75-80). Other scholars who investigate literary, visual, and filmic representations of 
female piano players include Laing, who discusses the representation of female musicians in the 
“woman’s film” (chapter 4), Leppert, whose work focuses almost exclusively on visual 
representation (Music and Image; and Sight of Sound), Sabin (chapter 3), and Vorachek . 
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While pianos were still not widespread by the late 1760s, piano historians 
credit the dramatic rise in the popularity of pianos in the years between 1770 and 
1830 to Muzio Clementi and his “Piano Revolution” (Ehrlich, 13-20, and 
Parakilas, 64-109). Clementi, unlike child prodigies such as Mozart, was a 
virtuoso to whom the public could relate as he demonstrated what James 
Parakilas terms “what an ordinary mortal could achieve by hard work” (66). He 
also anticipated the split between public and private piano-playing that would 
become especially important for female players (see below) and significantly 
influenced the expansion of the market for pianos (Parakilas, 66-70). 
One of the earliest histories of the piano was published in 1897 by C. F. 
Weitzmann. This history focused primarily on the public nature of pianos and 
piano-playing, looking at the instrument’s development and different styles of 
piano-playing, primarily focusing on male composers and virtuosi (Beethoven, 
Chopin, Liszt, R. Schumann, etc.; see Weitzmann). Rosamund Harding’s detailed 
history of the piano and its technical development, published in 1933, similarly 
had little to say about the piano’s domestic nature and its social history. These 
piano histories tended, as Cyril Ehrlich notes, “to distort our view of the piano’s 
development . . . In its golden age [the piano] became the centre of domestic 
entertainment, of musical education and achievement and, not least, a coveted 
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possession, symbolic of social emulation and achievement” (9). This limited view 
of the piano’s history began to change, however, with Max Weber’s short work 
“The History of the Piano,” first published in 1921, and in which Weber describes 
the piano’s “musical nature” as that of a “bourgeois domestic instrument” 
(Selections, 382).8
The piano’s “musical nature” was not only class-based, however, but was 
also gendered female. The first piano historian to systematically look at the 
relationship between women and pianos was Arthur Loesser, who notes in his 
Men, Women and Pianos, published in 1954, that “the history of the pianoforte and 
the history of the social status of women can be interpreted in terms of one 
another” (267). Loesser’s work formed the basis for future social histories of the 
piano focusing on what Richard Leppert terms the “multiple and complex” 
connections between women and the piano in the nineteenth century (Sight of 
Sound, 119), connections that feminist scholars in particular have emphasized 
and elaborated. 
 
It was feminine piano playing that led to the piano’s rise in prominence in 
late eighteenth-century musical life, as playing the piano became a necessary 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Weber describes the piano’s “peculiar nature” as a “middle-class home 
instrument” The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, written between 1910-11 and published 
in 1921 (Music, 124). 
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accomplishment for white, middle- and upper-class women in Western Europe. 
Women’s piano playing served a variety of purposes from attracting a husband 
and demonstrating economic status, to functioning as a site onto which the 
desire of middle-class women could be displaced (cf. Vorachek, 27ff; also see 
Solie, chapter three, “ ‘Girling’ at the Parlor Piano,” for a useful overview of the 
various purposes the piano served in women’s lives).9
For the middle-class, learning to play the piano became an essential skill 
for girls, as it was believed to “provide discipline, diversion, and a skill that 
would help her attract a husband” (Vorachek, 26; see also Ritchie, chapter one, 
“Discipline, Pleasure, and Practice,” for more on the role of discipline in piano 
playing). Further, the piano was viewed as an appropriate instrument for women 
(unlike, say, the flute or cello) due to its association with the “motionlessness” 
considered to be the proper position for women’s bodies (Hoffmann, 42-43, and 
Sabin, 31-35). As Arthur Loesser points out: 
 
A girl could finger a . . . pianoforte with her feet demurely 
together, her face arranged into a polite smile . . . and be an 
outward symbol of her family’s ability to pay for her 
education and decorativeness, of its striving for culture and 
the graces of life, of its pride in the fact that she did not have 
to work and that she did not “run after” men (65). 
                                                 
9 For further details, see Hoffmann, Sabin, Parakilas, and Vorachek. 
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Playing the piano was thus a way of signaling a certain type of middle-
class femininity, one that demonstrated the family’s wealth and its daughters’ 
virtuousness. This display could also lead to social mobility as young women’s 
piano-playing skills could be used to improve her status by marrying well 
(Burgan, 56, and 60-61, Parakilas, 178, and Sabin, 43-45). 
The quest for upward mobility through marriage meant that women’s 
accomplishment at music became an important part of courtship, a time during 
which a young woman was “simultaneously and continuously under the 
scrutiny of both suitor and parents” (Parakilas, 79). The piano served a mediating 
function between the worlds of suitor and parents since the “domestic piano, 
although it was one of her means of seduction, was firmly planted in the center 
of her parents’ house or some other home where members of the older 
generation could supervise her seducing” (Parakilas, 79; see also Sabin, Solie, and 
Vorachek). 
In the safety of the salon, young women could flirt without danger while 
playing the piano. One scholar of the history of women and pianos, Stefana 
Sabin, describes the interaction of male suitor and female piano player as the 
“primal situation” of bourgeois heterosexual interaction, one with the ultimate 
goal of finding a husband for the daughter of the family. As she notes: 
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Eine junge Frau am Klavier, den Blick auf den Tasten gesenkt 
. . . daneben stehend ein junger Mann, der sie bewundernd 
anschaute . . . – das war sozusagen die bürgerliche Ursituation 
der Geschlechterinteraktion. Der Salon war ein geschützter 
Ort, in dem die höhere Tochter – und ihre Eltern – sich nach 
einem Ehemann umsehen konnten (43).10
Importantly, it is the piano that is the symbol of both the daughter’s desire for 
courtship and the quest for a husband. 
 
Other scholars stress the importance of Jane Austen’s work for 
representing the role of the piano in courtship (see, for example, Burgan, Salwey, 
and Vorachek; also see Leppert, Music and Image, for a discussion of the 
importance of the representation of female piano players and their male suitors 
in eighteenth-century painting). Yet another piano historian, James Parakilas, 
cites a scene from Jane Austen’s novel Pride and Prejudice as an example of just 
such supervised seduction. During a visit to Lady Catherine’s home, Elizabeth 
plays the piano for Darcy and his relative Colonel Fitzwilliam; as her playing 
progresses, she and Darcy become so engrossed in conversation that Elizabeth 
ceases to play, with the following result: “Here they were interrupted by Lady 
                                                 
10 “A young woman sitting at the piano, with her gaze directed to the keyboard and a 
young man by her side, gazing admiringly at her . . . – that was the primal situation for bourgeois 
sexual interactions. The salon was a protected place, where middle-class daughters – and their 
parents – could search for a husband”(my translation). 
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Catherine, who called out to know what they were talking of. Elizabeth 
immediately began playing again” (Austen, 157). 
Despite (or perhaps because of) such supervision, the piano became, as 
Laura Vorachek notes, “a sexual symbol at almost the same moment it became a 
symbol of middle-class domesticity” (31). What piano playing enabled for 
middle-class women was an acceptable means of visual display in the privacy of 
their homes, as well as a suitable way for their suitors to indulge in voyeurism, 
something that is also made clear in the Austen scene cited above: 
[Darcy] walked away from [Lady Catherine], and moving 
with his usual deliberation towards the piano forte, stationed 
himself so as to command a full view of the fair performer’s 
countenance. Elizabeth saw what he was doing, and at the 
first convenient pause, turned to him with an arch smile 
(Austen, 155). 
That such visual display and voyeurism were intended outcomes of 
women’s domestic11
                                                 
11 The expected outcomes and connotations of visual display for female professional 
pianists differed significantly from those associated with domestic playing, as we shall see below. 
 piano playing has also been commented on by piano 
historians who note changes in piano design over the course of the nineteenth 
century, including pianos decorated with hunting scenes (clearly intended for 
men), as well as the development of the small, upright piano, which enabled the 
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performer to be seen more easily than the tall upright did (see Leppert, Sight of 
Sound, 119-51, and Vorachek, 31). 
There was, however, a contradiction at the heart of the history of 
femininity and piano playing. For if the piano in the nineteenth century was a 
symbol of middle-class femininity, it simultaneously represented gender 
ambiguity through its connection to the public sphere and virtuosi, as many 
scholars have argued. While the majority of amateur pianists were female and 
confined to the private sphere of domesticity, the piano was, as Laura Vorachek 
and other scholars have argued, “also a public instrument during the nineteenth 
century, most notably used by the increasingly popular international concert 
virtuosi” (Vorachek, 29; see also Ellis, Green, Parakilas, and Post). 
While these public virtuosi were (mostly) male,12
                                                 
12 Famous exceptions to the rule of male virtuosi were Marie Pleyel, Sophie Bohrer, and, 
of course, Clara Schumann. For more on both female professional pianists and Clara Schumann, 
see below. 
 changes in pedagogical 
practice over the course of the nineteenth century encouraged young girls 
learning the piano to nonetheless identify with them, as James Parakilas has 
pointed out. Parakilas uses the term “domestic virtuosi” to refer to female 
amateurs for whom the amount of practice time recommended matched that 
undertaken by male pupils preparing for a public career as a pianist. In the late 
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eighteenth century, piano teachers recommended a few hours per week of 
practice time for those learning the piano for pleasure, as opposed to three to 
four hours per day (in addition to a daily one hour lesson) for those preparing to 
be professional pianists. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, this 
distinction all but disappeared (Parakilas, 115), thereby creating gender 
instability by teaching girls to be virtuosi, despite their being simultaneously 
discouraging them from becoming so. 
This discouragement was given by the same people encouraging girls to 
spend long hours practicing, namely piano masters themselves (Parakilas, 119-
22). Parakilas uses Carl Czerny13
                                                 
13 Czerny (1791-1857) was an Austrian piano player and teacher. A child prodigy, he 
studied with Clementi and Beethoven and in turn, he became Lizst’s teacher. He composed over 
1,000 pieces, but is best known for his etudes and drill pieces, which are still used for piano 
teaching. For more on Czerny, see (Gramit, Czerny, and Wehmeyer).  
 as an example of such a piano master, pointing 
out that Czerny, in his Letters to a Young Lady, on the Art of Playing the Pianoforte 
writes: “Many pupils . . . who ought to practise for years studies and easy and 
appropriate pieces, have the presumption to attempt Hummel’s concertos or 
Thalberg’s fantasias!” (Czerny, 48; see also Parakilas, 119-21). As Parakilas goes on 
to state, Czerny’s concern here is to uphold “artificial gender distinctions to 
maintain the power of men in a field that otherwise would have soon been 
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dominated by women” (Parakilas, 121).14
As scholars such as Mary Burgan and Katherine Ellis have made clear, one 
result of the above was that the female pianist was viewed by her (male) critics as 
ambiguously gendered should she gain too much skill (see Burgan, Ellis, Green, 
and Post). Burgan discusses the ways Victorian literature depicts female pianists 
with a high skill level, noting that “those women who are depicted as conscious 
artists tend to be ‘performers’ through and through, seeking an unseemly 
domination over their masculine audiences” (Burgan, 63). Further, female 
concert pianists were evaluated according to notions of what constituted 
“proper” feminine display and skill and were often judged harshly if their 
playing was too “masculine” due to its disruption of gendered mores. As 
Katharine Ellis explains, “a woman pianist performing operatic fantasies and 
 In other words, while it may have been 
in Czerny’s and other piano teachers’ (financial) interest to encourage girls to 
undertake a time-consuming course of lessons and practice, their need to 
maintain male superiority led them to attempt to prevent women and girls from 
becoming too skilled or encroaching on male turf by playing virtuosic pieces. 
                                                 
14 It should be noted here that there were other reasons for encouraging girls to spend 
long hours practicing, one of the most popular being the belief that such practice would result in 
moral discipline. See below in this chapter for more on the role of discipline in women’s piano 
playing. 
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other virtuoso pieces in Paris’s concert halls provided a direct challenge to such 
behavioral codes by making a spectacle of herself . . . any public performance by 
a woman raised questions about her personal conduct” (361). 
As noted above, feminine visual display as part of a courtship ritual was 
an accepted part of domestic piano playing, while the display associated with a 
female professional pianist was viewed more skeptically. As Lucy Green has 
argued, female performers are always “to some extent close to being thrown into 
a world of feminine sexual display,” resulting in an affirmative of the female 
performer’s “discursive position as feminine” (26). In other words, what female 
performers (whether in the domestic or public realms) cannot escape is their 
femaleness. The ways in which that femininity is interpreted vary, however, 
according to whether we are viewing a private or public performance, and 
whether an instrument is involved in the performance. 
Thus Green argues that female singers are received as “affirmative of 
femininity” (28), whereas the presence of an instrument means that women 
instrumental soloists are viewed as interrupting femininity (52ff).15
                                                 
15 Note, however, that Green views women pianists in domestic settings as affirming 
their femininity: “in an early nineteenth-century domestic setting . . . a woman pianist would 
 As she goes 
on to point out: 
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the act of instrumental performance by women threatens a 
disintegration of some of the fundamental characteristics of 
femininity . . . The display she enacts, rather than that of a 
playful or alluring singing bird, is that of a more controlled 
and rational being who appears capable of using technology 
to take control over a situation . . . women’s instrumental 
performance threatens to break out of patriarchal definitions 
and offer a femininity which controls, a femininity which 
alienates itself in an object and impinges on the world (54). 
The result of this interruption of femininity is that the women enacting it are 
viewed as masculine women (see Ellis, 362).16
Excursus: Clara S. 
 
The most famous female professional pianist of the nineteenth century 
was, of course, Clara Schumann. In regard to Jelinek, Clara Schumann is also the 
title character of Jelinek’s play Clara S. First performed in 1982, Clara S. can, in 
many ways, be viewed as an étude for Die Klavierspielerin, treating similar themes 
                                                                                                                                                 
have given rise to display-delineations that were to all intents and purposes just as affirmative as 
those of a woman singer” (52). 
16 Such masculinizing of female musicians was commonplace. For other discussions of 
the phenomenon, see Jennifer Post, who points out that “Until recently, women involved in 
public performance were regarded by others and viewed themselves as unique. Their 
performances were seen as exceptional. In fact, women were sometimes not identified as 
women” (45). Similarly, Heather Laing’s study looks at the treatment of female musicians in 
classic Hollywood film, and she also finds that “The difficulty of characterizing the female 
musician, particularly in the face of her performance, therefore often leads to representations that 
deny the woman as a musician and/or as a ‘woman’ . . . In The Great Lie, renowned concert pianist 
Sandra (Mary Astor) is characterized as monstrously selfish and unfeminine, devoid of humility, 
sympathy and, most heinous of all, the maternal instinct” (107). 
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such as the difficulties faced by women artists, the (over)identification with a 
parent (in Clara’s case, the father; in Erika’s, the mother), the “love triangle” 
(Clara/Schumann/Wieck; Erika/Klemmer/Mother), and the unstable gendering 
caused by success in the “male” profession of professional pianism.17
The gender ambiguity found in portrayals of female professional pianists 
took place not only in contemporary descriptions of Clara Schumann, but is also 
present in the scholarship on her life and work. All biographies of Clara 
Schumann published prior to Nancy Reich’s book Clara Schumann: The Artist and 
the Woman (first edition, 1985) were based on one source: Berthold Litzmann’s 
Clara Schumann: Ein Künstlerleben, which was authorized by the family and 
published between 1902 and 1908 (for details on Litzmann’s book and his 
 In this 
section, I will extend the discussion begun above regarding the ambiguous 
gendering of female professional pianists (including Clara), turning then to 
Jelinek’s portrayal of Clara Schumann in her play, before moving on to a 
discussion of the piano and sexual difference in Die Klavierspielerin. 
                                                 
17 That Jelinek was also drawing on Clara Schumann’s life story when writing Die 
Klavierspielerin seems clear, given the similarities between Wieck’s domination of Clara and 
Mother Kohut’s domination of Erika. Jelinek’s Clara explicitly links the two: “Meine Intensität als 
deutsche Pianist kommt ausschließlich aus einer heftigen anfänglichen Kindheitsdissonanz!” 
(“CS,” 93) [“I owe my intensity as a German pianist to violent dissonance in childhood!” (Clara, 
410)]. 
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sources, see Reich, “Clara Schumann,” Reich, Clara Schumann, and Reich and 
Burton).18
(1) a devoted wife and mother, (2) a “consecrated, loyal 
priestess,” (3) a figure in a great romance with Robert 
Schumann, or (4) a party to a “passionate friendship” with 
Brahms (Reich, “Clara Schumann,” 252). 
 According to Reich, Litzmann’s biography and the subsequent 
scholarship based on it portrayed Clara as 
At the same time, however, as both Jennifer Caines and Reich have 
demonstrated, Clara was viewed by contemporaries as an artist who transcended 
the female roles described by Litzmann. 
In her article on representations of Clara in nineteenth-century concert 
reviews, Caines looks at Eduard Hanslick’s review of Clara’s Viennese concerts 
held in 1856. She points out that Hanslick “unquestionably associates Clara with 
masculinity, rather than femininity,” citing several examples from his review 
(Caines, 40-44). Indeed, Hanslick goes so far as to explicitly compare Clara to 
other male pianists of the time, declaring her superior: “she rather shames the 
brilliant virtuosi of our time, by the masculinity of her playing” (Qtd. in Caines, 
40). In her feminist biography of Clara, Nancy Reich cites Clara’s contemporaries 
to support her claim that Clara may well have been able to transcend her sex in 
                                                 
18 For a “post-Reich” biography of Clara Schumann, see Kühn. 
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some ways: “to male musicians of her own age or older . . . she was a 
professional colleague above gender” (Clara Schumann, 190). She also notes, 
however, that Clara herself often found her roles as artist and woman conflicting, 
writing that “Always accepted by her male colleagues as one of them, Clara 
Schumann nevertheless remained sensitive to prevailing attitudes toward 
women” (Reich, “Clara Schumann,” 275). Robert Schumann also had, according 
to Peter Ostwald, a “highly ambivalent attitude toward her femininity” (26)19
The contrast between Clara Schumann’s status as “honorary man” in her 
public career and woman in her private life is also explored in Reich’s biography. 
Raised and educated like a boy by her father, Friedrich Wieck (Caines, 34-35; see 
also Reich, Clara Schumann, 15 and 21), Clara experienced something of a crisis as 
her marriage to Robert drew near, and Reich notes that Robert began to press her 
to abandon her role of artist for that of wife, as indicated in his letters to her: 
 
I have just read in your letter, “If I stay in Dresden for a year, 
I’ll be forgotten as a musician” – Klärchen, you’re not really 
serious – and if you were forgotten as musician, won’t be 
loved as a wife? . . . you should forget the musician the first 
year of our marriage; you should live for no one but yourself 
and your house and your husband, and just wait and see how 
I make you forget the musician – no, the wife is more 
                                                 
19 As evidence of this ambivalence, Ostwald cites the following quote from one of 
Robert’s letters to Clara: “I often think of you, not as brother [might think] of sister, or as a boy of 
his girlfriend, but as a pilgrim at a distant shrine” (Qtd. in: Ostwald, 26). 
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important than the musician, and my fondest wish will have 
been fulfilled if I can get you to have nothing more to do with 
the public (Schumann, 2: 246, emphasis in original; see also 
Reich, Clara Schumann, 67-69). 
Robert Schumann, it seems, understood that the “feminine” role of wife might 
well require Clara’s sacrifice of her “masculine” public role.20
In her play, Jelinek takes on the gender confusion caused by Clara’s 
multiple roles, when she has her Clara state: 
 It is precisely this 
tension between Clara’s roles as artist and woman, as well as the myth of Clara 
created by Litzmann and other biographers that Jelinek’s play addresses. 
Wenn sich die Fähigkeiten der Frau über die Norm der Zeit 
hinaus entwickeln, dann entsteht eine Monstrosität. Sie ist ein 
Verstoß gegen die Eigentumsrechte dessen, dem sich das 
Weibstier zur Verfügung zu halten hat. Der Geist der Frau 
gehört . . . der Erfindung von Neuspeisen und der 
Abfallentfernung (CS, 118).21
Jelinek’s Clara also points out the roles that her father and Robert played in 
helping to create the “monstrosity” of a female artist: “Mein Vater hat die 
 
                                                 
20 This tension between a woman artist’s artistic ambitions and love or duty is a common 
theme in the Künstlerinroman and one that Jelinek picks up on in both Clara S. and Die 
Klavierspielerin. See Varsamopoulou, Heller, and Huf for more on the Künstlerinroman. 
21 “If a woman’s abilities develop beyond the usual norms, a monstrosity results. It’s an 
offense against a man’s rights of ownership which any female animal has to obey. A woman’s 
mind . . . should be permanently focused on creating new dishes and disposing of human waste” 
(Clara, 425). 
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männliche Vorstellung vom Genie in mich hineingehämmert und mein Gatte hat 
sie mir gleich wieder weggenommen, weil er sie für sich selber gebraucht hat” 
(CS, 82).22 She blames her marriage to Robert for her failure to achieve greatness 
as a composer: “Ich bin im sakralen Raum deiner Genialität geopfert worden, 
Robert! . . . Diese grausige Ehe mit dir! Immer wenn ich zum Klavier und an eine 
Komposition schritt, fand ich den Apparat bereits besetzt: von dir!” (CS, 117).23
Jelinek’s Robert agrees with Clara in finding her status as a “monstrosity” 
offensive, and describes her as incompetent as a composer as well as sexually 
unattractive: 
 
[es] fiel mir plötzlich ein, wie unfähig meine Frau Clara für 
das selbstständige Komponieren mit Tönen immer gewesen 
ist. Für das Magische der Kunst . . . Der einzige Effekt ihrer 
Kompositionsversuche was das sukzessive Absterben ihres 
weiblichen Geschlechtsreizes für mich (CS, 115).24
What these excerpts from Clara S. demonstrate is the way that Jelinek shows us 
through the figures of Clara and Robert how there is a “double standard” 
 
                                                 
22 “My father dinned the male idea of genius into me, but my husband snatched it back 
because he wanted it all for himself” (Clara, 405). 
23 “Sadly, Robert, I was a sacrificial victim of your genius! . . . It was such a nightmare 
being married to you! Every time I went to the piano to compose something, the piano-seat 
would be already occupied—by you!” (Clara, 424). 
24 “. . . it suddenly struck me how incapable my wife Clara has always been of composing 
her own music. Of any artistic magic, in fact . . . The only thing her attempts at composition 
achieved was a gradual weakening of her sexual attractiveness for me” (Clara, 423). 
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applied to women artists, as Caitlin Gannon has noted: “Whereas a man can 
write poetry or compose music and win the affection of a woman through his art, 
a woman attempting the same is viewed as threatening and unfeminine. Her 
production of art negatively affects her attractiveness” (150).25
The Piano and Erika’s Sexual Position in Die Klavierspielerin 
 In this respect, 
Jelinek’s Clara figure foreshadows the dilemma of the female pianist that she 
develops more fully in Die Klavierspielerin, to which I now turn. 
In this section, I look at how Jelinek’s novel works with the traditions of 
both feminine display and the masculine nature of professional pianists, thus 
illustrating the same contradictions at the heart of piano playing that the social 
history of the piano and Clara S demonstrate. 
The format of this section follows the format of the “Androgynous Piano” 
section above. I will thus look at the four elements from the piano’s social history 
outlined in that section (music as a female accomplishment and its role in the 
domestic life of the bourgeois family; the importance of piano playing in the 
development of a certain type of middle-class femininity; the piano’s role in 
courtship; and the “masculine” nature of female concert pianists) as they 
                                                 
25 For other readings of Clara S, see Erdle, Heinemann, Janz (53-62), and Thomas, 
“Subjectivity.” 
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influence Jelinek’s text, concluding with a discussion of Jelinek’s portrayal of a 
pianist lacking a stable sexual position. I also argue that Jelinek’s portrayal of this 
ambivalently gendered history can be related to Lacan’s claim that becoming a 
woman is always precarious and incomplete. 
Jelinek’s text is, obviously, a novel and not a historical text. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that the history of ambiguously gendered pianos and pianists is reflected 
in Jelinek’s history of one piano player, albeit always in an ironic fashion. 
Turning first to the domestic life of the bourgeois family, the reader sees Jelinek’s 
trademark use of irony in her description of the role of art in comforting Erika for 
her domestic life with her mother: 
SIE [wird] in ein paar Minuten unter der heißen Flamme des 
mütterlichen Scheidbrenners zu einem Häufchen Asche 
verbrennen, weil sie spät nach Hause gekommen ist. Dabei 
wird die ganze Kunst SIE nicht trösten können, obwohl der 
Kunst vieles nachgesagt wird, vor allem, daß sie eine 
Trösterin sei. Manchmal schafft sie allerdings das Leid erst 
herbei (KS, 27).26
With this passage, Jelinek turns on its head not only the notion that art offers 
solace (indeed, here it actually causes the suffering), but also the notion that 
 
                                                 
26 “a few minutes from now, SHE will feel the hot flame of her mother’s blowtorch and 
SHE will be burned on to a pile of ashes because SHE is late in getting home. No art can possibly 
comfort HER then, even though art is credited with many things, especially an ability to offer 
solace. Sometimes, of course, art creates the suffering in the first place” (PT, 23). 
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daughters would use art (e.g., their piano-playing) as a means of giving solace to 
the domestic life of the bourgeois family, which was one of the main functions of 
salon music, as musicologist Ruth Solie has noted. She cites an example from a 
nineteenth-century German advice manual: 
Father comes home in a bad temper, having had a hard day in 
the hostile world outside; his daughter opens the piano, 
touches the keys and sings her father his favorite song. Isn’t it 
wonderful to see the sunshine return to his face, and the ugly 
shadows disappear? (Qtd. in Solie, 96). 
Erika, hurrying home to a mother in a bad temper, will neither offer nor receive 
any solace from her piano-playing. 
Looking at the importance of piano playing in the development of a 
certain type of middle-class femininity, we see that Jelinek portrays Erika as 
understanding that piano playing can be used as a means of displaying a certain 
type of femininity: “Um von ihm [the first violinist to whom she is attracted – 
BB] als Frau anerkannt zu werden, um im Notizbuch seines Geistes einen Eintrag 
als weiblich zu erhalten, spielt sie in den Pausen ganz allein solo auf dem 
Klavier, für ihn allein” (KS, 88).27
                                                 
27 “In order to have him recognize her as a woman and register her as ‘female’ in his 
mental notebook, she plays the piano for him alone during breaks” (PT, 84). It is also important to 
note here that this attempt fails, for reasons I shall outline later in this section. 
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This type of femininity is, of course, related to the piano’s role in courtship 
discussed above. Once again, Jelinek’s novel links ironically to the tradition of 
feminine display and male voyeurism described above in the scene depicting 
Walter’s thoughts on Erika’s performance at a private concert: 
[Klemmer] bewundert uneigennützig die Technik Erikas und 
wie sich ihr Rücken rhythmisch mitbewegt. Er betrachtet, wie 
sich ihr Kopf wiegt . . . Er sieht das Muskelspiel ihrer 
Oberarme, was ihn aufgrund des Zusammenpralls von 
Fleisch und Bewegung aufgeregt macht. Das Fleisch gehorcht 
der inneren Bewegung durch Musik, und Klemmer fleht, daß 
seine Lehrerin dereinst ihm gehorchen möge. Er wetzt im Sitz. 
Eine seiner Hände zuckt unwillkürlich an die gräßliche Waffe 
seines Geschlechts (KS, 66-67).28
 
 
Given the domestic setting of the performance and the presence of Erika’s 
mother, we can safely place desire for Erika within the literary and historical 
traditions of domestic piano playing as a “source of visual pleasure for men” 
(Vorachek, 31). With a twist, however; by informing the reader that Klemmer is 
masturbating and wishing for Erika’s eventual obedience while watching her 
play, Jelinek demonstrates for the reader in a less genteel fashion just what Mr. 
Darcy and Walter’s other literary predecessors may really have been thinking in 
                                                 
28 “[Klemmer] unselfishly admires Erika’s technique, he admires the way her back moves 
to the beat, the way her head sways . . . He sees the play of muscles in her upper arm, he is 
excited by the collision of flesh and motion. The flesh obeys an inner motion that has been 
triggered by the music, and Klemmer beseeches his teacher to obey him some day. He 
masturbates in his seat. One of his hands involuntarily twitches on the dreadful weapon of his 
genital” (PT, 62-63). 
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the respectable middle-class salon. In doing so, Jelinek demonstrates once again 
her belief that male-female relations are always marked by a violent 
undercurrent,29 even in the seemingly innocent pursuit of music-making and 
viewing.30
While Jelinek portrays Erika and Klemmer as willing participants in 
courtship rituals centered around the piano, she has Erika’s mother reject one of 
the most important motives that formerly drove parents to have their daughters 
learn piano, namely, the obtaining of a skill that would prove useful in attracting 
a husband. Indeed, the mother prefers to keep Erika single so that she (and not a 
husband) can enjoy the fruits of Erika’s labor (See KS, 8-9, and PT, 4-5) To 
achieve this goal, Erika’s mother uses Erika’s training as a pianist as a means of 
keeping her away from men and of de-sexing Erika’s body: 
 
Die Pubertärin lebt in dem Reservat der Dauerschonzeit. Sie 
wird vor Einflüssen bewahrt und Versuchungen nicht 
ausgesetzt. Die Schonzeit gilt nicht für die Arbeit, nur für das 
Vergnügen. Mutter und Oma, die Frauenbrigade, steht 
                                                 
29 For more on Jelinek’s depiction of male-female relations as always marked by violence, 
see Beard (especially 344-47), and Hanssen (chapter 7). 
30 In this, Jelinek is once again true to the historical record in that connections between 
music and violence were routinely made in the nineteenth-century, if in a more subtle form (on 
this, see Leppert, Sight of Sound, chapter 6, “Sexual Identity, Death, and the Family Piano in the 
Nineteenth Century”). 
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Gewehr bei Fuß, um sie vor den männlichen Jäger, der 
draußen lauert, abzuschirmen (KS, 37).31
 
 
The primary way through which Erika’s mother attempts to keep Erika free from 
male influence is the discipline of piano practicing. The mother also views 
Erika’s practicing as a way to keep her daughter from achieving sexual 
attractiveness: 
Kritik braucht SIE [Erika] nicht zu fürchten, die Hauptsache 
ist, daß etwas erklingt, denn das ist das Zeichen dafür, daß 
das Kind über die Tonleiter in höhere Sphären aufgestiegen 
und der Körper als tote Hülle untengeblieben ist. Die 
abgestreifte Körper der Tochter wird sorgfältig nach den 
Spuren männlicher Benützung abgeklopft und dann 
energisch ausgeschüttelt. Frisch kann sie nach dem Spiel 
wieder übergestreift werden, schön trocken und raschelnd 
steif gestärkt. Fühllos und keinem zum Fühlen preisgegeben 
(KS, 38).32
 
 
Despite her mother’s attempts at keeping her unsexed and away from men, 
however, it is music and piano-playing that brings Erika into contact with male 
                                                 
31 “The adolescent girl lives in a sanctuary, where no one is allowed to bother her. She is 
shielded from influences, and never exposed to temptations. This hands-off policy applies only to 
pleasure, not work. Mother and grandmother, the female brigade, stand guard, rifle in hand, to 
protect Erika against the male hunter lurking outside” (PT, 33). 
32 “SHE [Erika] does not need to fear criticism, so long as something can be heard, for the 
sounds indicate that the child has ascended the scale, to reach loftier spheres, while leaving her 
body down below as a dead frame. The daughter’s physical remains, sloughed off in her ascent, 
are combed for any traces of male use and then thoroughly shaken. After completing the music, 
she can slip back into her mortal coils, which have been nicely dried and starched stiff and crisp. 
Her frame is now unfeeling, and no one has the right to feel it” (PT, 35). 
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musicians and awakens a yearning for sexual experience in her: “Die 
angehenden Männer und derzeitigen Nachwuchsmusiker, mit denen zusammen 
sie kammermusiziert und zwangsorchestriert, erwecken eine ziehende 
Sehnsucht, die immer schon tief in ihr zu lauern schien . . . Ihr Docht strahlt 
heller als tausend Sonnen auf diese ranzige Ratte hinab, die sich ihr Geschlecht 
nennt” (KS, 87-88).33 Here we see that the activity of piano playing leads, for 
Erika, to a desire for sex as opposed to being an experience of sublimated desire 
(for more on sublimation, see below). In this way, Erika’s project differs from her 
mother’s, as she flirts with the idea of attracting a mate: “Sie wartet still, immer 
stiller, daß einer sich für sie entscheidet, und sie wird sich daraufhin sofort 
glücklich für ihn entscheiden” (KS, 89). Ultimately, however, Erika is portrayed 
as being ambivalent regarding her desire for a mate: “Sind Sie noch nicht 
verheiratet, Fräulein Erika, fragt die Milchfrau and fragt auch der Fleischhauer. 
Sie wissen ja, mir gefällt niemals einer, antwortet Erika . . . Sie hat noch ein 
Mütterlein und braucht daher keinen Mann zu frei’n” (KS, 17).34
                                                 
33 “The future men and present music pupils with whom she performs chamber music 
and is forced to play in orchestras arouse an ache in her, a yearning, which has always seemed to 
lurk in her . . . Her wick burns brighter than a thousand suns, focusing on the rancid rat known as 
her genital” (PT, 83). 
 Erika’s 
34 “You still aren’t married, Fräulein Erika? the dairy woman asks, and so does the 
butcher. You know I can never find a man I like, Erika replies . . . She’s still got her mom, she 
don’t need no Tom” (PT, 13). 
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vacillation between these two positions is mirrored by the text’s multiple shifts in 
narrative perspective, and is also, I would argue, connected to the piano’s nature 
as “both masculine and feminine,” (as pianist Kevin Kopelson puts it [98]), as 
well as its potential for blurring sexual difference, to which I now turn. 
As noted above, a contradiction existed at the heart of the history of 
femininity and piano playing thanks to the piano’s dual nature as private 
(feminine) and public (male) instrument. Jelinek’s piano player is one who 
demonstrates this dual nature through her inability to be successful in either role 
– for Erika does not achieve greatness as a concert pianist, nor is she one whose 
feminine display as a performer attracts men, as the novel demonstrates in its 
portrayal of her attempt to attract male attention through her piano-playing 
(cited above; see KS, 88; and PT, 84). This attempt fails since her feminine skills at 
piano-playing cannot make up for her lack of femininity in other matters: “Auf 
dem Klavier ist sie sehr gewandt, doch nur nach ihrer schrecklichen Plumpheit 
im täglichen Gebrauchsleben wird sie von ihm beurteilt. Diese 
Ungeschicklichkeiten, mit denen sie sich nicht in sein Herz trampeln kann” (KS, 
88).35
                                                 
35 “She is very skillful on the keyboard, but he judges her purely by her terrible 
ungainliness in daily practical life—the clumsiness with which she cannot trample into his heart” 
(PT, 84). 
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Erika’s failure to register as “female,” despite her attempted display of 
femininity as a pianist can thus be related both to the history of female pianists 
(and their ambiguous gendering), and also to her failure to achieve a sexual 
position. As discussed earlier in this chapter, many scholars have noted that Die 
Klavierspielerin stages Erika’s failure to achieve a stable “feminine” sexual 
identity. 
Before looking at how that failure is portrayed in Die Klavierspielerin, I 
would first like to give a brief summary of Lacan’s account of the difficulty for 
women in assuming a sexual position. While Lacan, like Freud, sees the Oedipus 
complex as significant in determining a subject’s sexual position, his formulation 
of the Oedipus complex differs from that of Freud. As Dylan Evans points out: 
For Freud, the subject’s sexual position is determined by the 
sex of the parent with whom the subject identifies in the 
Oedipus complex (if the subject identifies with the father, he 
takes up a masculine position; identification with the mother 
entails the assumption of a feminine position). For Lacan, 
however, the Oedipus complex always involves symbolic 
identification with the Father, and hence Oedipal 
identification cannot determine sexual position (Evans, 
Dictionary, 178). 
 
Identification with the father thus causes women to experience the Oedipus 
complex in a way both similar to and different from men, as Lacan noted in 
Seminar 3: 
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For the woman, the realization of her sex is not accomplished 
in the Oedipus complex in a way symmetrical to that of the 
man’s, not by identification with the mother, but on the 
contrary by identification with the paternal object, which 
assigns her an extra detour (S3, 172). 
 
It is precisely that detour that makes “the subject’s sexual identity . . . always a 
rather precarious matter” (Evans, Dictionary, 179) especially for women, since, as 
Lacan puts it: “The metaphysics of the woman’s position is the detour imposed 
upon her subjective realization. Her position is essentially problematic, and up to 
a certain point it’s unassimilable” (S3, 178). For Lacan, a sexual position is 
determined by the relationship a subject has with the phallus,36
That Erika, in Lacanian terms, and like the piano and its players, is also 
ambiguously gendered, is made clear on the first page of the novel, when the 
reader is informed that Erika serves her mother as a replacement for the father: 
“Nach vielen harten Ehejahren erst kam Erika damals auf die Welt. Sofort gab 
der Vater den Stab an seine Tochter weiter und trat ab. Erika trat auf, der Vater 
 a relationship 
that can best be summed up as “having” (masculine) or “being” (feminine) (see 
Evans, Dictionary, 178, Grosz, especially chapter 3, and Levy-Stokes, “Phallus”). 
                                                 
36 It is important here to note that the phallus is not the same as the penis. Indeed, “the 
possession of a penis does not guarantee possession of the phallus. A biological male may be 
completely identified with not having the phallus” (Levy-Stokes, “Phallus,” 138) 
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ab” (KS, 7).37 By replacing the father, Erika fulfills two roles for her mother, that 
of child and husband. In other words, she both is the phallus for the mother (as 
child) and has the phallus (as father replacement). One way in which Erika 
attempts to replace the missing phallus of the father for her mother is through 
her piano playing: “So situiert sie sich mit Hilfe des Klaviers . . . als Künstlerin 
der Phallus zu sein, den die Mutter begehrt.” (Appelt, 119-20).38
It is important that one of the ways that Erika attempts to have the phallus 
is through her piano playing, as the piano also functions in history and Jelinek’s 
text as a signifier of sexual difference, but one that is as unstable as women’s 
difficult journey through the Oedipus complex with its detours. In structural 
terms, I would argue that the piano functions in a manner similar to phallus in 
that it is the player’s relation to the piano that determines her or his sexual 
position. In other words, the masculine position of concert pianist could be seen 
as a subject who possesses the phallus, while the feminine display associated 
with amateur piano-playing relates to being the phallus. That Erika cannot be 
 
                                                 
37 “The baby was born after long and difficult years of marriage. Her father promptly left, 
passing the torch to his daughter. Erika entered, her father exited” (PT, 3). 
38 As artist, she positions herself, with the help of the piano, as the phallus that the 
mother desires” (my translation). 
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firmly fixed as a masculine or feminine player can thus also be related to her 
dual position as having and being the phallus for her mother. 
Sublimation and Perversion: Die Klavierspielerin as Anti-Künstlerroman 
Erika’s lack of a sexual position is therefore very much overdetermined, as 
simultaneously cultural and individual: it can be linked both to the history of the 
piano and female piano players, and to her relationships with her mother and 
her missing father. As Erika’s failure to achieve a sexual position is most clearly 
demonstrated through her perversions, the following will discuss perversion as a 
structure, the portrayal of Erika’s development as a perverse subject, and the 
ways in which Die Klavierspielerin, through its portrayal of perversion instead of 
sublimation, can be read as an anti-Künstlerroman. 
Erika’s lack of a sexual position is related to perversion as both are formed 
during the Oedipus complex, as Julia Kristeva has noted (158). The perverse 
subject fails to acknowledge the mother’s castration as part of going through the 
Oedipus complex and is instead characterized by disavowal, or the refusal to 
give up one’s mother and the pleasure one receives as the object of her desire 
(Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 170; see also Gurewich). Thus, Erika’s perversion, 
especially in regard to her relationship with Klemmer, can be understood as an 
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attempt to break free from her mother and to cease being a stand-in for the 
father.39
At the same time, however, perversion ends up only reinforcing those 
unfree “bonds of love” it seeks to escape because inability to give up the mother 
means that the pervert’s subject position is actually that of object. As Lacan puts 
it: “the whole problem of the perversions consists in conceiving how the child, in 
his relation to the mother . . . identifies himself with the imaginary object of [the 
mother’s] desire in so far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus” (E, 
197-98). What that means is that the pervert (in this case, Erika) “plays the role of 
object: the object that fills the void in the mOther” (Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 
175). 
 
Additionally, perversion is characterized by disavowal (denial of the 
mother’s castration) and is also related to “the father’s desire, the father’s name, 
and the father’s law” (Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 170). As Fink goes on to note: 
From a Lacanian perspective, the apparent contradiction 
inherent in disavowal can . . . be described as follows: “I know 
full well that my father hasn’t forced me to give up my 
mother and the jouissance I take in her presence . . . hasn’t 
exacted the ‘pound of flesh,’ but I’m going to stage such an 
exaction or forcing with someone who stands in for him; I’ll 
                                                 
39 For discussions of how this failure to break free from the mother is portrayed in 
Haneke’s film version of Die Klavierspielerin, see Champagne, and Wyatt. 
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make that person pronounce the law” (A Clinical Introduction, 
170). 
 
Perversion, then, is not to be understood as a “form of sexual aberration,” but 
rather as a “specific mode of desiring and making sense of the world” 
(Gurewich, 192). 
Both of these characteristics of perverse subjects (the attempt to break free 
of the mother and to find a substitute for the father) are present in Die 
Klavierspielerin. In the first case, Jelinek portrays Erika’s mother as understanding 
Erika’s relationship with Klemmer as an attempt to get away from her: 
Die Mutter hat einen kurzen Verdacht, daß Herr Klemmer 
vom längst vergangenen Hausmusikabend versucht, sich 
zwischen Mutter und Kind zu zwängen. Dieser junge Mann 
ist recht nett, doch er ersetzt keine Mutter (KS, 157).40
In regard to the father, Erika’s relationship with Klemmer can also be understood 
as her search for someone to pronounce the father’s law, or as the narrator puts it 
in describing the scene in which Erika gives Klemmer a letter outlining the 
masochistic contract she would like to enter into with him: “Erika Kohut 
 
                                                 
40 “Mother briefly suspects that Herr Klemmer, from that long-past home recital, is 
forcing his way between mother and child. That young man is very nice, but he can’t replace a 
mother” (PT, 155). 
 169 
 
versteigt sich dahin, daß sie ein Versäumnis begehen wird, wofür sie sofort 
bestraft zu werden wünscht” (KS, 225).41
Finally, I would like now to relate perversion to sublimation in order to 
discuss Die Klavierspielerin in generic terms as an anti-Künstlerroman. For Erika, as 
a perverse subject, proves unable to (consistently) sublimate or to express herself 
through her art, despite its being, as pianist Kevin Kopelson notes, an 
“ideological given” that “pianists express themselves” (10) when they play. This 
leads him to claim that “by playing Beethoven, Romantic Beethoven, I sense 
myself—my authentic, essential self . . Or, rather, we both sense my authentic, 
essential, sexual self” (11, emphasis in original). Erika also subscribes to this 
“ideological given,” explaining to her students: “die Koreaner sollen fühlen, 
nicht eine Schallplatte von Alfred Brendel stumpf imitieren” (KS, 116).
 
42
                                                 
41 “Erika is presumptuous: She wants to be naughty so she can be punished on the spot” 
(PT, 221-22). 
 Jelinek, 
however, in her deliberate ironizing of this Romantic ideal, depicts Erika as 
unable to display an “authentic” self through her playing: “Sie hat Kenntnis von 
der Sonatenform und dem Fugenbau. Sie ist Lehrerin in diesem Fach. Und doch: 
ihre Pfoten zucken dem letzten, endgültigen Gehorsam sehnsüchtig entgegen” 
42 “The Koreans should feel, they should not stolidly imitate a recording by Alfred 
Brendel” (PT, 114). 
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(KS, 106).43
What we also see in this passage is that Erika’s perversions can be related 
to her music-making via sublimation. According to Lacan, the pleasure achieved 
by the pervert (through her or his perversions) and the artist (through 
sublimation) are closely related, as Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out: 
 In other words, what Jelinek shows Erika expressing through her 
piano playing is not her “essential, sexual self” but a longing for obedience, 
which can also be understood as perversion (i.e., masochism). 
There is a question in psychoanalysis as to the connection 
between sublimation and perversion . . . The point is . . . to see 
that [perversion and sublimation] stem from the same 
question: satisfaction from activities other than fucking (312). 
To put it in other terms: both the artist and the pervert desire in a similar fashion, 
insofar as both wish to go “beyond” the pleasure principle. Die Klavierspielerin 
constantly unmasks this linkage between music and sexuality as the dirty secret 
of German Culture, as the following discussion demonstrates.44
                                                 
43 “She knows about the form of the sonata and the structure of the fugue. That’s her job, 
she’s a teacher. And yet, her paws ardently grope toward ultimate obedience” (PT, 102). 
 
44 This can, of course, also be related to Freud’s argument in Civilization and its Discontents 
that “An dieser Stelle mußte uns die Ähnlichkeit des Kulturprozesses mit der Libidoentwicklung 
des Einzelnen zuerst aufdrängen” (GW, 14: 457) [“we cannot fail to be struck by the similarity 
between the process of civilization and the libidinal development of the individual” (SE, 21: 91)]. 
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It is precisely perversion’s similarity to sublimation that allows us to read 
Die Klavierspielerin’s status as an anti-Künstlerroman. The Künstlerroman has, of 
course, a long and distinguished history in both German literature and 
modernism. As scholar Evy Varsamopoulou points out, beginning with Ludwig 
Tieck’s Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen (1798), German authors have used the 
genre of the Künstlerroman to offer a “narrative account of the formation, 
development, psychology of an artist, as a special type of individual” (xi). 
Jelinek’s portrayal of Erika as an artist is then not new, but what is new in Jelinek 
is a female subject who is unable to sublimate, but instead remains simply and 
unredeemably perverse. I should now like to offer a brief outline of the 
Künstlerroman’s generic conventions before turning to a discussion of the ways in 
which Die Klavierspielerin both conforms to and disrupts these conventions. 
To do so, I have drawn on the scholarship on the Künstlerroman to compile 
a list of four thematic similarities shared by Künstlerrommane. Despite the fact 
that there is a fairly large body of work on Künstlerromane, I have chosen to focus 
on the work of only a few scholars for this list due to the fact that most studies 
tend to focus on individual works (accepting the genre as something already 
given) as opposed to setting out definitions of generic conventions. One of the 
few works to attempt to define the Künstlerroman is Maurice Beebe’s Ivory Towers 
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and Sacred Founts, which, despite its age (it was published in 1964)45
Looking at their work, one can thus conclude that four of the most 
important thematic traits that make a text a Künstlerroman in generic terms are: 1) 
the artist protagonist; 2) depiction of the artist as a genius or “special” individual; 
3) a geographical or metaphorical voyage made by the artist “in search of new 
experiences or situations” (Seret, 4), experiences and situations that he
 remains one 
of the definitive scholarly works on the Künstlerroman. 
46 will then 
use to create art; and 4) portrayal of what Maurice Beebe terms the conflict 
between “sexual love and artistic creation” (Beebe, 97), which, I argue below, is 
resolved by the artist’s learning how to sublimate.47
Turning first to characteristics one and two, while having an artist as 
protagonist is obviously a requirement needed to classify a text as a 
Künstlerroman, it is also important that it not just be any artist. The artist 
 
                                                 
45 One reason that Beebe’s work is still a relevant source may well be the fact that, as 
Varsamopoulou points out, “the Künstler(in)roman is not a fashionable critical object” (xvii). In 
addition to Beebe’s work, I also used Varsamopoulou’s, Roberta Seret’s, and P.M. Pasinetti’s 
books to formulate the list of conventions discussed in this chapter. 
46 I use the pronoun “he” here quite deliberately as the majority of Künstlerromane have 
male protagonists. See note 19 for references to scholars who discuss the Künstlerinroman. 
47 For more on the elements (thematic and formal) that comprise Künstlerromane, see 
Beebe, Seret, Varsamopoulou, and Pasinetti). 
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protagonist of the Künstlerroman, and indeed the genre itself, both have their 
roots in the German Romantic movement.  
While it is possible to view the Künstlerroman as a subgenre of the 
Bildungsroman, the Romantic Künstlerroman differentiated itself from the 
Bildungsroman by “[rejecting] the priorities and principles informing the 
Bildungsroman” (Varsamopoulou, x) in favor of a text that featured an artist (or 
aspiring artist) as the central character, an artist who conformed to the Romantic 
notion of “the artist [as] a human being inhabited by a special power or genius 
that singles him out and estranges him from others” (Pasinetti, 4), as well the 
view of the artist “as a genius endowed with the talents to originate beauty and 
reveal truth (Seret, 3). 
Jelinek’s novel conforms to one of these characteristics insofar as Erika, as 
a pianist, can be viewed as a type of artist. Where Die Klavierspielerin departs 
from the Künstlerroman’s generic conventions, however, is in its relationship to 
the view of the artist as genius or special. Indeed, she pokes ironic fun at such a 
notion in passages such as the following: 
Erikas Beruf ist gleich Erikas Liebhaberei: die Himmelsmacht 
Musik. 
Sie blicken die Schülerin an und denken, die Musik habe ihr 
Gemüt schon früh erhoben, dabei erhebt es ihr nur die Faust. 
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Für Erika wählt die Mutter früh einen in irgendeiner Form 
künstlerischen Beruf, damit sich aus der mühevoll errungen 
Feinheit Geld herauspressen läßt, während die 
Durchschnittsmenschen bewundernd um die Künstlerin 
herumstehen, applaudieren(KS, 10, 20, 26).48
What we see here is that while the narrator early on informs us that Erika’s love 
is music, thus leading the reader to believe that the novel may go on to be a 
portrait of the artist as a female genius, the reader instead soon learns that Erika’s 
status as an artist has not come about due to an irrepressible desire to create or to 
be a genius, but rather because her mother chose an artistic career for her in 
order to make money and to separate Erika from the masses. This is certainly a 
far cry from Stephen Dedalus’s desire to “discover the mode of life or of art 
whereby [his] spirit could express itself in unfettered freedom” (Joyce, 267). As 
Andrea Bandhauer has noted: 
 
Erika’s artistic existence does by no means reflect the cliché of 
the artist’s freedom and the bourgeois myth of the “artist as 
genius” . . . Rather, it is a tortured existence based on force 
and disciplinary measures generated by a mother motivated 
by petty-bourgeois materialistic ambitions (5). 
                                                 
48 “Erika’s vocation is her avocation: the celestial power know as music” / “They look at 
the music student and imagine that music has raised her spirits; but the only thing that’s raised is 
her fist” / “Mother chose a career for Erika when her daughter was still young. It had to be an 
artistic profession, so she could squeeze money out of the arduously achieved perfection, while 
average types would stand around the artist, admiring her, applauding her” (PT, 6, 16, 24). 
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The motivation behind Erika’s career choice brings us to the third generic 
characteristic listed above (the artist’s search for new experiences or situations 
that he can use to create art). To return to the comparison with Joyce’s Portrait, 
while Stephen will use the “reality of experience” to “forge in the smithy of [his] 
the uncreated conscience of [his] race” (Joyce, 275-76), Erika’s experiences are 
used in large part to satisfy her mother’s ambition: 
Eine weltbekannte Pianistin, das wäre Mutters Ideal . . . An 
keiner Stufe, die Erika erreicht, ist es ihr gestattet auszuruhen, 
sie darf sich nicht schnaufend auf ihren Eispickel stützen, 
denn es geht sofort weiter. Zur nächsten Stufe . . . Am Gipfel 
herrscht Weltberühmtheit . . . Solange die Mutter noch lebt 
und Erikas Zukunkft webt, kommt für das Kind nur eins in 
Frage: die absolute Weltspitze (KS, 28).49
Unfortunately for Frau Kohut, Erika is destined to fail as an artist: “Dann versagt 
Erika einmal bei einem wichtigen Abschlußkonzert der Musikakademie völlig . . 
. Was bleibt ihr anders übrig, als in das Lehrfach überzuwechseln. Ein harter 
Schritt für den Meisterpianisten” (KS, 30-31).
 
50
                                                 
49 “A world-famous pianist – that is Mother’s ideal . . . Erika is never allowed to rest at 
any level she reaches, never allowed to catch her breath and lean on her icepick . . . The peak 
offers international fame, which is never reached by most climbers . . . So long as Mother lives 
and continues planning Erika’s future, there is only one possibility for the child: the top of the 
world” (PT, 24). 
 Erika’s failure at art is also 
50 “Then, one day, at an important concert at the Academy of Music, Erika fails totally . . . 
What else can she do but become a teacher? A difficult step for a master pianist” (PT, 26-27). 
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reflected in her failure at developing and experiencing as a human being, as 
Carlotta van Maltzan has noted: 
At the end of the novel, all the events described turn out to 
have been non-events for Erika in the sense that they have 
had no effect on her. The fact that her life situation remains 
the same is highlighted by the connection of the first and last 
sentences of the novel51
If Die Klavierspielerin were truly a Künstlerroman, as opposed to an anti-
Künstlerroman, the events of the novel would instead add up to experiences that 
result in “a journey of the mind and soul, a movement away from the 
materialistic toward the abstract.” (Seret, 2). 
 . . . In its constant repetition her 
life/story remains the same (101). 
Furthermore, Erika’s non-experience brings us to the fourth generic trait 
outlined above, namely that of the conflict between “sexual love and artistic 
creation” (Beebe, 97), which I see as being at least partially resolved by the 
artist’s learning how to sublimate (here it is important to bear in mind that 
genital sexuality can also be viewed as a form of sublimation, as noted above). In 
this respect, it is significant that not only is Erika doing the same thing at the end 
                                                 
51 Both of these sentences describe Erika as on her way to her mother: “Die 
Klavierlehrerin Erika Kohut stürtzt wie ein Wirbelsturm in die Wohnung, die sie mit ihrer Mutter 
teilt” / “Erika weiß die Richtung, in die sie gehen muß. Sie geht nach Hause. Sie geht und 
beschleunigt langsam ihren Schritt (KS, 7 and 285). [“The piano teacher, Erika Kohut, bursts like a 
whirlwind into the apartment she shares with her mother” / “Erika knows the direction she has 
to take. She heads home, gradually quickening her step” (PT, 3 and 280).] 
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of the novel as at the beginning, but that that same thing is going home to mom. 
For if Erika fails to sublimate (as I argue below that she does), it is her failure to 
separate from her mother that prevents her from achieving sublimation. 
And giving up mom and learning how to sublimate are, I would argue, 
the primary tasks that male artist-protagonists of Künstlerromane have to achieve 
in order to become artists.52
In the artist-novels [of] the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the artist is often forced to choose between woman 
and vocation, and only rarely does he achieve fulfillment as 
both artist and lover . . . most portraits of the artist assume 
that sexual love and artistic creation are in conflict (97). 
 As Maurice Beebe notes in his study of 
Künstlerromane: 
Thus, at the end of Portrait of the Artist of a Young Man, Stephen takes leave not 
only of Ireland, but of his mother and the young woman whose sexual 
attractiveness had inspired his writing of a villanelle, separating both from 
sexual activity and desire for the mother. The reader is left to assume that the 
energy that Stephen would otherwise have used in those relationships will 
instead go towards the creation of art.53
                                                 
52 Obviously this is also true of all male subjects. My point here simply is that the 
Künstlerroman thematizes this more directly than some other genres. 
 
53 This redirection corresponds to Freud’s definition of sublimation: “Die Sublimierung 
ist ein Prozeß an der Objektlibido und besteht darin, daß sich der Trieb auf ein anderes, von der 
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This is not to argue that all artists sublimate all of their sexual desire all 
the time (and indeed many artists, including Joyce, did and do enjoy active 
sexual lives). As interpreters of Freud and Lacan have noted, Freud himself 
never “presented sublimation as equivalent to sexual abstinence . . . Sublimation 
simply gives another aim to the drive, another satisfaction” (Kaltenbeck, 105). 
Jean LaPlanche also notes that “sometimes, indeed, sublimation does work in 
opposition to sexuality, but sometimes, on the contrary, the two complement 
each other, work together” (24). 
Jelinek makes reference to the popular understanding of sublimation as 
equivalent to sexual abstinence in Die Klavierspielerin, when she has Erika’s 
mother express her belief that the artist must give up sex in order to achieve 
artistic greatness: 
Lieber den Gipfel der Kunst als die Niederungen des 
Geschlechts. Dieses Geschlecht hat der Künstler dagegen 
landläufiger Meinung von seiner Zügellosigkeit zu vergessen, 
glaubt die Mutter . . . Leider wimmeln die 
Künstlerbiographien, welche überhaupt das Wichtigste an 
                                                                                                                                                 
sexuellen Befriedigung entferntes Ziel wirft” (GW, 10: 161) [“Sublimation is a process that 
concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct’s directing itself towards an aim other than, and 
remote from, that of sexual satisfaction” (SE, 14: 94)]. 
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den Künstlern sind, all zuoft von geschlechtlichen Lüsten und 
Listen ihrer Protagonisten (KS, 199-200).54
Jelinek’s tongue-in-cheek reference to “Künstlerbiographien” serves to remind 
the reader of Klavierspielerin that while this novel can be read as an artist’s 
biography, it is one that also foregrounds the sexual exploits of its artist, but in a 
way that differs from the usual Künstlerroman. 
 
55
For example: while watching a porn film, Erika mentally compares the 
work of the actors to the work of musicians: “Erika ist darauf geeicht, Menschen 
zuzusehen, die sich hart bemühen, weil sie ein Ergebnis wünschen. In dieser 
Hinsicht ist der sonst große Unterschied zwischen Musik und Lust eher 
geringfügig” (KS, 110).
 
56
                                                 
54 “Better the peak of art than the slough of sex. Contrary to the popular notion of his 
wantonness, the artist, Mother believes, must forget about sex . . . Unfortunately, biographies of 
artists, which are the most important things about artists, teem all too often with the sexual ruses 
and abuses of their protagonists” (PT, 197). 
 Here Jelinek makes for the reader a connection between 
music and sex as both performance, almost sport. Similarly, Erika feels sexual 
55 Here we need to remember that sublimation can also be related to “normal” 
heterosexual genital sexuality as Tim Dean has noted: “if we take satisfaction of the drive without 
repression as our definition of sublimation . . . . then we’re led to the counterintuitive conclusion 
that heterosexual copulation itself constitutes a kind of sublimation” (Beyond Sexuality, 276, 
emphasis in original). In this respect, Erika’s failure to achieve “normal” sexual relations with 
Klemmer can also be seen as a failure to sublimate. 
56 “Erika is geared to watching people who work hard because they want results. In this 
respect, the normally large difference between music and sexual pleasure is quite tiny” (PT, 106). 
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pleasure when talking about music to one of her students: “Erika erhebt . . . 
Bachs Werk in Sternenhöhe . . . Erika spürt das Prickeln zwischen den Beinen, 
das nur der von Kunst und für Kunst Ausgewählte fühlt, wenn er über Kunst 
spricht” (KS, 104).57
There is, however, one important difference between perversion and 
sublimation and that is, that while the pervert retains a subject position as object 
(of the mother’s desire), the artist is able to maintain an active position as a 
desiring subject (on this, see Lacan, S7, 112). Since Erika does not achieve a 
subject position, but remains instead the object of her mother’s desire, she is 
unable to sublimate through art, which would require her to take that active 
position.
 
58
To conclude, I would like to return to the discussion of Julia Kristeva’s 
work that appears in the introduction to this dissertation. For if Kristeva is 
correct in arguing that sublimation creates a subject “who lacks nothing, in fact, 
except that he lacks a lack,” (161), and if Jean Wyatt is correct in her contention 
 
                                                 
57 “Erika praises Bach’s work to the skies . . . Erika feel the tingling between her legs, 
something felt only by those chosen by and for art when they talk about art” (PT, 101). 
58 Thus Renate Schneider has written of Die Klavierspielerin: “Der gesamte Text ist ein 
Hohn auf die These der Sublimierung des Eros durch die Kunst” (363) [“The whole text is a 
mockery of the thesis of the sublimation of Eros through art” (my translation)]. 
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that Erika is a subject (child) who “need never confront lack, either in the mother 
or in herself” (460), then we can see how music and perverse sexuality are 
intertwined for Erika—her failure to become a concert pianist is simultaneously a 
failure to achieve sublimation, a failure which manifests itself in perversion as a 
means of obtaining the jouissance denied to her by art. What Jelinek demonstrates 
with her perverse piano teacher, then, is not just the similarity between the 
pervert and the artist, but she also offers us an anti-Künstlerroman that stretches 
generic boundaries through its portrait of the artist as pervert rather than genius. 
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CONCLUSION 
During the 2002 fall semester, I taught an honors seminar, titled “Love, 
Sex & Domesticity in Women’s Writing,” for first-year students in the College of 
Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University. One of the texts we read over the course 
of the semester was Die Liebhaberinnen. My students had a mixed reaction to 
Jelinek’s novel, with one of them explaining that while she found it an interesting 
and funny, she was dismayed that Jelinek’s novel had “ruined” her future 
reading of romance novels due to the way Die Liebhaberinnen laid bare for her the 
manner in which romance novels function. 
In other words, my students recognized that, as noted in the introduction, 
genres are indeed “social contracts between a writer and a specific public, whose 
function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact” (Jameson, 
The Political Unconscious, 106). They also realized that Jelinek’s reworking of 
genres results in what Anne Cranny-Francis views as a “fundamental 
intervention in the relationship between reader and text, a disruption of the 
reader’s conventionalized understanding of the contract, the literary institution 
of a particular genre” (18). 
This disruption of genres is one of Jelinek’s most significant literary 
contributions and one of the reasons I chose to focus on sustained readings of 
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these three Jelinek texts in generic terms in this dissertation. As I argued in the 
introduction, it is through Jelinek’s use of generic forms where we can locate the 
politics of the texts examined in this dissertation. For if genres are political and 
ideological as many have argued,1 then the rewriting of generic forms is also 
political. In Jelinek’s case, however, the politics of rewriting do not necessarily 
conform to an expected Marxist or feminist form. For that reason, one can argue 
that these works function to create a “negative aesthetics,” as opposed to a 
positive reworking of generic forms. It is this lack of positivity that explains the 
often fraught reception of Jelinek’s work by both Marxists and feminists,2
In regard to Bachmann, Sara Lennox has argued that: 
 and is 
also where Jelinek’s affinities to figures such as Ingeborg Bachmann and Theodor 
Adorno can be seen. 
Bachmann’s analysis of her period and of the situation of 
women within it is enabled by her profound appropriation of 
a Frankfurt School analysis, whose leading theorist, Theodor 
W. Adorno, declared: “There’s no right way to live when the 
world is wrong” (Cemetery, 15).3
 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jameson, The Political Unconscious, Cranny-Francis, and Beebee. 
2 For more on Jelinek’s reception by Marxists and feminists, see DeMeritt, Fiddler, 
Rewriting (Chapter 1, “Jelinek in Context”), Haines and Littler, and Mayer and Koberg. 
3 “Es gibt kein richiges Leben im falschen” (Adorno, GS, 4: 42, Lennox’s translation). 
 184 
 
Similarly, Jelinek’s analysis of Austria and gender relations conforms both to 
Adorno’s aphorism cited above, as well as his view that “[das Kunstwerk] 
kritisiert . . . die Realität. Es ist deren negative Erkenntnis” (GS, 11: 261).4 
Through her use of what Allyson Fiddler has termed a “super-reality” (Rewriting, 
31), Jelinek creates texts that, due to their affinity with Adorno’s idea of a 
negative aesthetic, reject earlier feminist theories of aesthetics. Rita Felski defines 
those earlier theories as fostering “literature as a form of self-expression, 
identification between reader and author” (30). As I have demonstrated in this 
dissertation, Jelinek rejects this identificatory mode of writing and refuses to 
create “positive” subjects, preferring instead, through her generic perversions, to 
produce art that is a “Kritik von Praxis als der Herrschaft brutaler 
Selbsterhaltung inmitten des Bestehenden” (Adorno, GS, 7: 26).5
                                                 
4 ‘Art is the negative knowledge of the actual world” (Adorno, “Reconciliation,” 160). 
 
5 “critique of praxis as the rule of brutal self-preservation at the heart of the status quo” 
(Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 12). 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Works by Sigmund Freud 
GW Gesammelte Werke 
SE The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 
Works by Elfriede Jelinek 
A  Die Ausgesperrten 
Clara Clara S. A Musical Tragedy 
CS Clara S. musikalische Tragödie 
KS  Die Klavierspielerin 
LH  Die Liebhaberinnen 
L  Lust (German) 
Lust  Lust (English) 
PT  The Piano Teacher 
women  women as lovers 
Wonderful Wonderful, Wonderful Times 
Works by Jacques Lacan 
E Écrits. A Selection 
S1 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954 
 186 
 
S2 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
Techniques of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955 
S3 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book III: The Psychoses 1955-1956 
S7 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960 
S11 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 
S20 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX: Encore. On Feminine Sexuality: The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge 
Works by Karl Marx 
C Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 
EW Early Writings 
GR Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft) 
Full details on the editions used can be found in the Works Cited. 
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